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When God created the world, he 
paired all things. ‘I shall go to 
Syria’ said Answer. ‘That is also 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Syria has increasingly become a topic in international news media following the Bush 
administration’s War on Terror and the rising levels of conflict in the region. From being a 
country few people knew anything about, Syria has now gained the dubious honour of 
membership in the Axis of Evil – taking the place of Iraq – as a sponsor of terrorism and 
regional troublemaker. At the same time, much is written about internal Syrian politics and 
claims are made about the inherent instability of the country and the threat it faces from 
sectarian conflict and civil war, similar to what has occurred in Lebanon and Iraq. Kaplan 
(20.03.2005), for example, wrote two years ago that 
rather than Iraq, it could be Syria that ends up collapsing…Syria is but a Levantine 
version of the former Yugoslavia--without the intellectual class which that other post-
Ottoman state could claim at the time of its break-up (since Hafez al-Assad's rule was 
so much more stultifying than Tito's). In Syria, as in the former Yugoslavia, each sect 
and religion has a specific geography…As President Bush humiliates Assad's son-
and-successor into weakness, will Syria become a larger version of Civil War-era 
Lebanon? 
These predictions have piqued my interest in the internal and sectarian politics of Syria and its 
future, especially due to what is written about the Alawi minority to which the president and 
many of those in power belong.  
In addition, the increasing power of the Shi’as of the Middle East raises the need for 
insight into the Alawi sect because they in many instances are grouped together with the 
Shi’as of other countries in order to explain political developments. Religious simplification 
makes the inclusion of Syria into the so-called Shi’a Axis of power – stretching from Iran in 
the east, through Iraq and Syria, to the Shi’as of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the west – so much 
easier. Being officially Shi’as, the Alawis are then understood largely on the basis of the 
understanding of Shi’as elsewhere and portrayed as motivated mainly by religion. In his 
newest book on the Middle East, the well-known Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk 
(2006: 1013) falls into both of these traps of over-simplification: 
Alawite power explains many things. It explains why Iran – the very vanguard of 
Shiite Muslim revolution – should have become so close an ally of [Syria]…It 
explains why the Hizballah…should be so enamoured of the regime in Damascus. 
Though the Baath [Party] is secular, the women of Qardaha [the home of the 
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president’s family in the Alawi heartland] cover their faces even more assiduously 
than the women of Tehran.  
 
I first learned about the Alawis while travelling in Syria in 2002 and 2004. Although I knew 
that they were somehow different from other Muslims in Syria, I knew little else about them. 
However, while visiting the mountains and the Mediterranean coast, the areas where most 
Alawis live, I realised that these regions were different from the rest of Syria and appeared to 
be more relaxed and liberal, quite contrary to the impression one is left with from the 
statement of Robert Fisk (2006) above. When I looked the Alawis up online, there seemed to 
be a lot of information about them, but this would prove to be only a half-truth. The more I 
looked the more I realised that what is available on the net is just copied and re-copied from 
other sources and very little seems to be based on first-hand information. The lack of 
information is apparent in the multiple use of a quote of an Alawi woman who speaks about 
how Alawis are considered Muslims by a majority of Muslim Syrians (originally from Landis 
2003). This has been copied widely across the net as proof of one thing or another. 
Moreover, with a few noteworthy exceptions, there seems to be a lack of primary and 
recent research in the academic literature. What is written about them is mostly based on 
historical sources, sometimes going back centuries. Many of these are Orientalist and 
prejudiced accounts from European ‘explorers’, but these are still used by some scholars to 
legitimise their judgement on the ‘nature’ of the Alawis, as if, even if it was true at one time, 
it should be the same today. Daniel Pipes (1990: 161), for example, concludes in his chapter 
on them: ‘Ignaz Goldziher [published in 1910] put it succinctly: “This religion is Islam only 
in appearance.” It is important to make this point very clear: Alawis have never been Muslims 
and are not now.’ His reasons for making such claims, and in such a manner, can only be 
guessed at. 
Accounts such as his have led me to distrust most information available about them as it 
refuses to take into account the politics involved in sectarian issues in Middle Eastern 
countries. Neither does it consider the impact the strategies that minorities use to protect 
themselves and their beliefs has when living in hostile environments. The need to be able to 
place Alawis outside the boundaries of Islam seems to emanate only from certain Sunni 
Muslims who feel threatened by Islamic diversity. At the same time, viewing sects and 
religions as static and immutable is, in my view, not very useful for understanding socio-
political issues. This thesis consequently adopts a constructivist perspective, which sees the 
world as made up of socially constructed phenomena. The attempt is therefore not to judge or 
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decide one way or another, but to show how sectarianism, and especially the case of the 
Alawis, is contingent on myriad factors. Moreover, the understanding of them and of minority 
sects elsewhere should not be reduced to the texts in their holy books or to outsiders’ claims 
about their beliefs.  
This thesis is therefore meant as a contribution to the understanding of the dynamics that 
make up sectarian identities and politics in Syria at present. It is not meant to generalise about 
Alawis across the country, but to give an indication of the different ways Alawis construct 
themselves and their communities in relation to other sects and groups in Syria. The research 
question that has guided this thesis from beginning to end has therefore been: 
 
How do the Alawis of Syria construct their collective identity? 
Levels of analysis 
Analysing an issue according to strict categories is not necessarily useful. Likewise, cate-
gorising Syrians according to sect is not necessarily the best way to analyse Syrian society. 
They may also be analysed on completely different levels and along very different lines such 
as class or urban-rural divisions. This would have been important for this thesis if it had rested 
on different theoretical foundations with the aim of explaining rather than understanding a 
phenomenon. What this thesis tries to do, though, is to understand how Alawis depict their 
role as a group in Syria. Where competing categories are used as an explanatory factor, this 
will be mentioned. But overall, my sources use sect as their primary category.  
When in Syria, a foreigner is exposed to a range of opinion about ‘The Others’ from all 
the different sects and communities. It is hard to distinguish what is based on personal 
experience and what derives from hearsay and rumour. Due to the variable nature of 
statements and opinions, I wanted to organise people’s opinions about one another after an 
academic fashion. Because of the focus on political Islam over the last decade, the majority, 
Sunni Muslims, have been in the spotlight in research. It was therefore of interest to me to 
focus on what takes place in the Alawi communities as this has gained very little attention 
apart from their role in the regime of the former president and his son, the current president. 
As for the units of analysis: as long as my sources construct their world along sectarian lines, 
this has been directly adopted in this thesis. 
In my experience, sectarian identities are very important in Syria and one cannot choose to 
place oneself outside this hierarchy. One is born into a sect and one is therefore ‘trapped’ in it. 
Although a Syrian can convert to another faith, this is very rare, and the idea of where one is 
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from ‘originally’ is essential to Syrians’ categorisation of others. One cannot hide from this 
because either name or place of origin – in many cases several generations back – are 
giveaways for what sect one belongs to. Some people seem to rise above such a ‘crude’ 
understanding of their society, but these are the idealists or those of the upper classes who 
interact using alternative categorisations. Although many people wish sect did not matter, 
most seem to be forced into the sectarian framework if only for the reason that ‘The Others’ 
categorise ‘Us’ according to sect.  
In any case, this thesis is not about religion. Beliefs and faith are of secondary importance 
and only to the extent that they are important to my sources to how they construct their 
likenesses or differences from other groups. The issue here is a minority that is defined 
according to religion. Due to the rigid boundaries between the sects in Syria, they take on an 
aspect of ethnic groups even if they speak the same language and look the same. This is 
because the sects have developed identities that are cultural just as much as they are religious. 
In many cases, other texts use terms such as communal group. However, this term has 
political connotations as a group that mobilises along sectarian lines. It is therefore more 
suitable to cases such as the politicised sects in Lebanon. Even though opposing groups 
categorise the Alawis as mobilised by sectarian interests, this is not necessarily my 
impression. The term used in this thesis is therefore sect.  
Although this thesis speaks of Alawis in general and as a group, this is only to simplify 
the text and not an attempt to generalise or to claim that this is representative of all Alawis. 
Identity is both relational and in flux – just as discourses are in varying stages of closure – and 
how Alawis construct their identity will therefore vary in time and in space. The discourses 
presented in this thesis are for that reason only indicative, and above all in those areas where I 
have done my fieldwork. Other sources, for example Landis (2003), seem to have 
encountered other discourses that differ from those I have identified. This is possibly due to 
what type of sources I have used, which is explained further in the next chapter on 
methodology. It is likely that Alawis living in areas where they locally constitute a minority, 
for example in Damascus, will construct their identity in a different way.  
Furthermore, what my sources tell me and how they choose to narrate their views is 
dependent both on me and the circumstances. Syria is a tightly controlled country where 
sectarian issues are considered divisive and destructive on the social fabric. Therefore, unless 
an outsider meets the most outspoken and confident of individuals, the information he is first 
presented with is the acceptable and politically correct view. However, the idea behind this 
thesis is precisely to get below this layer of the publicly acceptable opinion and to tell the 
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story of what my sources have told me after we have been politically correct and people have 
chosen to trust me, hence the focus on primary sources. Following on from this, this thesis is 
in itself a narrative, enhancing certain stories and downplaying others as it ‘re-presents’ the 
stories told to me through four visits to Syria. 
The structure of the thesis 
The next chapter, chapter two, outlines the methodological considerations this thesis is 
founded on. It explains the extraordinary difficulties one has to face when doing research in 
Syria and how this affects the choices of methods and approaches. It also dwells on my 
relation to the field and how it is affected by my presence.  
Chapter three is the theoretical framework of this thesis. Considering that the thesis is 
empirically focused, the theories used are meant as inspiration rather than a straitjacket for the 
analysis. The main tools for the conceptualisation of identity is discourse theory and the 
concrete terms and instruments this gives for the analysis of discourses and identities. How-
ever, in order to better conceptualise certain issues that have come up during my work on the 
topic, both historical narrative – used in the analysis of nationalism – and theory on domi-
nation and resistance have been included.  
Chapter four gives a presentation of Syria and the context of the topic at hand based on 
secondary literature. The first part gives a historical description of the political developments 
in Syria while the second part shows how the Alawis’ role in this can be understood. A short 
description of the theology of the Alawis has also been included in order to present some of 
the points of contestation on issues of tenets and beliefs. This is followed by an explanation of 
how the Syrian regime has dealt with sectarian issues following the rise of Alawis to positions 
of political power in Syria after 1963. Of importance here is how the regime has imposed its 
own Official Discourse in public communication, which tries to make the ideal of peaceful 
co-existence come true by claiming that it is true.  
Chapters five, six, and seven constitute the analysis itself, divided according to the main 
elements identified in the Alawis’ construction of their collective identity. Chapter five shows 
how history is used to construct a line from the past to the present, and this historical narrative 
is central to how the Alawis construct how they live, where they live, and how they came to 
be who they are. These stories are similar to those found among minorities elsewhere and is 
structured according to Smith’s (1999) classification of ethnic myths. This is followed by 
chapter six, which analyses how Alawis use social markers in order to differentiate between 
‘Us’ and ‘Them’. The construction of an ‘Us’ is unequivocally dependent on the construction 
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of ‘The Other’ and the differentiation takes place on the frontier between the two, mainly 
through interaction with Syria’s Sunnis and Christians. Chapter seven deals with the 
construction of contemporary politics in Syria and how events both inside and outside Syria 
influence Alawi identity. Central to this topic is the issue explained in chapter four on the role 
Alawis play in the regime of president Bashar al-Asad and to what extent the regime and 
other Syrians’ perceptions of the regime influence how Alawis present themselves.  
The conclusion, chapter eight, ties the previous chapters together and explains how, in my 
opinion, the different discourses in Syria exist in parallel. The antagonistic relationship 
between the Sunni hegemony and the Alawi discourses is a result of the historical dominance 
of the Sunnis, but also of the regime’s (anti) sectarian policies. The relationship between these 
discourses also has relevance for the analysis of power, which, in this perspective, rests on the 
power of definition.  
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2 METHODOLOGY 
 
Collecting data in Syria, above all on issues deemed taboo in a controlled society, poses a 
range of difficulties and leaves the researcher with relatively few alternatives. This chapter 
outlines the choices I have made before and during the two fieldworks for this thesis in order 
to get access to the information I have sought and what these choices have had to say for the 
later analysis. Methodology and theoretical considerations are closely related. Yet, in order to 
separate the theoretical framework for the analysis of identity from the method of data 
collection, I have chosen to put all theoretical considerations in chapter three. Of issue here, 
therefore, is methodology as practice; the choices and the considerations I have made based 
on a constructivist paradigm discussed in the next chapter.  
Challenges to research in Syria 
Doing research on sectarian issues in Syria poses a range of challenges that need to be add-
ressed. As mentioned in the introduction, the issue itself is a difficult one. Speaking about 
sects in anything other than positive terms is something people are uncomfortable with 
because of the nature of the state and the regime in the country. In terms of repression, Syria 
is not among the most authoritarian of states. As long as a citizen does not meddle in politics 
or mobilise people on grounds that can be interpreted as political, ‘normal’ people are usually 
left to themselves and their own affairs. This means that Syrians are fairly easy to talk to 
about most things, including foreign affairs, but if a foreigner asks about national politics, it is 
apparent from people’s reactions that they become uncomfortable. Most of the time, they will 
follow the official line on the issue or say something neutral and then change the subject.  
In Syria, sectarian issues are considered highly political. This is partly due to history, 
events in neighbouring countries with their sectarian conflicts, and partly to the rhetoric of the 
regime. The message from the regime in public communication and education is that Syria’s 
sects are an advantage and enrich culture and country. All Syrians are supposed to be Syrian 
and Arab first and sectarian identities are therefore secondary. Sectarian identities are 
acceptable as long as they are cultural and religious, but once they turn political they compete 
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with the only allowed political identities – Arab and Syrian – and that is seen as a threat to the 
cohesiveness and stability of the state.  
This does not mean that sect is not important or that people do not talk about it. Indeed, 
the fact that it is taboo gives an indication of its significance in Syrian society. However, since 
speaking about it is seen as a threat to the state, people will not discuss this topic openly with 
just anybody. This is exacerbated by the conflicts in the wider region. Due to the traditional 
enmity with Israel and the more recent disintegration of relations with the United States, 
internal conflict is usually blamed on these external actors. For example, during the Muslim 
Brotherhood uprising 30 years ago, the regime claimed that the insurgents were funded by 
Israel in order to tear Syria apart (van Dam 1996). Therefore, when a foreigner starts asking 
questions about such dangerous issues, many people become suspicious about the motivations 
behind them. This reaction is intensified when the questioner not only speaks their language, 
but is also knowledgeable about Syrian society. Although I have rarely been accused of being 
a spy outright, it has still been an issue at times, such as one situation when, with a group of 
acquaintances, one of them challenged me by claiming that 70 percent of all foreigners in 
Syria are spies one way or another. 
On the surface, Syria is not a very controlled society. However, its intelligence apparatus – 
or rather, its myriad independent branches – is considered extremely large in relative terms 
(Batatu 1999). It is referred to as the Mukhābarāt and every Syrian is aware that any public 
conversation can be overheard by someone working for them. Apart from the use of in-
formants, its agents typically double as something else in order to spy more effectively on 
both citizens and foreigners, frequently working as taxi drivers or lottery salesmen. Indeed, a 
taxi driver, thinking I was an innocent traveller and sympathetic to his cause, confided in me 
that he worked for the Mukhābarāt. In any case, the ordinariness of surveillance makes 
Syrians especially wary since not only may a conversation be overheard, but any person that 
one does not know personally could be on their payroll. This is probably one of the main 
reasons Syrians in general employ the Official Discourse of harmonious co-existence in order 
to appear to be a perfect citizen who believes in the regime’s discourse (see chapter four).  
In addition to this, the negative connotations sectarian issues have in Syria mean that 
people seem to feel somewhat ashamed about the existence of sectarian friction when 
speaking to a foreigner. Syrians are very aware of the general perceptions people from Europe 
and North America have of Syria and the Middle East and they are eager to show that there is 
more to their country and region than what one hears about in the news. This means that 
focusing on a topic that they find negative in many cases leads them to deny its existence and 
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claim that non-Arabs are always out to find conflicts and problems that do not exist. This is a 
valid point and many issues are blown out of all proportions when it comes to the Middle 
East. However, if only for the outright denial of its existence, I find such opinions of little 
value for the topic here. In this thesis, though, I try to give a balanced picture and not to give 
the most conflict-oriented sources too loud a voice.  
Design 
The study of collective identity decides to a large extent the possibilities I have had for 
gathering information. As I have wanted to ‘capture’ an identity, the most obvious approach 
was to use the objects of the study’s own stories of themselves and how they describe their 
identity. This was the most logical consequence of the topic, and basing the theoretical 
framework on constructivism allows for a conceptualisation of identity as temporal and frag-
mented, not to mention context-specific. Of course, there is never just one collective identity, 
but there should be common denominators in an identity that those who identify with it 
themselves present as a collective identity (Wodak et al 1999). This was also the impression I 
had after two trips to Syria during the summers of 2002 and 2004. When the Alawis 
themselves construct a collective identity that is defined according to belonging to a specific 
sect, this also defines the field of research.  
The theory I have used as inspiration, mainly discourse theory and historical narrative, is 
explained properly in the next chapter in order to place it closer to the analysis. However, the 
impact this choice has on the research is profound. Whereas a structuralist will look for causal 
relationships, what I am looking for are the chains of meaning in accounts. The starting point 
for the research also changes radically. Whereas a Marxist researcher will begin with the deep 
structure, which in the social realm means class divisions, and see all his subsequent data as 
reflections of this structure, my research begins with the data – with what I am told from the 
objects of my research, who are subjects in their own right. In other words, the research is 
subjective in that it only seeks to use the information provided and not judge it according to 
standards such as truth or objective reality (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996, Peet 1998).  
However, doing research on identity is challenging, and even more so when it is taboo and 
in a repressive context. It requires knowledge of the field, of the context, and of social codes. 
This became possible by dividing my research into stages and over a period of time. First of 
all, I have studied Arabic in the Middle East, something that facilitates communication 
immensely since most Syrians do not speak much English. Although I have studied Standard 
Arabic, the Arabic lingua franca, I have gotten used to the particularities of Syrian dialect 
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from my stays in Syria. I am nowhere near fluent, but my knowledge of Arabic is good 
enough for understanding everyday topics. Having lived in other Arabic-speaking countries 
such as Jordan, this has expanded my cultural knowledge, as the similarities to Syria are 
many.  
Secondly, I have been to Syria a total of four times. The first two times have already been 
mentioned and they formed my first impressions of Syrian society and sectarian differences. 
After forming a rough idea about my topic, I spent four months in Syria in the autumn of 2005 
living on the Mediterranean coast, both practicing the language and building up a new 
understanding of the topic. As I was living in an Alawi community, the idea was to immerse 
myself in the field and get to know people and their lives. On returning home, I spent half a 
year reading up on Syria and on theories relevant to the topic and furthermore systematising 
my experiences from Syria. During the summer of 2006, I spent another eight weeks in Syria. 
Knowing what I was after and having a network to rely on for information, I was able to be 
much more concrete and systematic in my approach than earlier. I could ask directly about 
what I perceived to be central to the topic and along analytical lines I had identified as 
relevant to the topic.  
My position in relation to the topic is of importance here. It can be argued that one is more 
able to understand one’s own culture because one is part of it, which would mean that an 
Alawi and a Syrian should be doing this research. Turning this on its head, one can also argue 
that when one is part of something one cannot see things clearly, meaning that an outsider can 
see relationships more easily (Thagaard 2003). What I have tried to do is combine these two 
approaches. By being an outsider, I am not part of the field and its politics, which has been 
invaluable during my stays. This will be elaborated on below. However, having spent time in 
the field and built up trust with many of my sources, I hope I have gained enough insight into 
Alawi society to write about it, even though I wish I had had more time to do this.  
Approach 
There has been very little empirical research done on the Alawis in Syria and it was the 
realisation of this lack of information that first gave me the idea to look into the topic of 
sectarian relations, and more specifically, how the minority Alawis construct their world. 
However, getting access to the field and learning about a topic that is considered taboo and, 
furthermore, set in a repressive society presented me with uncomfortable choices. Adapted 
from Hammersley and Atkinson (1996), I had the following alternatives when seeking 
information in the field: 
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1. Pretending to only be visiting and conceal the reasons behind my curiosity 
2. Telling people I was considering writing about Syria and thus only trying to learn 
more about Syrian society 
3. Telling people outright that I was doing research on their community and for what 
purpose 
None of these alternatives was ideal in itself and I would have to rely on all three of them at 
different times. The first option was the easiest and the least ethically acceptable. Yet, this has 
been the way I have had to gather most of the information. Being completely open about my 
research was never a viable alternative in general. Due to the challenges connected with the 
topic, most people I have met and talked to would probably never have said what they did. 
This is either because they would be afraid it could be used against them if it fell into the 
wrong hands or because writing about a sensitive topic would in their eyes be spying, 
regardless of academic ideals. Furthermore, because of the number of intelligence service 
agents in Syria, it would only be a question of time before I would attract unwanted attention, 
which could endanger both my sources and my friends.  
I only told a few people what I was doing and only those I trusted completely, either 
because I had known them a long time or because of their attitude either to the topic or to 
academic research. In addition, to some people I only said that I was considering writing 
about the Alawis. This was because they were uncomfortable with the situation and I knew it 
would endanger my relationship with them to say that I was doing research at present. 
However, all the sources I draw on extensively throughout this thesis all knew what they were 
contributing to (see the later section on sources). However, only telling those I trusted was no 
guarantee for not attracting attention. At one point, I was about to tell an acquaintance what I 
was doing in order to ask him if he would be interested in doing an informal interview. I was 
certain that he would be a good source and positive to my research and the topic. Before 
doing so, I asked a mutual friend if she thought it would be a good idea to tell him and was 
told that he was kept under surveillance and had been forced to report to the secret police if he 
met anyone suspicious. Working in the government herself, she actually warned me that it 
would be preferable if I did not tell anyone about the research. 
In the Syrian context, therefore, it is either a question of doing the research covertly or not 
getting any reliable information at all. Not only is this the case when talking to people, but it 
is also relevant in relation to the state. Since sectarianism is a non-issue and not to be 
discussed, keeping a low profile was a requirement in order to do it safely. Had I sought 
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permission and, although highly unlikely, been given it, it would have entailed being kept 
under close surveillance and my sources facing possible negative repercussions also.  
Yet, there are ethical considerations one must make when choosing this type of research. 
First, there is the vulnerability of the group (Thagaard 2003). Knowing that the Alawis are a 
minority and would be vulnerable in a new and possibly volatile political situation, I have had 
to consider if anything of what I write can be used against them. This has conflicted with what 
I see as the reason of doing research, which is to be honest and to make the results available. 
Considering that this thesis is publicly available, I have in a few cases decided not to include 
information because it can be used wrongly. I have also been very careful about ‘using’ 
people, meaning that I have not only spoken to them because they can be useful to me. Had I 
been more cynical, I could probably have broadened the base of the research and included 
more sources. Using what people say against them is easier when dealing with a powerful 
group on the top of the hierarchy, such as an elite operating largely above the law (Cook 
1997). 
Secondly, I have a responsibility to my sources that what they say cannot be traced back to 
them (Hammersley & Atkinson 1996). This has had a number of practical consequences for 
recording data, which will be explained below when giving details of my sources. 
Furthermore, the confidentiality required means that my analysis will be lacking in references. 
I have chosen not to include any information anywhere that can be used to track sources or to 
correlate the references. This means that both dates and, in most cases, places have been 
omitted. Only in the cases where it has relevance have I included additional information other 
than sex. This is undeniably paranoia, but it is based on a worst-case scenario where I have 
been under surveillance and my contacts could be traced. Although several of my sources are 
open about the topic and are not too worried about being overheard, I have chosen this option 
out of respect for those who did worry. 
Positioning 
In constructivist research, neutrality is neither a possibility nor an ideal. I, the researcher, am 
not able to stay objective or aloof from the field I am working in. I enter the field with 
preconceptions and ideas – external knowledge – and the questions I pose and the role I take 
influence those I speak to and the answers I get (Thagaard 2003). Furthermore, many of those 
I write about have become friends and this means I feel a sense of loyalty. The topic is also 
highly politicised, which means that once I have chosen the approach, I have also chosen 
sides. When my sources speak in an anti-hegemonic way, my writing also becomes anti-
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hegemonic. However, this is not something I try to conceal. Indeed, one of the motivations 
behind this thesis is to give the Alawis a voice, something I feel is lacking in the Anglo-
American academic texts on Syria.  
The role the researcher takes in the field is often decided by the circumstances, but is also 
affected by how one portrays oneself in relation to the topics of the research (Hammersley & 
Atkinson 1996). Being a Norwegian, I was an outsider, a foreigner, and a guest. Even if I was 
mistaken for a Syrian from time to time, this was never the case during any of my 
conversations. I was therefore never a participant in society or part of the sectarian frame-
work. For my particular research, this was mostly something that eased my access to the field 
as I was not perceived to have an agenda, at least not within Syria – although people’s 
references to spying meant that some of them thought I was a foreign agent of some sort. To 
the extent that I would be placed in any sectarian category, I would be referred to as a 
Christian, a group that is described as being culturally close to the Alawis and an ally in their 
scepticism towards Sunnis. This would mean that people sometimes would include me in their 
narratives when speaking of the good historical relationship between Christians and Alawis.  
I would also seemingly be an ally just because I am from Europe and am perceived to 
have a more similar culture to them in relation to the Sunnis. This definitely had an impact on 
the way they would explain their differences from other groups. Talking with someone from 
an ‘ideal’ society, at least to some people, meant that they probably highlighted things they 
thought would seem positive to a European. Yet this is only to be expected and highlights the 
relational aspect of identity construction. Speaking to a Sunni Muslim who has grown up in 
Europe, they would probably have described themselves in a different way. All the accounts 
are true in the sense that all identities are reflections of the others that are part of the 
discourse, be it the conversation partner or the neighbour that they are speaking about.  
Yet, overtly taking sides was a tactic I used consciously in order to get access to the field. 
By finding and creating bonding material between my sources and me, I would let them know 
that I understood the mechanisms at work in the relations between people and their sects. My 
most interesting conversations came after taking a firm stance and declaring my scepticism 
towards Sunni extremism or by praising the social or cultural differences that make the 
Alawis different. It is important to point out, though, that I was never lying or tricking 
anybody at any point. It was instead a way of gaining people’s trust and to show them that I 
was on their side. Had I positioned myself as a neutral visitor – or, worse, sceptical to the 
Alawis as a group – this would never have given me access to parts of their discourses. Being 
sympathetic to the position of the Alawis in Syria meant that people trusted me to voice 
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critical opinions and this was also how the aforementioned taxi driver ended up confiding in 
me that he was working for the intelligence services. He even gave me a local name because 
he found me to be such a Syrian patriot. In a way, I was only playing a game that I had 
learned locally; of taking on roles or identities to make things go smoother. Often, I would 
also have to feign ignorance or pretend to know less about the topic than I did. Playing the 
curious foreigner meant that I had the basic presentation of who the Alawis are repeated to me 
in many different contexts and meant I could seize on things people said to ask further 
questions. In some cases, I even had to understate my Arabic skills because people found my 
accent suspiciously good.  
Had I been studying issues of conflict within the community I would to a greater extent 
have had to present myself as more neutral. If I had taken sides, I could have closed off access 
to people with a radically different opinion who would have been alienated by my positioning 
to one side in the conflict (Thagaard 2003). However, since this research was subjective in 
that it only seeks to portray the Alawis according to themselves, this was less of an issue. The 
only instance when this was probably an issue was when speaking about sensitive political 
issues. Due to Syrians’ wariness about stating opinions about regime politics in unsafe 
settings, mentioning unmentionable issues made people withdraw or become uncertain. This 
meant that I would proceed much more cautiously and gauge people’s opinions before 
volunteering my own.  
Methods 
I have been using a number of methods in order to get access to information during my 
research. In a way, this has functioned as triangulation, also called different lines of action, in 
order to diversify the approach to the field. The idea behind triangulation is to mutually 
confirm the findings by advancing from different angles. This is not in order to get more data, 
but to combine different forms of data and put them in relation to each other (Berg 2004). For 
this research, I have relied on observation, informal conversations and a limited number of 
reference interviews. The reliance on primary sources – almost exclusively Alawis, but also 
with some of mixed backgrounds – is a result of the phenomenon being researched. Much of 
what is available on the Alawis in books and online are accounts with uncertain origin or with 
dubious references. And at any rate, using non-Alawis as a source for how the Alawis 
construct their collective identity, which some accounts seem to do, cannot be relied on to 
give accounts for someone else’s identity. I therefore rely principally on data I have collected 
myself and use secondary sources only when I have reason to trust them.  
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Observation 
The use of observation has its roots in ethnographic research and can describe many different 
forms of interaction with the field. The term participant observation is widespread and 
acknowledges the presence of the researcher in the situation he is observing. This is used to 
bypass the notion of a neutral or external observer who has no impact on his object of study or 
plays no role in a situation. The role of the researcher can be diversified further depending on 
whether the researcher takes active part in activities as if he were a member of the group he is 
studying or not, and whether or not the people being studied know that they are being studied. 
My position and approach to the field was explained above and, as a foreigner, I was an 
outsider in all situations related to my research. Yet, the term participation recognises the 
partaking that social scientific research is. And in this sense, I was participating in the 
situations I observed and therefore I impacted on what took place (Atkinson & Hammersley 
1998).  
Observation also describes the passive nature of my relation to the field. It has formed the 
basis of my understanding of the topic and has gone hand in hand with the informal 
conversations mentioned below. Observation is an important way to gain access to 
phenomena that are normally closed to researchers. By being an observer, one can gain 
important information about actions and relations between people. One learns about the field 
in interaction with its actors so to speak, yet from an outsider’s standpoint. Observation 
requires a high degree of interpretation because actions and relations have to be imbued with 
meaning. This requires a deep familiarity with the field gained through interaction with it and 
the use of field notes to organise the observations (Berg 2004, Thagaard 2003). 
The covert nature of most of my observation practices has meant that I have often been 
socially invisible. By this, I mean that my presence has been acknowledged, but due to the 
unawareness of my intentions, conversations or actions have taken place that the participants 
probably had no idea that I was interested in or that I understood the meaning of. This is 
referred to as the masking of identity. This is useful because the knowledge of the presence of 
a researcher might hamper normal conversation and interaction (Berg 2004). In Syria, this 
approach is especially useful because of people’s scepticism to research into topics of conflict 
or that go contrary to how things are presented by those in power. My time in the field, 
personal relations, and knowledge of Arabic all gave me the opportunity to put my obser-
vations within a context and to be either ‘an ignorant foreigner who happened to be there’ or a 
trusted friend within a larger group.  
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Informal conversations 
Yet, my observation has rarely been that of a silent or completely passive observer. I have 
been part of situations and have sought information through my presence in situations. Still, 
my methods have mostly been passive in that I have seldom actively sought information, but 
instead let information come to me. This is a result of the challenges to research in Syria, but 
also because I found that the information that people volunteered themselves more accurately 
reflected their experiences and opinions. Typically, therefore, I would only seize on situations 
where someone raised an interesting issue and spur them on further rather than initiate the 
topic myself. 
The majority of conversations drawn on in this thesis are therefore of the informal kind, 
where the people I have spoken to have chosen to speak about themselves as Alawis or about 
sectarian issues to the extent that they have done so of their own volition. This has mostly 
constituted an unknown number of conversations in situations where I have met people in a 
variety of circumstances and only briefly spoken about specific issues. These informal 
encounters and chats ‘on the road’ have been the most useful for me. The extended use of this 
type of data collection is not due to a lack of access to interview subjects, but instead because 
this type of communication captures expressions of identity in a very different way from 
interviews, which are an out-of-context way of interacting (Valentine 1997). 
Although many of these conversations have been with random people with no knowledge 
of my role as a researcher, some of them have also been with people I had built up a level of 
trust with. Spending time with me for extended periods spanning two or more visits to Syria 
meant that they trusted me not to exploit what they told me for reasons other than academic 
research. Yet, they were not completely comfortable about the situation and the topic and I 
therefore let them steer the conversation. Furthermore, I could not take notes because this 
immediately changed the situation into something formal and seemingly more threatening. All 
accounts would therefore be written down only after the conversations had taken place. At 
any rate, the knowledge of my role and my intentions meant that I was able to ask questions 
that were more direct without having to worry that they would become suspicious. 
Furthermore, by knowing them personally, I was able to read more between the lines and 
detect evasiveness or feelings of unease to the extent that this seemed to have relevance for 
what we were talking about.  
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Semi-structured interviews 
Observation and interaction takes place in the field and the sources and objects of observation 
are in everyday situations. However, making sense of the meaning inherent in this data is 
difficult and this was the reason for the extended stays and variety of approaches. In order to 
verify my impressions and to be able to ask specific questions, I also had five semi-structured 
interviews during my second fieldwork to complement the informal conversations that had 
formed my impressions thus far. As with the informal conversations with friends mentioned 
above, they all knew what the interviews were for. 
The semi-structured interviews took place with those of my sources who felt most 
comfortable with the topic and somewhat aloof from the fear of reprisals for various reasons. 
The interviews centred on four topics that I had identified as central to how Alawis talk about 
themselves; namely history, beliefs, society, and politics, of which the first two have been 
joined into the same chapter in this thesis. They formed a guiding line throughout the inter-
views, but there was also space for other subjects that came up. These topics turned out to fit 
quite well with how the interviewees constructed their discourses. Unlike the majority of my 
conversations, the interviews were all conducted in English in order to verify my ideas and to 
minimise the risk of misunderstandings on my part. This group of five thus functioned as a 
reference group to control my insights. Some of them I also spoke to several times or 
corresponded with electronically. Moreover, I was able to take notes during the interviews, 
making those particular notes more accurate in that I did not have to wait to write them down, 
which was the case for the observations and informal conversations. Recording the interviews 
on tape was never a viable option in the Syrian context. I was careful about all written 
information and there were no personal references. As soon as possible, I transferred all 
accounts and my own notes to a computer in encrypted formats. 
Sources 
Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, I have not had the luxury of picking and choosing 
sources. For the most part, I have used those who have been interested and felt comfortable 
about talking about the issues. Even among people who I consider friends, there are many 
who have always shied away from sectarian issues both before and after learning about my 
research. The portion of people speaking openly about it is small in relative terms and I have 
avoided pushing people I felt to be uncomfortable speaking about these things.  
My age, sex, and background also affect who I typically come into contact with since 
people with similar frames of reference tend to meet and get along. People in their twenties 
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and thirties are therefore overrepresented. The same goes for men, although the relative ease 
of interaction between men and women in Alawi society means that I have been able to draw 
on the accounts of women also. The educational background of my sources also varies, but 
those having studied at university level are overrepresented in the reference group, above all 
because these sources have been more likely to understand the academic value of doing 
research on sectarian issues in their country. Geographically, my research has been confined 
to sources from the coastal regions and, to a smaller extent, to the coastal mountains. It is 
therefore important to reiterate that the discourses identified in this thesis are those 
encountered in this region where the Alawis constitute the majority. Inland Syria will 
probably display variations on these discourses or different ones altogether.  
Meeting and talking to people in Syria is relatively easy. The relatively low number of 
tourists in Syria means that people are interested in talking to foreigners. Furthermore, people 
are proud of ‘Arab hospitality’ and are in general very welcoming and inclusive. This has 
meant that being visibly foreign has led to small talk in situations ranging from fellow bus 
passengers to guests at restaurants. The ease of meeting new people and the exchange of 
phone numbers and personal information meant that I could pursue those who displayed most 
openness. Nearly all my sources are either people I have met in random ways or friends of 
these random encounters. Displaying knowledge of Arabic also impresses people because this 
is quite rare to find among Westerners in Syria. This, in addition to being interested in social 
and political issues in the Middle East, often makes people eager to talk about their own 
impressions and experiences and paves the way for the sensitive topics, yet, as mentioned, 
only when people themselves have opened up to it.  
 
In addition to my own sources, I have used a number of written or online sources that I will 
describe here. First, the written academic sources consist of Joshua Landis, assistant professor 
at the University of Oklahoma who has unique access to the field through personal relations, 
and Frida Nome who I know personally and who has done research on related issues in Syria. 
Landis’ blog Syriacomment1 has been used to give background information and to back up 
certain points. I also draw on a personal contact of his who has published two texts on his 
blog; an Alawi calling himself Khudr.  
                                                 
1 http://joshualandis.com/blog/, formerly http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/  
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Secondly, I have drawn on texts that are available on the website Alaweenonline2. This 
website appears to be an attempt by Alawi religious scholars to counter claims about their 
beliefs and to present their views within an Islamic context. It is a good example of how the 
discourse that I term the Official Discourse explains Alawi beliefs in ‘acceptable’ Islamic 
terms and the texts are used as an expression of this discourse. The website is in Arabic and 
relevant texts have been translated to English for me by one of my sources.  
Finally, there is a blog called Syriaexposed3, which is written by somebody calling them-
selves Karfan and Friend. They present themselves better than I can: 
This is a place for all the dirty laundry of Syria. The real Syria away from 
Academics, Journalists, and Intellectuals jabbering about Bathism, Arabism, 
Totalitarianism, and all the big talk that they invented just to give credibility to 
analyses and meaning to events. In day-to-day life, there is no Arabism, there is no 
Bathism, there is not even a Syria as they are displayed in all the writings around this 
world. This blog is by Karfan, whose name means disgusted. Generaly disgusted 
with life and everything in it. Recently, disgusted with all those who are trying to 
make a living from giving false and fictitious analyses about Syria and with those 
who believe them. I am his freind, I write Karfan's bullshit in English because he 
thinks that anyone who lives in Syria knows about this bullshit and there is no need 
to put it for them in Arabic. Karfan says that this blog is about the reality of Syria 
from within for those of us who forgot this reality and believed recently a big lie: that 
we actually have a normal country. (Karfan 18.03.2005a) 
Their aim is to tear apart all the myths about the Syrian society, in a way deconstructing the 
official Syrian discourse. Although Karfan is an Alawi from Tartous, some readers claim that 
he is not. In my opinion, he probably is, but in any case, due to the nature and style of his 
writing, I have not used the blog as a primary source. Instead, I use it to quote from when it 
expresses parts of the discourses that I have identified because they illustrate points in an 
entertaining, albeit sometimes extreme, manner. As the quote says, Syrians already know 
about what they write, and their satirical style is found in Syrian media, although it is veiled to 
conform to the censored arena in the country. From the reactions in many of the posts, it is 
clear that this style of writing and topics raised mean that writing in a similar way in Arabic 
would cause problems. In fact, the author claims that he dares not publish or access the blog 
in Syria and only writes when he is in Lebanon in order not to be tracked by Syrian 
intelligence. This in itself illustrates the sensitive nature of these topics.  
It should be noted that when quoting this blog, I have chosen not to correct spelling 
mistakes as long as they do not inhibit understanding. This is because they are rather frequent 
and doing so would lead to an impression of major editing through the multiple brackets.  
                                                 
2 http://www.alaweenonline.com  
3 http://syriaexposed.blogspot.com  
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A note on referencing 
As already mentioned and for good reasons, none of my personal sources for this thesis are 
referenced with either dates or personal information. Throughout most of the analysis, there-
fore, unlike traditional ways of referencing, I will only refer to ‘a source’ and avoid making 
cross-referencing possible by linking these anonymous sources together. Texts, on the other 
hand, are referenced normally with name and year, and there is a full list of references at the 
end of the thesis. When I use online information, it is referenced with name and date and with 
a complete reference with web address and date of download in the online reference list at the 
end. References to online information with no author are only referenced with the address and 
date of download in a footnote.  
Analysis  
Constructing meaning out of observation and myriad conversations of various kinds is a 
matter of interpretation. In any kind of interpretation, the information collected fuses with the 
analyst’s preconceptions and attitudes and this gives rise to criticism of the lack of neutrality. 
As mentioned, the point here is not to be neutral. I have not been looking for facts, but for 
meaning. This means looking for what my sources emphasise and how they create frontiers 
between themselves and others and how they link all this together. It is also about critical 
interpretation, meaning that one should look beyond what is being said and interpreting the 
meaning in statements and actions. This requires solid knowledge of the field (Thagaard 
2003).  
My approach is grounded in the theories I use and in a way, the result is no different from 
the accounts I analyse. In a narrative sense, this thesis is a narrative in its own right, 
enhancing some things and ignoring others; all pieced together from separate events and 
accounts. The end result – the analysis – is a summary and systematisation of a range of 
accounts and categorised according to what I have found interesting and based on the theories 
I have used for the analysis. The discourses presented in the analysis are, as such, categories 
of my own invention based on tendencies in my data rather than clear-cut categories. The 
theoretical framework presented in chapter three has been used instrumentally and the 
analytical tools available from these can be found there. Yet, the way the process took shape 
is of interest.  
Central to the development of the collection of data and the analysis was the splitting of 
the fieldwork in two. The first fieldwork in the autumn of 2005, constituting my third visit to 
Syria, was based on a loose outline of what I wanted to investigate, building on impressions 
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from the two earlier visits. Following this stay, I spent a total of five months in Oslo 
systematising the preliminary findings and writing a draft for the theoretical framework. This 
meant that I had the opportunity to go back into the field for a second time with my ideas 
grounded in theory to be examined anew in light of the theories I found useful. I could then 
expand on things I had heard, but not pursued. The approach has therefore been a rotation 
between inductive and deductive approaches (Thagaard 2003).  
In conclusion 
The theoretical foundation of this research and the methodology that follows from it empha-
sises the contextual and situated character of the findings. This means that the revelation of an 
objective reality is neither possible nor an aim. Instead, it seeks to emphasise the social 
character of the construction of people’s multiple and contextual realities. Our ability to 
generalise in the traditional scientific way is therefore limited. However, this type of 
qualitative research, despite the concealment of sources, gives more than an indication of the 
construction of identity among Alawis. By linking the contextual and the theoretical, it means 
that it has value to similar contexts of relations between majorities and minorities, especially 
when these relations are not open to discussion or their official interpretations are contestable. 
In a way, it is a contribution to theory building on the topic at hand and the dynamics of 
dominant discourses and the resistance these create (Denzin & Lincoln 1998).  
That I have touched on something vital for the Syrian context, at least, seems to be the 
case if only by being called ‘dangerous’ by one of my sources on hearing the preliminary 
ideas for the analysis.  
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3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a framework for the analysis of Alawi identity. As 
the title of the chapter suggests, the idea is to create a prism through which we can see the 
findings and to interpret them, but not to judge them. Consequently, the theories are not 
presented in order to neither test nor disprove them, but instead to use them as a tool for 
interpreting how the Alawis see their world. In other words, the theoretical framework is 
meant to be inspirational and not all-encompassing for understanding the topic, although the 
basis for the framework is that reality is socially constructed. As the aim is to present the 
Alawi view of reality and not to judge the legitimacy or truthfulness of their claims, it was 
natural to choose an angle that neither lays claims to the truth nor judges its subject. Discourse 
theory is suited for this purpose because it seeks to show how different components are pieced 
together into a logical whole that gives meaning to its subjects. Individuals are the access 
points to the discourses and their construction of identity.  
In the following, the social constructivist background of discourse theory will be presented 
followed by how discourse theory explains the construction of both individual and collective 
identities. The focus will be on the differentiation between an experienced ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
and the conflictual nature of identity formation. Furthermore, an expanded theory on the 
dynamics of domination and resistance will be explored, ending with an explanation of 
narrative theory and its usefulness for making sense of how history is represented.  
Constructivism in the Social Sciences 
The theory of the social construction of reality, henceforth termed constructivism, is a fairly 
recent theory in the social sciences and emerged as part of a general critique of the established 
paradigms of how we can understand and explain the world we live in. These had been in-
fluenced by the natural sciences and their dominance in defining how knowledge can be 
determined. Early in the history of the social sciences, this quest for truth was the driving 
force behind research, although how one arrived at this truth has been a point of contestation 
(Guba & Lincoln 1994, Schwandt 1994).  
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Constructivism is part of the post-modern paradigm and can be separated from the 
classical theories on different levels. At the ontological level, the level of what form reality 
has and what can be known about it, theories such as positivism, Marxism and critical realism 
can be called foundational. Foundationalism claims that ‘there exist fixed, indubitable, and 
final foundations that guarantee the truth of a given claim to knowledge’ existing 
independently of our knowledge of them (Johnston et al. 2000: 279). Contrasting this, con-
structivism is relativist, meaning there is no ‘real’ reality and as such no underlying, fixed and 
definite truth. Rather, to constructivists, reality is constructed socially and does not exist 
outside its specific context, and even if does, there is no way we can identify it (Guba & 
Lincoln 1994).   
This same distinction is visible on the epistemological level – of how we can gain valid 
knowledge of reality and the role of the researcher in relation to this knowledge. 
Constructivists will claim that since there is no independent and underlying truth, all 
knowledge is created. Given that what is true to me might not be true to you, there is no way 
of choosing or deciding between competing claims to the truth. A researcher must therefore 
acknowledge that he himself is embedded in his own context and that this influences what he 
is studying. Adherents to foundationalist theories, on the other hand, will either see the 
researcher as independent and removed from is study object and able to establish certainty 
(such as positivists) or at least have objectivity as an ideal, even though it might not be 
possible, and thus to be able to establish a probable certainty (such as critical realists). On the 
methodological level, this will be based on the use of verification or falsification, whereas for 
constructivists, determining what is true to someone means using some form of interpretation. 
This means that a constructivist approach can never explain a phenomenon since this is based 
on a belief that we can find facts that will tell us what the world is like, whether this is 
permanent or contingent of time and place. Rather, the focus will be on understanding or, 
more specifically, understanding what constructs knowledge. (Guba & Lincoln 1994, Peet 
1998).  
The construction of meaning  
The inspiration for discourse theory as a theory for understanding meaning is the work of 
Saussure, a structuralist who claimed that the relationship in language between words and 
their meaning is arbitrary and we can only understand reality through concepts that have no 
meaning in themselves. Instead, they have meaning only when understood in relation to other 
concepts that describe something different. For example, ‘socialism’ only has meaning in re-
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lation to terms such as ‘capitalism’ and ‘feudalism’ (Torfing 1999). Yet, where Saussure saw 
these meanings and relations as locked, critics of the structuralist approach claim that these 
relationships change and meanings consequently change according to the context in which 
concepts are used. Furthermore, the meanings carried by language are temporary and 
contestable and open to interpretation. In the constructivist approach, language is a pre-
condition for thought as it creates a framework for how we can understand and explain what 
we experience. Nevertheless, this understanding is taught to us from infancy and we are there-
fore forced to acknowledge its predefined concepts. When we use language, we reproduce our 
world by reaffirming the pre-established meanings behind the language (Burr 1995). 
Discourse analysis is a theory where the goal is to expose the processes that determine 
how meaning is constructed. There are different theoretical approaches within discourse 
analysis with differing views on what constitutes discourse and therefore what can be 
analysed. Some approaches are strictly linguistic whereas others see ‘everything as discourse’. 
Yet, this latter approach does not imply that there is no material reality outside of discourse, 
meaning that the desk I am sitting by is not real. Instead, the point they make is that the desk 
does have a material existence, but our comprehension of the desk can only come through the 
meaning it has in various discourses (Torfing 1999).  
This thesis uses the terms and concepts developed in the discourse theory of Laclau and 
Mouffe. As Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) say, different approaches can profitably be mixed 
in order to make an analysis possible depending on the subject matter. The point here is not to 
position myself strictly to one approach, but rather to adopt one set of tools useful when 
analysing how discourses create identities and construct the available subject positions.  
All discourses are created and exist through articulation. This is a process where our 
reality is defined through the construction of meaning. This happens by fixing concepts 
together in a way where they mutually constitute one another. Meaning is thus constructed 
through their differential positions. Discourse theory distinguishes between elements, which 
are concepts, or signs, that can have various meanings, and moments, which are signs that 
have attainted one meaning through its place in the discourse. Central in each discourse are 
the nodal points; privileged signs, or reference points, that all the other signs in the discourse 
are organised around. In the process of articulation, the goal is a totality where elements are 
turned into contingent moments whereby alternative meanings are excluded in order to make 
the discourse unambiguous. This is called closure. An example is the moments of 
‘democracy’, ‘state’, and ‘freedom’ that take on a whole new meaning from liberal democracy 
when articulated in communist discourse:  
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Democracy acquires the meaning of ‘real’ democracy as opposed to ‘bourgeois’ 
democracy, freedom acquires an economic connotation and the role and function of 
the state is transformed. In other words, their meaning is partially fixed by reference 
to the nodal point ‘communism’ (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 8) 
Everything that is excluded from a discourse is part of what is called the field of discursivity. 
This is the discourse’s constitutive outside and is what ultimately defines it by defining what 
it is not (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
Yet, discourses can never attain complete closure due to the pressure exerted from the 
field of discursivity, as exclusion to this field ‘is precisely what makes possible the 
articulation of a multiplicity of competing discourses’ (Torfing 1999: 92). Meaning arises in 
the relation between concepts, and these relations are in constant flux, threatening to turn the 
moments back into elements. As Neumann (2001: 61, own translation) asserts: ‘In any funda-
mentalist religious society there will be atheists’. This is one of the main premises of 
discourse theory, where every closure is seen as at best temporary and partial. This is because 
the meaning of signs can be undermined by the meaning they have in other discourses, thus 
making them ambiguous. The degree of a discourse’s closure can be from a position of 
political conflict, where the discourse is open and the fixation of meaning has yet to occur, to 
a state of hegemony, where a discourse has attained a dominant position and stabilises a 
particular social order. Torfing (1999: 101) describes this as ‘the expansion of a discourse, or 
a set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of 
articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by 
antagonistic forces’. Eventually, when a hegemony is entrenched enough, it becomes 
objective, what is called ideology in other theories of discourse. In this situation, it appears as 
something that is no longer political or contested and is what we take for granted or see as 
‘natural’. 
Hegemony is established through hegemonic interventions, which involves the use of 
force. This takes place when two or more discourses overlap and restrict one another and 
involves repression of real and existing possibilities (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). Hegemony 
and how it is established is described in more practical terms by Torfing (1999: 302) as the 
achievement of a moral, intellectual and political leadership through the expansion of 
a discourse that partially fixes meaning around nodal points. [It] involves more than a 
passive consensus and more than legitimate actions. It involves the expansion of a 
particular discourse of norms, values, views and perceptions through persuasive 
redescriptions of the world. 
The conflict between discourses and their identities, called antagonism, will be elaborated on 
below. 
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The idea of hegemony is intimately connected to power. Power is not objects wielded by 
someone to threaten someone else, but is instead seen as a product of discourse. Power 
becomes visible in the process of articulation, which always takes place in a setting of 
constant conflict. Power is to control the definition of what constitutes meaning and what is 
expelled to the outside of the discourse. In effect, power is the fixation of meaning in order to 
make certain social practices and actions acceptable and, similarly, to marginalise conflicting 
social practices and actions. It is hence an effect of discourses. In this way, groups or 
individuals are powerful by their place in a discourse and they exercise power by drawing 
upon the discourses to sanction their actions (Burr 1995). When something has reached a level 
of objectivity, this power is no longer perceptible. It has become something we take for 
granted and is not contested. However, the power is still there, only it is invisible. Objectivity 
is ‘the sedimented form of power, in other words a power whose traces have been erased’ 
(Laclau 1990, cited in Torfing 1999: 161-162).  
Identity as discourse 
Central to the continual debates in the social sciences is the relationship between structure and 
agency. All over-arching socio-political theories can be placed along a continuum of the 
weight that is given to the individual’s freedom of action. At one extreme, there is humanism, 
which took shape during the Age of Enlightenment and where the philosopher Descartes is 
central. Humanism argues that people are autonomous and rational beings with a choice and 
subsequent control over their action. In this view, identity comes from within as a unified 
whole that is permanent and static. The focus here will be people’s actions. At the opposite 
end of the continuum, we find structuralism, which sees people as subjected to the structures 
around them. An example of extreme structuralism can be found in orthodox Marxism, which 
theorises levels of structures working behind what we can conceive. These structures are 
completely deterministic on human agency and claims that people have no independence 
when it comes to making their own choices and deciding their own actions (Peet 1998).  
Yet, both humanism and structuralism fall within the foundationalist paradigm mentioned 
in the first part of this chapter in believing there to be a ‘real’ reality or a truth that can be 
known through theorising or observation. Constructivism, on the other hand, sees reality as 
constructed through processes and this has consequences for the view on identity. There can 
be no reality behind our feeling of self and it is never stable. Instead, it is seen as fragmented 
and in constant change in response to what we experience. Whereas the foundationalist 
theories have an essentialist understanding of identity, where subjects are seen to be in the 
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centre of the categories that empower them, constructivism sees identity as the product of the 
process of categorisation (Natter & Jones III 1997, Peet 1998). 
Individual identity 
The constructivist understanding of identity is that it is not something that arises from within a 
person. Instead, it is something that exists between people and is therefore relational. Burr 
(1995) uses the example of a person who has always lived alone on a deserted island. With no 
one to interact with there will be no traits he can use to describe himself nor any feeling of 
self that makes sense. This can only arise in relations with other people.  
The term used for the role of agency in discourse theory is subject position. This is a 
notion that considers each discourse to have implicit in it a limited number of positions that 
people can take. People thus constitute points in discourse with certain roles and actions open 
or closed to them depending on the discourse. In this sense, the concept of identity is 
somewhat structuralist in that it sees people as having freedom only internally to the identity 
in a discourse. The point of departure for the constructivist understanding of identity is the 
idea that there is a human urge to feel ‘complete’ and that every person seeks to find himself 
or herself. This can only take place by identifying with the subject positions open for this 
person within the available discourses (Torfing 1999). In the words of Burr (1995: 141): ‘A 
person can only be a meaningful entity, both to himself and others, by being “read” in terms 
of the discourses available in that society.’ The main point is that identity is constituted in and 
by discourse.  
The process whereby a person takes on a subject position is called interpellation. This is 
defined as ‘addressing [individuals] in a way which constructs them as particular discursive 
subjectivities, i.e. as women, consumers, workers, “trouble-makers”, foreigners, etc.’ (Torfing 
1999: 302). Yet, the determinism that we find in structuralism is not present in discourse 
theory. The ambiguous nature of discourses gives room for manoeuvre and for changing 
identities, yet this is closely related to the power of definition vested in the subject positions. 
Whether a person identifies with a subject position or seeks to alter this position is followed 
up on in the section ‘Domination and Resistance’.  
Just like in discourses, every identity will have nodal points that concepts will be linked 
to. Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) mention men and women as such nodal points. Each gender 
has specific traits linked to them, such as ‘strength’ and ‘football’ for men and ‘passivity’ and 
‘knitting’ for women. The discourse will then define actions that people identifying them-
selves as such should take on in order to be acknowledged as a ‘true’ man or woman. And just 
 27
like in discourse, identity is defined not only by what it is, but just as much as what it is not. 
As a result, our identities are the combination of the subject positions we take, negotiate or are 
forced into. This is also what is meant by the statement that identity is fragmented. People 
have subject positions in an array of discourses that will constitute their identity, and most of 
them will be highly temporary and specific to social space.  
Collective identity 
Collective identity has the same history in the development of the social sciences as discourse 
analysis. The existence of groups was seen as something essentialist and natural growing out 
of structures or inherent qualities. The Marxist conception of classes as intrinsic to the 
capitalist system is an example of this. On the other hand, the way in which collective 
identities are formed according to discourse theory, follows closely the pattern of individual 
identity formation with the construction of a collective ‘self’. Central to their formation is the 
reduction of possibilities, where something is held forth as central to the identity and other 
characteristics are ignored. This is similar to the process of articulation, which seeks closure 
in what concepts – or traits in our context – are integral to the identity, and what should be 
expelled to the field of discursivity (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). 
Important to group identities is the concept of The Other. As was said earlier, the 
articulation process requires a definition of not only what something is, but at the same time, 
and just as important, what it is not, meaning that it is relational. This means that for any 
identity there must be markers common to all members of the group that clearly differentiates 
‘Us’ from ‘Them’, where the latter is ultimately what constitutes ‘Us’. Norval (2000) calls 
this frontier formation in order to highlight that this differentiation takes place on the border 
between the groups. At the same time, anything that differentiates the members internally, 
which potentially will constitute other ways of forming groups, will be disregarded and not 
seen as important for this particular group’s identity. Toni Morrison (quoted in Natter & Jones 
III 1997: 146) shows how race has become a significant category of identity through 
European contact and exploitation of slaves. Skin colour came to be the marker of difference 
that came to ‘mean’ something: ‘One supposes that if Africans all had three eyes or one ear, 
the significance of that difference from the smaller but conquering European invaders would 
have also been found to have meaning.’ In the same way, in Europe until fairly recently or 
even to this day, any non-white person is categorised as ‘Black.’ This ignores or hides any 
difference or similarities that can construct competitive identities between the groups of 
‘Whites’ and ‘Blacks.’ 
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Antagonism 
Every person has an array of different identities, both individual and collective, that co-exist 
simultaneously, and whether they are activated depend on the discourses a person operates 
within. These identities thus exist only as part of discourses and they sometimes overlap 
creating conflict of meaning. This conflict is strengthened by the way discourses work; in 
what they expel to their constitutive outside. As repeated a number of times, discourses are 
constituted by what they are not and this happens in a conflictual way. Torfing (1999: 125) 
explains this by showing that the constitutive outside of discourse A, is not B or non-A, but 
anti-A. The example he uses is the discourse of ‘western civilisation’: 
[This discourse] is established by the exclusion of countries, habits and people that 
are all somehow considered to be ‘barbaric’. However, as the chain of equivalence is 
expanded to include more elements, it becomes clear that what all these elements 
have in common is only the negation of western civilisation. Thus, as Africa, India, 
Asia and South America are caught up in the chain of equivalence, the concept 
‘barbaric’ is gradually emptied to the point where it can only be defined as 
uncivilized, i.e. as a threat to civilization. Consequently, the discourse of ‘western 
civilization’ is established in a confrontation with a constitutive outside which 
prevents it from being what it is. 
In the same way, in the process of articulation, identities exist by being positioned vis-à-vis a 
threat to that very identity. Identities obstruct one another because they require differing roles 
or actions from its subjects. This is called antagonism and is discourse theory’s term for what 
we see as political: conflictual issues under discussion. Antagonism occurs because people, 
like discourses, can never attain closure in their identities. This happens when a presence of 
an ‘other’ prevents a feeling of totality, a symbol of a person’s non-being. This is called 
‘blockage’ of identity and is experienced as such both for the antagonising force and for the 
antagonised (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000).  
As previously mentioned, antagonism is solved through the use of force as hegemonic 
interventions to remove ambiguity. This involves the negation of identity as both the negation 
of alternative meanings and the negation of people identifying with these (Torfing 1999). 
Jørgensen and Phillips (1999) use the example of the antagonism during the First World War 
when soldiers’ identification with the cross-national working classes was in direct conflict 
with the ability to make them fight each other as representatives of different states. Through 
hegemonic intervention, the working-class identity was suppressed by being undermined by a 
discourse where a nationalist identity was the main form of identity. This antagonism will be 
approached from a slightly different angle in the theory presented next. 
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Domination and resistance 
Theories of domination and resistance, or of the elite and the subjected, offer an interesting 
way of analysing antagonism and the reaction to conflicting identities. This theory deals with 
repressive contexts where opposition to the status quo is dangerous. Open confrontation or 
questioning of the roles imposed is therefore not an option in most cases, and the theory deals 
with how the hegemony is maintained and the forms of opposition available to the dissenters. 
In the following, I use Scott (1990) in order to explain the theory and adapt his ideas to 
discourse theory where this is relevant for the topic of this thesis. 
Scott introduces the terms the public transcript and the hidden transcript in order to 
identify the forms of resistance taking place below the horizon of history so to speak. The idea 
is to show that even though historical accounts present a picture of the subjected masses as a 
docile class that does not rebel against the elites in power – even when it would be in their 
interest to do so – there are subtler forms of resistance that eventually might result in overt 
resistance. The public transcript refers to what he calls the self-portrait of the elites – of how 
they want others to see them – and regulates the subject positions available for both the 
dominant and the subordinates. In the case of the theoretical framework of this thesis, this is a 
situation where hegemony is imposed, and this hegemony causes antagonism due to 
conflicting identities among its subjects. Due to the repressive context, though, the opposition 
to the hegemony takes the form of a hidden transcript. This is the secret discourse of the 
subordinates, which is rarely accessible to the dominant. On the surface, the subordinates 
conform to the expectations of the dominant – they pose. Below the surface, though, when 
among their own kind, the hidden transcript is practiced in reaction to the public transcript. 
Consequently, the conformity of the subordinates is a form of concealment due to the rigidity 
of the script. In many cases, it is a matter of survival for groups to hide their true beliefs and 
intentions in the face of inequality. This does not mean that the dominant take what they see 
at face value, but they rarely have access to the hidden transcript unless some kind of 
surveillance is in place. 
Central to the sustainability of the hegemony, is the concept of unanimity. In order to 
reproduce the social order, the subjects must give the impression of accepting their roles and 
living in harmony. Not only must the subordinates seem to consent to the situation, dis-
agreement between members of the dominant group must also be kept to arenas closed to the 
subordinates. If they reveal the division, this can be exploited by the subordinates to re-
negotiate their subordination. Likewise, where there is open resistance to the discourse, the 
power inherent in the subject positions of the dominant groups will have to be applied in order 
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to set an example. If open resistance goes without reaction, it encourages more disobedience 
and the unravelling of the discourse. Acts that violate the rules set out by the discourse, be it 
for the dominant or the subordinates, are called discursive negation and it will similarly 
weaken the power of a discourse. 
The hidden transcript denotes competing discourses that oppose the hegemony. Just as 
Neumann (2001) above argues that any fundamentalist society has atheists, Scott claims that 
there are rarely any situations of domination where there is not a hidden transcript. He rejects 
the notion of ‘false consciousness’ and says that this can only be possible in a situation where 
individuals are isolated and are therefore not able to identify with others in the same situation. 
Therefore, there will always be one or more hidden transcripts in situations of antagonism. 
Furthermore, the more repressively certain rules are enforced – meaning the consequences of 
opposing them are severe – the more hidden a transcript stays.  
Scott is careful to point out that the hidden transcript, just as any discourse, only exists to 
the extent that it is practiced, articulated, enacted and disseminated. This takes place in 
offstage social sites that can be protected from the eyes and ears of the dominant and are 
actively defended by the subordinates. These social spaces are themselves often creations of 
the hidden transcript. The examples he chooses are typically to do with the situation of the 
slaves in antebellum United States. Being subjugated to Whites conflicted with discourses of 
freedom and equality, and overt resistance was rare and would normally result in physical 
punishment. The hidden transcript of the slaves, therefore, would be formulated in a time and 
place when their masters were absent. If a slave was castigated, for example, he would say 
nothing in front of his master, but at night, in the slaves’ quarters, he would degrade his 
master and claim that if the situation had been different, or in another time and place, he 
would have answered back or gotten his revenge by hitting back.  
 
In discourse theory, hegemony offers three reactions to its subjects. The most typical one is 
identification, which occurs when a subject takes on his identity unquestioningly or willingly. 
This is typical for most of our roles in society where there is either hegemony or objectivity. 
Most of us unquestioningly take on the role of patient and the actions and behaviour inherent 
in this role when going to the doctor, for example. However, when people feel the meaning in 
their identity is not representative of them, their resistance can take the form of either anti-
identification or disidentification. Anti-identification is a reaction of someone who fights a 
subject position within the boundaries of the hegemony and thus at the same time reproduces 
it. In other words, he will not seek to overthrow the hegemony, but rather to improve his own 
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status within it. Disidentification, on the other hand, is a process of deconstruction – the term 
deriving from Jacques Derrida. It is a critique that uses the inherent ambiguities and instability 
of a discourse to rearrange the moments and thus expose the contingency that constitutes the 
meaning of an identity by someone who claims not to speak from any group identity. This 
process can also be termed counter-hegemony (Torfing 1999, Natter & Jones III 1997). 
In a similar way, Scott explains that resistance can take two forms: either as resistance 
within the public transcript, which is the least dangerous, or through the hidden transcript, as 
explained above, with the development of social spaces for its practice and of carriers for its 
expression (even though this will usually fall within the anti-identification resistance). For 
resistance within the public transcript, he uses the examples of inmates in a Norwegian prison. 
In order to improve a situation of seemingly arbitrary and unregulated distribution of 
privileges and punishment, they draw on the rigid enforcement of rules in other spheres of the 
running of the prison and their society as a whole. By stressing these norms of regulation and 
equality that justify the rule of the prison’s administration, they can claim that the 
administration has violated their own norms and in this way create change without 
questioning the legitimacy of their subordination.  
Resistance to the public transcript that does not take the form of open rebellion, however, 
is based on the infiltration of parts of the hidden transcript into the public transcript in forms 
that do not cause retribution from the dominant. This takes place through various strategies of 
deception and disguise where either the message or the messenger is concealed. Concealing 
the message means using language or symbols in ambiguous ways, relying on the knowledge 
of codes of meaning that are manipulated, thus lessening the scope for retributive action. 
Concealing the messenger, on the other hand, allows for more open acts of resistance as the 
architect is unknown. Rumour is a powerful form of anonymous resistance especially wide-
spread in societies where public communication is controlled. This is because its oral trans-
mission can be moulded to circumstances. Scott (1990: 145) writes that ‘As a rumor travels it 
is altered in a fashion that brings it more closely into line with the hopes, fears, and worldview 
of those who hear and retell it.’  
A more elaborate form of disguise is the turning of parts of the hidden transcript into folk 
or popular culture with meanings that contradict or undercut the official interpretations. 
Popular culture, obviously, is less controlled by the dominant. Its expressions can take the 
shape of songs, tales, dances, or rituals, many of which are repeated across cultures. Another 
important form it takes is the religious ideologies and expressions of the underprivileged, 
which implicitly protest against their worldly fate. It is important to note, however, that 
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resistance just as often takes the shape of sabotage and explicit threats when the person behind 
can be reasonably safe from reprisal. Scott again uses the black American slaves as an 
example, saying that their pilfering or theft should also be read as forms of resistance and not 
only as acts to secure their survival.   
Nationalism and narrative  
This final section of the theoretical framework presents theories of nationalism and these 
theories’ construction of a national identity. Their inclusion here is not a claim to any political 
project of independence or separatist tendencies amongst Syria’s Alawis, but rather because 
of certain parallels between this type of collective identity and the situation of the Alawis. The 
most obvious of these parallels are the clear demarcation of sects in Syria and furthermore, 
the geographical concentration of the Alawis in one area of the country. It should be 
mentioned, however, that separatist ideas were floated in the 1940s before independence, 
strengthening the case for drawing these parallels (see chapter four).  
Just like the other theories discussed earlier, the academic understanding of national 
identity has gone from a perception of it being perennial and given at birth, to a socio-political 
construct. It is closely related to the theory on collective identity, and the way it sees how 
people form a nation is only a magnified version of finding traits that separate ‘Us’ from ‘The 
Others’. In the words of Norval (2000: 226): ‘National identity is the form, par excellence, of 
identification that is characterised by the drawing of rigid, if complex, boundaries to 
distinguish the collective self, and its the other.’ Nationalist discourse organises the world by 
mutually exclusive categories of national identity. In other words, all people are divided into 
different nations and these nations, considered integral units in their own right, should be 
sovereign, usually within the boundaries of a specific territory. Only when these nations rule 
and cultivate themselves can they reach true freedom and fulfilment (Kedourie 1960). In other 
words it is a linking of national identity and political mobilisation based on this identity. This 
identity can be thought of as an extended form of loyalty, which traditionally took the shape 
of loyalty to one’s family, clan or tribe. In the modern form, nationalism extends this loyalty 
to a much larger group defined according to language, ethnicity or certain cultural traits that 
differentiate it from other nations (Smith 1991).  
It should be noted here that there are differing views on the foundations of national 
identity. The ethno-symbolist body of theory, for example, claims that today’s national 
identity has much older roots. Smith (1991) claims that national identities have been formed 
on the basis of ethnies; a term referring to pre-modern ethnic communities. These ethnies had 
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traditions, values and symbols on which a contemporary national identity is founded. 
However, following the constructivist premises of the framework of this thesis, the issue is 
not whether there are believed continuities between past and present, but the arbitrary way the 
cultural markers are used to form collective identity. Even in our situation of an identity based 
on religious differences, differences are never so ‘clearly discrete, non-overlapping and 
distinct that they “automatically” become the basis for different social groupings…The very 
sense of being a member of a coherent and clearly demarcated group is not simply given by 
tradition but raised in certain contexts’ (Calhoun 1997: 32). 
National narrative 
Of central importance to our context is how nationalism constructs the history of the nation 
and the tying of this history to a specific territory. This history takes the role of a collective 
memory of how we came to be who we are as a group. Narrative is the term used to denote 
how people tell stories; of how they portray both time, space and identity. The idea is that 
people tell and retell stories organised around events that are linked together. What we 
normally refer to as a story has two fundamental elements: the story and the narrative. The 
story refers to the events themselves, in effect the raw materials of a story. The narrative, 
however, is the mode chosen for telling the story, or of how one chooses to represent the 
events. Some chose to break down the narrative further and isolate the plot, which is the way 
the events are linked together to form a chain of causation, but this is of less interest here 
(Abbott 2002, Cobley 2001).  
A narrative’s function is thus to move from a start-point to an end-point with digressions 
on the way. The digressions fill out the ongoing story and are characteristically what gives a 
story its form by giving the audience an opportunity to understand the causality of the 
sequence of events. The narrative can leap backwards and forwards in time and the audience 
will fill in the gaps and put together the story from the different events (Abbott 2002). The 
narrative seeks to represent – or ‘re-present’ – events, which, at the same time, necessarily 
embody both space and time. In order to maintain the interest of the audience, a narrative will 
often utilise concepts such as anticipation, focus and retrospection (Cobley 2001). In order to 
illustrate the role of the narrative, we can imagine a situation where actors involved in a 
conflict all agree on the course of events, but not over how these events may be best repre-
sented, or what should be the context that would explain the conflict (Hodgkin and Radstone 
2003a).  
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The formulation of nationalist thought is deeply linked with history. Since national 
identity, like any identity, requires decisions of who and what is considered part of the nation, 
there must be ‘proof’ of why ‘We’ are a nation. This leads to what is termed an invention of 
tradition where the nationalists present an intelligible account of how the nation came to be in 
the form of a history of the nation (Breuilly 2000). This takes the shape of a historical 
narrative that links the past and the present through the chain of events, ‘mythically expanding 
the nation into a transhistorical, and thus eternal, entity’ (Wodak et al 1999: 1). Again, the 
power lies in the narrative’s ability to create an impression of causality. Even though cause 
and effect are not necessarily stated explicitly, by linking together events, they implicitly 
represent a causal chain (Abbott 2002). 
Both nationalist movements and nation states refer to history as a national collective 
memory, something that is part of all the members of the nation. This history highlights 
certain events that are central to the story while most events taking place in the same space or 
time are seen as inconsequential. Another way of describing it is that historians pick specific 
bits that represent the story they wish to tell, whereas incongruous or undesirable elements 
must be suppressed and denied (Hodgkin & Radstone 2003b). In the 19th century, for 
example, European historians actively edited out non-white elements of the European past, 
presenting Ancient Greece as the cradle of Western civilisation. In this way, they were able to 
erase influences from Africa and the Near East (Cobley 2001).  
Ethnic myths 
At the heart of the national narrative, then, is the anchoring of the present in the past. 
Nationalisms have many ways of narrating their mythical pasts, and their distant origins are 
typically lost in the fog of time and exist as legends of a nation’s fathers in folklore (Wodak et 
al 1999). Nevertheless, Smith (1999) asserts that these types of myths can be broken down 
into component parts – he calls them ethnic myths – that can be recognised in nearly all 
nationalist historical narratives, and the following typology is adopted directly from him.4
The initial myths of a nation deal with origins, ancestry and space. The myths of temporal 
origin seek to place the emergence of a nation in time. This is essential in order to determine 
the linearity in time between our forbears and us, or as he expresses it himself: ‘Fixed points 
in time act as barriers to the flood of meaninglessness’ (Smith 1999: 63). A myth of ancestry 
to historical characters is essential in order to explain development of the nation, and, further-
                                                 
4 Although Smith cannot be placed within the constructivist paradigm that constitutes the theoretical framework 
of this thesis, his approach is nevertheless useful for our understanding of how historical narratives are typically 
constructed. 
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more, for the symbolic relevance these characters have. This creates an opportunity for 
creating claims to direct descent and thus articulate the nation as an extended family. Myths 
of location – and migration – create the spatial element for claims to a territory, which is so 
central to nationalist ideology. These myths explain where we came from and how we got to 
where we are now. Just as the myths of origins create temporal barriers, myths of location 
create territorial barriers against flux and ‘aimless wandering’. A good example of the impor-
tance of spatial myths is evident in the Arab-Israeli conflict and both groups’ claims to 
history.  
Tracing the history of the nation through the ages characteristically falls into three epochs. 
The first one is the myth of the golden age, which traces the heroic and glorious past of the 
historically autonomous nation that was able to organise its own affairs. Closely linked to 
myths of ancestry, the heroes of the golden age are models in their values and their faith for 
the present-day nation, especially in the cases where the nation is oppressed. Frequently, 
archaeological artefacts will gain a new meaning when interpreted in view of the glorious 
past. In Syrian-Arab nationalism, for example, this Syrian-Arab Golden Age is represented by 
the Damascus-based Umayyad caliphate of the 8th century, which ruled before the Arab 
Middle East was taken over and dominated by non-Arab Muslims (Choueiri 2000).  
The second subsequent epoch is the myth of decline. The decline came about either due to 
neglect and decadence on part of the nation itself, or because of the invasion of barbarians 
who conquered the nation and repressed its culture. In some cases, the decline is so sudden or 
violent that we can speak of a national trauma and the subsequent portrayal of the nation as a 
victim. The fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453 played such a role in Greek nation-
alism: ‘It also entailed a sense of Greek Orthodox captivity, the Tourkokratia, which weighed 
down the Greek spirit and enchained the true faith’ (Smith 1999: 216, italics in original). 
Indeed, the sense of being a victim can give the impetus for extreme nationalist ideology 
justified by and impetus to get even with the perpetrators. 
 It is this supposed lingering desire to recover lost rights and liberties enjoyed during the 
golden age that leads to the third epoch. This is the myth of regeneration. This is the time of 
re-establishing the long-lost freedom of the golden age and of the reassertion of the nation and 
its culture. The heroes of the golden age are then the building blocks and the ideals of the 
nation reborn. During the Greek war of independence, for example, the Greek leaders would 
be likened to Achilles, even if Achilles was a mythical and not a historical character.  
A few other characteristics of certain nationalist myths are worth mentioning here. One is 
the exodus theme encountered at various points in myths, usually in order to escape injustice 
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or persecution and search for the land of freedom. Smith (2003) describes Afrikaner 
nationalism in South Africa as having a special commemoration of the mythical trek of 
Afrikaner pioneers who escaped British colonial rule by fleeing ‘into the wilderness’. There 
are strong parallels between how they chose to portray this event and the story of the Children 
of Israel in the Bible.  
The second one is that of the claim to a homeland. The spatial character of the myths, 
including the myths of location and migration, means that space becomes a carrier of history. 
Territories become historical landscapes with symbolic value because they are linked to 
defining historical events that took place there. The role of Kosovo in Serb nationalism is a 
case in point. The fields of Kosovopolje were the location of the 1389 defeat of the medieval 
Serbian empire by their later overlords, the Ottoman Turks. In this way, myths become title-
deeds of historical rights to a territory, eventually constituting a homeland, even if the nation 
no longer lives there. This is crucial in both Zionist and Armenian nationalisms. 
In conclusion 
The narrative theory presented here at the end constitutes a body of theory on its own, but it is 
related to constructivism by representing an approach to the construction of meaning. 
Whereas earlier approaches considered either the producer or the thing it represented as the 
carrier of meaning, the constructivist approach shows how meaning is socially constructed by 
the relational representation of it (Cobley 2001). In this manner, the way in which history is 
‘re-presented’ in the historical narrative gives it meaning through articulation. This is no 
different from the creation of any other discourse, even though historical narratives typically 
take on the form of objectivity, thus appearing natural and uncontested to us. Moreover, 
historical narratives are formative because the way we understand the past determines how we 
understand the present (Hodgkin & Radstone 2003a).  
As was mentioned in the methodology, the topic of this thesis means that discourse theory 
is a fruitful approach due to its conceptualisation of identity. When in the field, both historical 
narratives and discourse theory gives the possibility of ‘capturing’ the stories of the Alawis 
and analysing them according to the tools the theories make available. The point of departure 
will be what the sources say and not a specific theory that lays down causal relationships and 
sees the data as reflections of these. Identity is context-dependent and it is its contextual 
nature in Syria that is of interest here. This context is the topic of the next chapter before 
moving on to the findings in the analysis in chapters five, six, and seven.  
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4 THE CONTEXT 
 
Syria has become notorious in the West over the past decade as an enemy in the US’ war on 
terror, but most people know very little about internal Syrian politics or of its heterogeneous 
population. This chapter will attempt to give an understanding of the political forces that have 
shaped Syria over the last 100 years in order to give a background for the following three 
chapters constituting the analysis on the construction of Alawi identity in Syria. It is important 
to understand the role the Alawis have played in independent Syria and how the government 
constructs its politics in relation to sectarianism and religious extremism to get a grasp on the 
discourses my Alawi sources use.  
This chapter follows a different logic than the analysis, which relies on the voices of my 
sources. The aim here is to give an impression of how Syria and its sectarian issues are 
analysed by academics, and furthermore, how Alawis are understood by outsiders. This is to 
give a different view of the issues and to set the construction of Alawi identity in a wider 
socio-political context. However, it should not be taken as a ‘truth’ that is opposed to those 
presented later, but rather as complimentary to the construction of their world that my Alawi 
sources give. Furthermore, the wider context is especially important for the construction of 
the Official Discourse of the regime, which the two main Alawi discourses identified in this 
thesis are constructed in relation to.  
The first section in this chapter introduces the forces that gave rise to independent Syria 
and the Arab nationalism that has been formative for the official view on sectarian issues. 
This is followed by the role of the Alawis in the Syrian state and how some explain their 
politics as sectarian based and others as a result of class cleavages. A brief description of the 
supposed beliefs and organisation of the Alawi religion is also included here. The last part 
introduces the language of the present regime and how the regime, from the 1970s, has 
constructed the Official Discourse according to an ideal of sectarian co-existence.  
People and history 
Syria lies at a crossroads between the West and the East, between Christianity and Islam. This 
is seen as a curse and a blessing by Syrians in that it has left a rich cultural and religious 
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heritage, but also that outside powers have always had interests in the region. When we speak 
of Syria in a historical context, it is important to understand that we are speaking of Greater 
Syria, a geographical area with more or less natural boundaries and in many cases described 
as a cultural unit. Greater Syria loosely comprises present day Palestine and Israel, Jordan, 
Syria, Lebanon, and parts of southern Turkey. Contemporary Syria was created through a 
division of the French Mandate, which had been set up through the Treaty of Versailles’ 
division of the Ottoman Empire following its defeat in the First World War.  
The Syrian population has remnants of all the historical forces that have swept over the 
territory and consists of both different ethnic groups and different religious sects. Arabs – 
meaning Arabic speakers – constitute about 90 percent of the population, the Kurds about 
nine percent, and the remaining one percent consists mainly of Armenians and Circassians5 
(George 2003: 3-5). The religious make-up of Syria is more uncertain. The last census that 
counted sects and religious minorities took place in 1956 at a time when the population was 
eight million. At present, with a population of 18 million, the estimates are based on relative 
numbers 50 years and ten million people later. In 1956, the Sunnis constituted 75 percent of 
the population, the Alawis 11 percent, the Christians of different denominations 10 percent, 
and the Druze 3 percent (Khuri 1991: 49). In addition, there are smaller numbers of Isma’ilis, 
Twelver Shi’as, and other Shi’a minorities6. Recent estimates roughly follow these relative 
numbers, but it is likely that they have changed due to different birth rates and emigration, 
which differs between the groups. It should be noted, however, that even if three quarters of 
the population are Sunnis, the majority of the Kurds are part of this number. Since the Kurds 
are largely excluded from political life in Syria, those Sunnis who matter politically are the 
Sunni Arabs who thus constitute about two thirds of the total population (Leverett 2005: 2). 
The map on the next page shows the areas where the different sects are dominant.  
From 1516, Syria was under Ottoman suzerainty based on an Islamic identity. The 
Ottoman Empire was the seat of the Caliph – the formal head of Sunni Islam and successor of 
the Prophet. It was ruled along the lines of Shari’a, the religious laws based on the Qur’an and 
                                                 
5 Muslims that emigrated from the Caucasus in the 19th century following the Russian annexation of the region. 
6 Twelver Shi’ism refers to the vast majority of Shi’as and is called ‘Twelver’ as it denotes the number of imams 
they consider to be the rightful successors to the Prophet Muhammad (based on direct descent from the Prophet’s 
family). The first imam was Ali and the twelfth and last is in occultation (al-Mahdī) and will reappear on the Day 
of Resurrection. The Druze and the Isma’ilis are offshoots of Shi’ism. The Isma’ilis are Shi’as of the Sevener 
tradition, meaning that they diverge from the Twelvers in the succession of the seventh imam and have, over 
time, developed differently from the majority of Shi’as. The Druze diverged from the Isma’ilis in the 11th 
century and have developed their own body of religious doctrine more removed from traditional Shi’ism and 
many therefore see them as a distinct branch of Islam (Momen 1985).  
The Alawi relation to Shi’a Islam will be elaborated on further in chapter five.  
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(From: Leverett 2005: 3) 
 
the Hadith  (the  tradition  of  the  Prophet  Muhammad  written  down  after  his  death).  This  
guarantees the rights of the religious minorities who were Protected Peoples (dhimmah), 
which meant that Christians and Jews had the right to rule themselves in legal courts of 
personal law. This was organised as a system of Millets, which were largely autonomous units 
headed by a religious leader of the community who was responsible for administration and 
taxation on behalf of the Sultan. This religious tolerance is considered one of the reasons 
behind the stability of the Empire (Cleveland 1994). However, those minorities that were not 
recognised as millets, above all the Muslim non-Sunni minorities, were regularly persecuted. 
This was especially the case with the Shi’a Muslims, including the Alawis. At the time when 
European power in Ottoman lands increased throughout the 19th century, the main forms of 
identity and solidarity was sect, tribe or city (Hinnebusch 2001).  
When the French occupied what is today Syria and Lebanon – preceding a mandate from 
the League of Nations to ‘administer’ the former Ottoman territories until they could govern 
themselves (Great Britain was awarded Palestine) – they set them up as two different 
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mandates. Lebanon was established in order to give the Christians of Mount Lebanon 
autonomy, while Syria was subdivided into five states, of which two were based on the 
minorities living there namely the Druze and Alawi states. With the exception of the State of 
Alexandretta, which was ceded to Turkey, the other four states were merged into the Republic 
of Syria before the Second World War and gained full independence in 1946 (Cleveland 
1994).  
The struggle for independence in Syria had its roots in Arab nationalism, a movement that 
took shape in the middle of the 19th century and was pan-Arab in character. Until the first 
decade of the 20th century, it was only a fringe phenomenon. However, it became a serious 
political movement when it was adopted by the local elites seeking to forestall the perceived 
imminent takeover of the region by the European powers. The early formulation of Arab 
nationalism sought to create a synthesis between historical Arab greatness and its territory. 
The focus on ‘Arab’ as the ethnic base of the ideology was a result of the important 
contributions of Christians and other Arab minorities who sought to create a competing 
identity to the pan-Islamic identity that was taking shape in the waning Empire. In order to 
differentiate between the Arab nation as an ethnic base and the Islamic community with its 
religious base, a history was ‘invented’ of the early Arabs; of their historic Semitic roots tying 
them to the historic Semitic peoples of the Middle East. Although there is a glorification of 
the nomadic life of the Arab tribes of the Arabic Peninsula – especially in relation to their 
early poetic tradition not to mention the rise of Islam – the linking of the Arab civilisation to 
the settled Semitic cultures draws a continuous historic line to the present way of living 
(Choueiri 2000, Khoury 1991).  
The decline of the early Arab civilisation is partly attributed to outsiders and partly to a 
lack of unity among the Arabs. In this way, the nationalists were able to do two things: First, 
they could create ‘The Other’ as non-Arabs, and Turks in particular, by linking the decline 
with the arrival of Turkish and other non-Arab Muslims into the Arab lands during the 
Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad. Whereas they excuse the excesses of the preceding Umayyad 
dynasty in Damascus on the luxuries of settled life that corrupted the nomad warriors of 
Arabia, the later decline is blamed on the non-Arab outsiders. Second, by blaming this decline 
of civilisation on the lack of a unified Arabic front, including the internal quarrels of the 
Umayyad dynasty that cost it its stability, the nationalists made a compelling argument for a 
renewed Arab unity to reclaim lost greatness (Choueiri 2000). 
The Syrian Sunni elites who had dominated Syria under the Ottomans stayed in power 
during the French Mandate partly co-operating and partly opposing the French under the guise 
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of Arab nationalism. They constituted an urban class of ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie allied with 
the Sunni religious leaders largely separated from the mass of peasantry still living under a 
form of feudalism. In order to weaken the power of the local elites, the French encouraged the 
empowerment of the minorities, including the Alawis, Druze, and Christians. The Muslim 
sects were the most deprived and thus benefited the most in relative terms. They had a 
privileged role in the armed forces and over time, they rose in the officer corps while their 
civilian co-religionists filled the ranks of the emerging middle classes of teachers and civil 
servants. Seeing that their future laid within a unified Syria (however diminished from its 
historical size), the minorities threw their weight behind Arab nationalism, which promised 
equality and inclusion based on linguistic unity and secularism. This was also encouraged by 
the elites who needed to create a unifying identity instead of tribal and sectarian allegiances 
(van Dam 1996, Hinnebusch 2001).  
The Syrian elite’s nationalist discourse was based on the Western values of independence, 
constitutionalism, parliamentarianism and personal freedoms. In order to oppose the elites and 
their entrenched power, a more revolutionary form of Arab nationalism was taking form 
outside the traditional quarters of the elites. This counter-nationalism, however, had to be 
formulated using different sources of inspiration. In the hands of the emerging middle classes, 
it was coloured by class aspirations and with an emphasis on social and economic justice, and 
stressing pan-Arabism in opposition to the local power bases of the elites. Following 
independence, several political parties were established with this radical agenda (Dawisha 
2003, Khoury 1991). 
Through the decades following independence, the military became extremely politicised 
and praetorian. Different factions and branches seized power at various times, but it was the 
adherents of the Ba’th Party who would eventually come out on top. The Ba’th Party – 
meaning ‘Resurrection’ – was an Arab nationalist party in the radical sense with a populist 
appeal. It was able to forge an alliance between the middle classes and large parts of the 
peasantry, which brought it into parliament in the 1950s and it eventually seized power in 
1963 in a coup d’état. The regimes that followed were fiercely secular and socialist, nation-
alising all important sectors of the economy and in this way undercutting the traditional elites. 
Through agrarian reforms and active recruitment in the countryside coupled with social 
development and bureaucratic expansion, the party broadened its base to between one fourth 
and one third of the population in the mid-seventies. This was possible due to the fusing of the 
party with the state, thus, in effect, constructing a one-party state, which asserted control 
through corporatist mass organisations. In 1970, Hafiz al-Asad, an Alawi from the province of 
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Latakia who had been Minister of Defence in the government, deposed the President and 
brought his less radical faction to power and was made president the year after. During the 
following years, he turned away from the most radical policies of the Ba’th Party through his 
Corrective Movement, including the interests of greater segments of the population. But he 
also turned the state into a ‘presidential monarchy’ with no democratic outlets other than the 
party. The fact that he was an Alawi and that his closest supporters were from the same sect as 
him, would have consequences for how the regime was perceived by the Syrian population in 
the years to come (Hinnebusch 1991 and 2001).  
The Alawis 
As mentioned in the previous section, Alawis are believed to make up about 11 percent of the 
Syrian population, constituting about two million people. There are also many Alawis in the 
Arab minority in southern Turkey (above all in the province of Hatay (Alexandretta), which 
was part of Syria until 1939) and in northern Lebanon (where they are represented in 
parliament as an autonomous sect). In Syria, they mainly live on the Mediterranean coast in 
the provinces of Latakia and Tartous and in the coastal mountain range of the Jabal Ansariyeh 
(meaning the Alawi Mountains), which divides the coastal plain from Syria’s interior. There 
are also Alawi rural communities to the east of the Jabal Ansariyeh, and with increased 
migration and economic development there are Alawis living in the major cities of Damascus, 
Homs, Hama and Aleppo. Although Latakia and Tartous are dominated by Alawis, they are 
also home to large communities of Christians who have traditionally lived alongside them. 
There are also a considerable number of Sunnis, mostly living in the traditional urban centres 
of the main towns and cities along the coastline. The Alawis were later arrivals to these areas 
and some Sunnis feel that they ‘were there first.’ Landis (08.10.2004) writes that 
It should be remembered that in 1920 when the French extended their control over 
Syria, no Alawites were registered residents of the coastal cities - Latakia, Jable, 
Banias, or Tartus. They were effectively reserved for Sunnis and Christians. In fact, 
the first French census shows that Alawis and Sunnis lived together in no town with a 
population exceeding 200 inhabitants!...Alawis shared towns with Christians but not 
Sunnis. Only after the imposition of French rule did Alawis begin to migrate to the 
larger cities of the coast.  
The two groups live segregated to this day in different neighbourhoods of the cities. In 
Tartous, for example, the Sunnis mostly stick to the historical old city and the island of 
Arwad, while the newer neighbourhoods surrounding the centre are predominantly Alawi.  
The Alawis are a religious sect within the Twelver tradition of Shi’a Islam. They are 
Arabic speaking and are not identifiably different from other Syrians. There is therefore no 
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particular ethnic difference between them and the Sunni Muslim majority. Moreover, acc-
ording to Alawis and the Arabist ideology of the regime, they are Arabs. However, the 
colloquial Arabic spoken in the rural parts of this region pronounces the Arabic letter qāf, 
which in many other accents is a glottal stop. This sound is closely connected with Alawis 
(and Druze) and ridiculed in other parts of Syria and by the more ‘cosmopolitan’ Sunnis 
living in the cities on the coast. Their surnames can sometimes be identified as typically 
Alawi, but just as often, they might as well be Sunni. Their given names follow the same 
pattern. I have come across people accusing Alawis of using Western names, but none of my 
acquaintances have such names. This is probably an upper-class phenomenon, which one can 
find all over the world. As for the claim that Alawis give their children Arabic Christian 
names, they do share names with Christians, but reply that this is their tradition and the names 
are, as such, not only Christian.  
Even though the Alawis are considered only a religious sect, they can also be classified as 
an ethnic group because of the impermeable boundaries between the sects. Alternatively, they 
could be termed a communal group, but this term has been discarded here because they do not 
form a coherent political entity congruent with sectarian lines, like their counterparts in 
Lebanon. The issue here, though, is to recognise that they do not form only a certain branch of 
Islam, but a community who considers itself culturally and historically different from the 
other sects in Syria. As Antoun (1991: 10) writes: ‘The terms “Alawi” or “Shi’a” or 
“Maronite” refer not simply to an ethnic identity or a religious ideology, but also to a 
territory, a politico-economic system, a wide-ranging cultural repertoire, and a history.’ As 
will be argued in this thesis, their difference can be traced to the perception that they have 
been expelled from the Islamic community against their will and how they have always 
opposed the power of the Sunni Muslims. 
Historically, the Alawis were confined to the Jabal Ansariyeh and persecuted due to their 
status as apostates and heretical Muslims and were considered savage mountain people who 
were a threat to the settled life of the cultivated plains (their own historical narrative is the 
topic of chapter five). As they were incorporated into the capitalist system under the Ottoman 
Empire, they were turned into indentured peasants and exploited. During the French Mandate, 
however, they had a favoured position together with the other minorities, and it was parti-
cularly within the army that they would prosper as other sectors of society were closed to 
them due to their poverty (Batatu 1999, van Dam 1996).  
Fiercely secular, they joined the radical Arab nationalist parties and became very 
important in the Ba’th Party, especially when the Latakia branch of the party became the 
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dominant one. The empowerment of the Alawis reached its zenith with the presidency of 
Hafiz al-Asad and his regime. A typical claim one hears and reads in the press is that the 
Syrian regime is ‘Alawi’, meaning that the state is by and for Alawis. Van Dam (1996) 
diversifies this picture in his research on the sectarian character of the Syrian state and its 
policies. He argues that even though sectarian, tribal, and regional ties were essential for the 
monopolisation of power following the Ba’th Party takeover in 1963, these ties unified key 
sectors of the armed forces and the political factions, in effect stabilising the situation in 
Syria. This continued under the presidency of Hafiz al-Asad in that he placed people he could 
rely on – from his own town or officer colleagues – in key positions in the armed forces and 
the powerful intelligence services. Due to his background, many of these were necessarily 
Alawis. Considering that class and socio-economic status in Syria closely followed sectarian 
and regional fault lines, it is not surprising that certain minorities became largely 
overrepresented in the political and military elites when they overthrew the ruling classes as 
they went on to favour members from their own deprived classes. 
In order to consolidate their power, therefore, the new elites relied on people from their 
own communities and regions, something that is not surprising since it would be easier to find 
loyal colleagues among people with similar backgrounds. However, this also gave their 
opponents the means to undermine the regime by exploiting the sectarian character of the 
regime, which again gave those in power another reason to only trust ‘their own’. Further-
more, the favouring of the earlier neglected provinces and regions of the minorities gave 
another dimension to the perception of sectarian favouritism, just like the empowerment of 
the peasantry meant diminishing power for the urban classes who had traditionally held power 
(van Dam 1996). Hinnebusch (1991: 47, italics in original) concludes that sectarianism cannot 
explain the dynamic of the regime, only how it represents a whole class: 
[T]he importance of minority groups, notably the Alawis, has been their role as 
advance guard of an elite or as class coalitions rather than as sects per se. They 
played the role of class vanguard, then shield of state formation; they now appear as 
both spearheads of embourgeoisement and restratification, and as the target against 
which antiregime class coalitions have coalesced.  
But many other groups and interests were built into the system, creating what he calls a 
‘Bonapartist’ state where so many people and groups – including both Alawis and Sunnis – 
had interests. This was why it survived the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood (returned to in 
chapter seven) in the late seventies and early eighties: 
[W]ith few exceptions, the constituency incorporated into the state – the army, 
salaried bureaucracy, peasantry, Damascene bourgeoisie, much of it Sunni – did not 
unravel. The Ba’thist state proved a more formidable structure than many had 
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anticipated. It was clearly built of sturdier cement than mere Alawi dominance and 
incorporated a multitude of interests beyond the ambitions of a handful of Alawi 
generals. (Hinnebusch 1991: 44) 
However, the Alawis did enrich themselves following the revolution of 1963, something that 
was even more spectacular due to their dirt-poor situation only a generation earlier. They did 
function as a privileged recruitment pool for positions in the bureaucracy and the military, but 
the improvement of peasant life-styles and not least the fact that they seized the opportunities 
for education both in Syria and abroad was probably also an element to their rise from poverty 
to middle-class as a group (Hinnebusch 1991).  
 
The ‘problem’ of having Alawis in power in Syria has a second dimension. One of the reasons 
they have been persecuted and treated badly until modern times was the perception of them by 
the dominant Sunnis. They would describe Alawi beliefs as kufr; the rejection of Islamic faith. 
This was obviously still the case when the leaders of Alaouites – the separate state set up for 
the Alawis under the French Mandate – pleaded with the French to reconsider its inclusion in 
the Syrian Republic: 
The Alawites refuse to be annexed to Muslim Syria because, in Syria, the official 
religion of the state is Islam, and according to Islam, the Alawites are considered 
infidels....The spirit of hatred and fanaticism imbedded in the hearts of the Arab 
Muslims against everything that is non-Muslim has been perpetually nurtured by the 
Islamic religion. There is no hope that the situation will ever change. Therefore, the 
abolition of the mandate will expose the minorities in Syria to the dangers of death 
and annihilation, irrespective of the fact that such abolition will annihilate the 
freedom of thought and belief....We assure you that treaties have no value in relation 
to the Islamic mentality in Syria. We have previously seen this situation in the 
Anglo-Iraqi treaty, which did not prevent the Iraqis from slaughtering the [Christian] 
Assyrians and the Yezidis [in 1933]. (Landis 11.08.2004) 
Fairly little is known about the tenets and beliefs in the Alawi religion. This is due to the 
secrecy that their beliefs are based on, a secrecy that is one of the main themes of this thesis. 
What has been written about Alawism is largely based on travel accounts from European 
travellers through the 18th, 19th, and early 20th century, describing a faith based on both 
Islamic, pagan and Christian influences, or this is at least how they saw it through their own 
Western eyes. Of the theology of the Alawis, nearly all of it is based on the publication of one 
of their secret holy books, the Kitāb al-Majmū‘, in 1859. It explains that Alawi society is 
divided between the Initiated and the Masses, where only the former are allowed to learn the 
inner secrets of the faith whereas the latter group should only know the most basic beliefs and 
honour the saints and the feasts. The faith revolves around the belief in the cyclical nature of 
the world, where all religious revelations come in the form of a divine triad of the Hidden 
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Meaning of God, the Meaning’s External Expression, and the Proselytiser. The last revelation 
was the Islamic one, where Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law, was the divinity, 
Muhammad was his expression, and Salmān al-Fārisī, one of the Prophet’s companions, the 
expression’s communicator. The book thus seems to place Prophet Muhammad below Ali, 
who traditionally has this position in Shi’a Islam, but furthermore to give him a divine status, 
which is against the teachings of both Sunni and Shi’a Islam and their emphasis on the human 
nature of them both. This is why they are referred to as ghulāt in Shi’a terminology: those 
who go too far in their veneration of Ali. The book also confirms the accounts of the belief in 
the transmigration of souls and other beliefs not in accordance with dogmatic Islam (Kramer 
1987, Batatu 1999).  
What is described in the Kitāb al-Majmū‘, in addition to other rumours about their beliefs, 
has lead to the declaration of Alawis as unbelievers by orthodox Sunnis, rejecting the Alawis’ 
claim to be Muslims. Also, among the Shi’a, they have a dubious status because they are 
considered to deify Ali, a practice that is widespread in many Shi’a sects, but not considered 
acceptable in mainstream Shi’ism. From the Sunnis ruling Syria from the middle ages, and 
even from Muslim extremists in recent times, it is claimed that the Alawis only take on the 
guise of Islam in order to protect themselves, but in their hearts they are apostates who should 
be forced to convert to mainstream Islam or killed. The absence of mosques in Alawi areas 
and the fact that the religious shaykhs felt the need to keep their religion secret have fuelled 
the speculations about them (Kramer 1987, Batatu 1999). 
Whether these beliefs represent the Alawis as a whole, a group of Alawis, or none of 
them, is impossible to verify. I will present some of the views I have encountered, but they do 
not represent anything new as such. Furthermore, the Kitāb al-Majmū‘ was revealed by an 
Alawi who had first converted to Judaism, then Sunni Islam, and finally Christianity, before 
being assassinated (Batatu 1999). His reasons for publishing the book and the Alawi secrets 
are therefore unknown and open to speculation. Considering that it is one of several holy 
books, it should be expected that there is more to their beliefs than this, especially if we try to 
imagine what kind of view one would be left with of Christianity if it were judged solely on 
the basis of one of the gospels in the New Testament.  
In 1973, eighty Alawi shaykhs issued a formal statement, probably on the request of the 
president, that the rumours about Alawi beliefs were ‘slander’ and based on the ‘burrowing in 
the past and reiterating inventions by the enemies of Arabism and Islam’ (Batatu 1999: 20). 
They went on to affirm that their book is the Qur’an and that they are Shi’a Muslims of the 
Twelver tradition. However, there seems to be internal disagreement between different cults 
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within the Alawi religion on certain issues. According to Batatu (1999), that same year a con-
ference was held in a secret location in Syria in order to come to an agreement on contentious 
theological issues. Allegedly, the most senior shaykh in the conference argued that the 
deification of Ali was a result of ignorance and of not trying to reconcile these beliefs with the 
Qur’an. But the disagreements point to divisions between the shaykhs present.  
The purported divisions are compounded by a lack of religious hierarchy or accepted 
leadership, as well as the existence of different cults with different traditions among the 
Alawis. Alawism, as will be followed up on in the next chapter, does not have a tradition of 
imposing religious rules on its followers and in matters of faith. It is inward-looking and 
private rather than public and based on outwardly appearances. Religious questions are to be 
meditated upon, which explains the lack of outward organised religion (Khuri 1991). There 
are also tribal differences dividing the Alawi community. However, these have all but dis-
appeared in coastal Syria and also seem to have lost some of their power among the younger 
generations in the mountains (Hinnebusch 2001). None of my sources has placed any 
importance in these tribal ties, unlike the differences between the Alawi cults, which some say 
have an impact on beliefs.  
At any rate, the belief that the Alawis were heretics was a point of concern for the Alawis 
from the incorporation of the Alawi state into Syria during the French Mandate. Whereas the 
French had encouraged the Alawis to define themselves as a separate religion, much like the 
Druze chose to do, the Alawi leaders insisted on belonging to the Twelver (Ja‘fari) tradition 
within Shi’a Islam from the 1920s, and this was renewed when it became obvious that their 
future laid within a Sunni dominated Syria (Landis 2003). Kramer (1987) writes that the 
Sunnis were equally eager to incorporate the Alawis and in 1936 it took reciprocal form when 
the Alawi leaders proclaimed that they were Muslims and believed in the profession of the 
faith7 and followed the five Pillars of Islam8. At the same time, the Grand Mufti of Palestine 
issued a religious decree that the Alawis were good Muslims. Considering that the Alawis 
claimed to be Twelver Shi’as, Kramer points out that it is remarkable that no Shi’a authority 
had extended its support to their claim. There were attempts to co-operate with the Shi’a 
academies in Iran and Iraq after independence, but nothing was ever formalised.  
Once the Alawi Hafiz al-Asad came to power in 1970, the issue took on new importance, 
principally because the new constitution stated that the president of the state has to be Muslim 
                                                 
7 There is no God but God and Muhammad is his Prophet 
8 The profession of faith (Shahādah), the ritual prayer (Salāt), the almsgiving (zakāt), the fasting during the holy 
month of Ramadan (Sawm), and the pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj). 
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– something that had to be included following unrest when any reference to Islam as the 
religion of the state was removed. Landis (2003) amongst others claims that the policies of the 
regime to turn the Alawis into good Muslims, both through outside support and reforms from 
within, have been implemented in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime and its 
president. To gain legitimacy as Muslims, al-Asad turned to the spiritual leader of the Shi’a 
community in Lebanon, Imam Musa as-Sadr. He recognised them as Shi’as in 1973 at the 
same time as the Alawi shaykhs issued a similar statement mentioned above, even though the 
Alawi religious shaykhs have never shared their beliefs with any Shi’a authority nor accepted 
external authority over their religion (Kramer 1987).  
The ‘secular’ state and the Official Discourse 
The Ba’th Party had always been very secular and it sought to forge a new Arab unity over 
what it saw as regressive and disruptive sectarian and tribal identities. Although it acknow-
ledged Islam as culturally and religiously central to the Arabs, it was seen as a result of 
inherent Arab greatness (Choueiri 2000). However, in Ba’th Party ideology, religion should 
be secondary to Arab identity and a question of personal beliefs. Yet, the conviction that the 
Arab identity should be primary did not coincide with how all Syrians saw themselves. The 
government also had to deal with religious leaders who still wielded considerable influence in 
their communities, and this was particularly the case with the Sunni clergy. When Hafiz al-
Asad came to power, he realised that in order to stabilise the country, he would have to make 
concessions to the Sunnis. Through his Corrective Movement, he sought to redo the most 
radical secular reforms of the earlier Ba’th regimes. In order to limit the clergy’s influence in 
the political sphere, he co-opted them by giving them increased power in the social realm. 
Therefore, instead of building a true secular society, the state was secular on the surface, but 
not in matters of family and personal law. Instead, this was governed by religious legislation 
for each religious community, meaning that Muslims are governed by Islamic Shari’a law and 
Christians by their churches’ religious rules (Landis 08.10.2004).   
As political Islam became a stronger force, the immediate reaction was to clamp down on 
it, with the regime’s most extreme reactions during the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
the late 1970s and its final bloody culmination in 1982 (see chapter seven). However, al-Asad 
also bolstered the power of the moderate forces among the Sunni clergy in order to cut off the 
extreme elements, at the same time as having all mosques and Qur’anic schools under close 
surveillance and control. In this way, he tried to control the Sunnis by channelling them into 
acceptable forms of Sunni Islam not opposed to neither him nor the Alawis. However, this 
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also meant turning the Alawis into good Muslims in the eyes of the Sunnis. The Alawis were 
from now on just considered Muslims. Even if the president insisted that Alawis are Twelver 
Shi’as, they were not allowed separate religious courts based on the Shi’a Ja’fari Shari’a, but 
instead came under Sunni legislation. Similarly, any references to sectarian differences were 
discouraged in favour of an all-embracing Islamic identity. This suppression of sectarian 
issues is apparent in the renaming of many regions in Syria that used to refer to the religion of 
its inhabitants. The Jabal ad-Durūz (the Druze Mountains) in southern Syria were renamed 
Jabal al-Arab (the Arab Mountains) and the Jabal Ansariyeh or the Alawi Mountains are now 
officially referred to as al-Jabal al-Akhdar, the Green Mountains. Similarly, sect used to be 
printed on Syrian id-cards, but this practice has now been discontinued (van Dam 1989 and 
1996, Hinnebusch 2001).  
Instead of allowing the Alawis and their religious shaykhs to define themselves, they were 
forced to conform to the Sunni Islamic notion of what is correct Islam. Landis (2003) says 
that instead of turning Sunnis into good liberals, Alawis were turned into good Sunnis. The 
downplaying of sectarian identities is visible at several levels. Organisation of Alawis along 
purely sectarian lines, is therefore seen as even more undesirable than of the other sects in 
Syria. When Jamil al-Asad, one of the brothers of Hafiz al-Asad, organised a political 
organisation that mobilised part of the Alawi community in the early 1980s, it was soon 
disbanded on the president’s orders (van Dam 1996). Similarly, he has reportedly used his 
influence with the Alawi religious shaykhs to tone down those beliefs that are deemed un-
Islamic and to conform to Shi’a beliefs. This was especially the case for the ‘excessive’ 
veneration of Ali. He also wanted to be a good ‘Sunnified’ example through his behaviour 
and he therefore fasted and prayed in the Sunni manner. He reportedly also built mosques in 
Alawi villages and organised Alawis to go on the Hajj Pilgrimage to Mecca (Kramer 1987, 
Landis 08.10.2004). 
The discouragement of a separate Alawi identity is visible in the curriculum of religious 
education in Syrian schools studied by Landis (2003). For two to three hours each week for 
twelve years, Syrian students study either Christianity or Islam. However, the Islam presented 
in the schoolbooks is that of orthodox Sunni Islam, and there is no mention of the Islamic 
minorities living in Syria or of Shi’a Islam as a whole, or even of the different schools of 
thought within Sunni Islam. According to the schoolbooks, there is no diversity within Islam. 
This means that Alawism is never mentioned in schools in Syria – the epitome the Official 
Discourse – and it falls implicitly under Islam. Syrians, therefore, learn nothing about each 
other’s beliefs and differences, and what they know or think they know is based on rumours 
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and stories passed on from friends and relatives. There are countless stories about the Alawis, 
many of which have been retold to me by non-Alawi Syrians, and this is something the 
Alawis I have spoken to know very well. In many of the conversations I have had, they refer 
to these Myths about the Alawis, which they are powerless to refute since there is no public 
mention of it. Their defensiveness in relation to these myths forms an important part of how 
Alawis portray themselves to non-Alawis. Karfan (02.05.2005) gives a good example of these 
myths from his time as a conscript in the Syrian army: 
That is why Karfan accepted his new assignment few months later of becoming the 
Psychological Warfare Officer (A Baath Party officer who is responsible for the party 
and propaganda affairs in the unit). The real joke was that Karfan never have been a 
Baathi in his entire life. The unit commander was an ignorant from Dara'a who 
thought that just because Karfan is from Tartous and Alawie, then he is certainly a 
member of the Baath! Theses are the sort of Myths that many has on the miserable 
Alawie population who was not lucky enough to be blessed of belonging to the 
entourage of our Lord the King Lion [Hafiz al-Asad]. Despite the fact that someone 
like Karfan is on the bottom of the bottoms in the social hierarchy of this country's 
society, many think that he is Baathi, he is certainly working for the secret service, 
and he has certainly very well established connections among the upper command! 
Why? Just because he is an Alawie by birth, regardless of the fact that his belief in 
religions is not much firmer than his belief in Mickey Mouse.  
To replace sectarianism, the regime has adopted an Official Discourse that ignores sectarian 
differences as potential friction. Nome (unpublished), who has done research on inter-
religious dialogue in Syria, describes this discourse as a discourse of harmony. Parts of this 
discourse were described earlier where a monolithic Sunni Islam is depicted as the one Islam 
that unites all Islamic sects. Additionally, this Official Discourse propagates a view that 
religious differences are only positive and that no minority is treated like a minority, but as 
part of a whole. The main theme is that all religions are ultimately the same religion and that 
all believers are therefore brothers. The country – meaning both Syria and the greater Arab 
homeland – is the unifying factor of all Syrians regardless of faith. The historical narrative in 
the Official Discourse is thus that all sects and religions have always lived peacefully 
together, and to the extent that there has been conflict, this has been for reasons other than 
religion or the perpetrators have been misguided, as is the case with Muslim extremists. Unity 
is essential to the discourse, and in this way, speaking of sectarian differences therefore 
becomes a threat to the discourse. Sectarianism comes to symbolise the break-up of the state 
and is a threat to the ideal of peaceful co-existence.  
This is the public transcript in Scott’s (1990) terms and it defines what is acceptable talk 
in public, both for the dominant and for the subordinates. And central to the public transcript 
is, of course, the notion of unanimity. If people do not seem to agree to the transcript, it does 
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not have any power. With the political situation in Syria, any talk that contradicts the 
discourse of the government is dangerous, which is why this author has often been called just 
that when pointing out the faults of the government line. The Official Discourse is 
consequently the discourse almost all Syrians draw on when speaking about sectarian issues, 
at least until they trust somebody to reveal their hidden transcript. 
In conclusion 
Antoun (1991) writes that there are two ways we can understand Syria. The first focuses on 
the mosaic of peoples divided between religions, sects, ethnicity, tribes, clans, regions, 
extended families and so on and that these can explain history in the way their difference in 
‘culture’ has led to clashes. The second one is class-based and understands the conflicts in 
Syria as social dislocations between different classes, be they peasants versus landlords or the 
middle classes versus the urban merchant classes. Both seem to be relevant because they in 
many cases have coincided. When class differences largely follow ethnic or sectarian lines, 
‘primordial ties’ can easily be used both to mobilise the classes or to blame them for prefe-
rential treatment. Therefore, in the case of Syria, the rise of the Alawis and their seeming hold 
on power can be explained by factors other than sectarian patronage or loyalty. However, 
religion and sect are powerful categories in Syria, and when people use these to explain 
history and social circumstances they become real because people believe them to be real. As 
certain cases will show through this thesis, categorisation according to sect is essential in the 
construction of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, and the willingness to take other differences into account is 
typically only the case when something reflects badly on the community.  
The denial of sectarian tensions in Syria in the Official Discourse only helps to strengthen 
the notion that sect is a powerful category. It tries to blur the differences between the Islamic 
sects in Syria and to make the ideal – that all believers are brothers and that there are no major 
differences between faiths and that those who propagate differences are trying to split the 
population and create chaos – come true by claiming it is already the case. In the discourse 
perspective, this Official Discourse came about through a hegemonic intervention to 
superimpose itself on several different sectarian discourses. It was imposed through the use of 
force and is maintained through the threat of transgression. However, the strength of the 
Sunni discourse, which was established through the power the Sunnis have wielded in Syria 
over time, is apparent in how the Official Discourse seems to grant it the power of definition 
on important areas, above all the subject positions available within Islam, as long as it does 
not threaten the civil rights of non-Sunnis. 
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5 CONSTRUCTING HISTORY 
 
As was mentioned in the methodology, the purpose here is to get an idea of how Alawis them-
selves ‘re-present’ their story and the narratives they use. The following account is based on 
my sources and their narration. Not surprisingly, most of them excuse themselves for not 
knowing enough about their history, and a few have referred me to other sources who are 
supposed to know much more than them. In other words, this chapter does in no way try to 
give a balanced or comprehensive account of Alawi history or theology. Instead, it is an 
account of everyday representations of Alawi history and its principal events, as taught to 
Alawis at home. In addition, I will draw on the descriptions used on the Arabic-language 
website alaweenonline.com (see page 19) in order to juxtapose the narrative of my sources 
and a website that, largely, follows the Official Discourse.  
The narratives of my sources are surprisingly unvarying, indicating a widespread 
unanimity in their historical discourse. In all accounts, though, the frontier formation for their 
identity takes place through the conflict with the Sunnis, which are the Alawis’ ‘The Other’. 
The perceived hegemony the Sunnis have achieved through their historical dominance is 
constitutive for the discourses found among Alawis. This discourses, as will be explained, 
diverge into what I call the Islamic Discourse and the Critical Discourse when it comes to 
their representation of their closeness to mainstream Islam.  
The historical narrative I have encountered during my fieldwork has many parallels to 
Smith’s (1999) classification of myths in nationalist movements. I have therefore chosen to 
divide the sections according to his theory, dividing it according to the myths of origins, 
myths of a distant Golden Age, myths of a subsequent Decline, and finally the myths of 
Regeneration. To begin with, though, the different names of the Alawis and their origins and 
beliefs will be explored. 
In the beginning, there was the name? 
The name chosen here, Alawis (‘alawīūn), is the name used for the Alawis in Syria today, 
both by themselves and in the Official Discourse (to the extent that they are mentioned at all). 
Whether the Alawis have always referred to themselves thus, is unknown, but to quote from 
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an e-mail I received from one of my sources: ‘There is no first name for Alawis. We’re called 
Alawis because we belong to the school of al-Imam Ali Ibn Abi Taleb…and are the followers 
of this great teacher Ali.’ Ali was the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad and was the 
fourth caliph, the rightful successor of the Prophet and the chosen leader of the Islamic 
community according to the Sunni Muslim tradition, after the Prophet’s death. The Shi’a 
Muslims, on the other hand, diverged as a sect in the belief that the Prophet’s successors 
should only come from his own family – the Ahl al-Bayt – and Ali was thus the last rightful 
caliph. Alawis place great importance on Ali – in some accounts elevating him to near divine 
status – and acknowledge the twelve imams that the Shi’as consider the ‘true’ successors of 
the Prophet, thus officially placing themselves within the Shi’a tradition in Islam.  
A second name used for the Alawis found in historical accounts and sometimes used by 
Sunnis in Syria is Nusayris (nuşayrīūn) or sometimes Ansaris (anşārīūn). The name stems 
from Mohammad Ibn Nusayr who was a student of the Shi’a eleventh imam and who is 
considered the founder of the Alawi religion. The reason for its unpopular status among 
Alawis is the derogatory nature it has attained. By accentuating the name of the person they 
are supposedly following, they become followers of a human being rather than God or his 
prophets. Alawi, on the other hand, has the divine and Islamic ring worthy of their religion 
and draws attention to the teacher they follow: Imam Ali.  
When inquiring further about this name, two of my sources have also mentioned that there 
is another theory to the Nusayri name, which is only derogatory and invented by outsiders. By 
being a diminutive form as the same root as Christian (naşrānī), it means in effect little Chris-
tians. This refers, they say, to myths about them that allege that they mix Christianity with 
their beliefs. A second derogatory name one of my sources mentioned is ‘people from the 
mountains’ (sha‘b al-jibāl). This refers to the geographical origins of the Alawis and empha-
sises their wild and ‘uncivilised’ nature. In the same vein, the Alawis are told to ‘go back to 
their mountains’ in offensive statements.  
The Alawi name seems to be entrenched in Syria at present, possibly due to its use in the 
Official Discourse, and carries a neutral or positive meaning and an Islamic character. There-
fore, those who speak of them in deprecating terms, above all the Sunnis who want to imply 
that Alawis are not Muslims, still use the term Nusayris (van Dam 1989). Interestingly, the 
website alaweenonline.com, which has as its stated goal to build a bridge of trust between 
Alawis and the rest of the Islamic community, consistently use the term Alawi Muslims. This 
is consistent with the content of the website, which follows the Official Discourse of Islamic 
unity very closely. By employing such a term, they narrow the gap between Alawis and other 
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Muslims by saying that ‘We are Muslims of a certain kind’ – as one uses the term Shi’a 
Muslims – instead of just being ‘Followers of Ali’. The website, in its exploration into the 
differences between Shi’as and Alawis9, which they characterise as miniscule and based on 
misunderstandings, claims that the Alawis and the Shi’as never separated. They portray the 
Alawis as complete Shi’as who only disagree on what was ultimately confusion over Ibn 
Nusayr’s claim to be an imam.  
 Once, when speaking about the topic of names, the two Alawis present were annoyed at 
my question about what the Sunnis call them. They said that even the term Alawi to them is 
meaningless as they are just Muslims, even if they have somewhat different beliefs than the 
Sunnis. It has been the Sunnis, after all, who have forced the name on the Alawis in order to 
make a distinction between the two sects. In other words, the majority chose to expel them to 
their constitutive outside and these two Alawis point out that the Alawis have never sought to 
take this position. The Sunnis, however, have hijacked the Muslim name by taking their name 
from the Sunnah, the tradition of the Prophet. This is the first indication of the Sunni 
discursive hegemony, which will be revisited throughout this thesis. Through their historical 
dominance, they acquired discursive power and were able to define the nodal points ‘Islam’ 
and ‘Muslim’ accordingly. The antagonistic relationship of Alawi discourses to this 
hegemony is the topic of the last section of this chapter. 
Origins and beliefs 
The origins of the Alawis are shrouded in the fog of time and politics. This is especially the 
case for how my sources begin their historical narratives. Whereas the majority align their 
history with that of Islam, and of Shi’a Islam in particular – a discourse I have therefore 
chosen to call the Islamic Discourse – there is a minority that diverges radically from this 
viewpoint. This discourse is referred to as the Critical Discourse and it emphasises roots and 
beliefs that are not acceptable to mainstream Islam today. This past is the most mythical and 
is based in antiquity. One source in particular says that the Alawi holy books trace their 
ancestry back to the Greek civilisation and mention Alexander the Great as an Alawi. 
The Critical Discourse affirms the Islamic beliefs of Alawis in the person of Ali, but it 
claims that Ali was only the last and most important prophet in a long line of revelations 
stretching back to the Greeks. The revelations are manifestations of God and take the form of 
a Trinity, not unlike that in Christianity according to one source. The most recent 
manifestation was a trinity of the Prophet Muhammad, Imam Ali and Salmān al-Fārisī, one of 
                                                 
9 http://www.alaweenonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=105
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the Prophet’s closest companions and a later supporter of Ali during the conflict over who 
was to succeed the Prophet. Batatu (1999: 18) explains this trinity as Ali being the (hidden) 
meaning of the deity (al-Ma’na), the Prophet Muhammad his manifestation (al-Ism) and 
Salmān al-Fārisī as the gate through which the message is delivered (al-Bāb). In other words, 
Ali is the most central point and the line between the divine and the earthly seems blurred. 
The Alawis also recognise the other Islamic prophets, the same we find in the Old and New 
Testaments, but accordingly appearing in trinities as well.  
Another element in Alawi beliefs termed esoteric, and therefore not acceptable Islam, is 
the belief in the transmigration of souls. Like many other sects in the Middle East and Asia, 
they believe that when a person dies he will be reincarnated in accordance with the life he 
lived. The rebirth can take the shape of both humans or of animals. This process works as a 
purification of the soul, where it will move upwards in stages until it finally becomes a star 
and takes its place with God. Although this belief was told to me by the aforementioned 
source in a confidential manner, this tenet is well known and other sources otherwise adhering 
to the Islamic Discourse also discussed this freely.  
The Islamic Discourse traces the Alawi origins back to the 9th century and to their 
divergence from Shi’a Islam. Their ancestry is Islamic and doctrinally fixed in that religion. 
However, my sources with academic backgrounds – while speaking of the transmigration of 
souls – acknowledge roots in beliefs and practices predating Islam. They differ from the 
Critical Discourse, though, in placing the reasons for this in the oppositional character of 
Alawism and Shi’ism and that this position meant that they sought ideas that were contrary to 
the orthodox Sunni views. One of these sources specifically mentions Christian and Kurdish 
influences as possible unorthodox sources.  
At any rate, where the Islamic Discourse situates Alawism’s temporal origins in its devi-
ation from Shi’a Islam with the teachings of Ibn Nusayr, it converges with the Critical 
Discourse. From this point, the narratives of all my sources follow more or less the same path, 
a path they describe as sharing with the Shi’as. The numerical and political superiority of the 
Sunnis led to repression and persecution. From having been spread all over the Middle East, 
but concentrated in Iraq and Persia, the Alawis migrated towards the western part of Greater 
Syria where they were able to live under more secure circumstances for a while. They thus 
describe their story as being a sect that was spread over the Islamic world, but was forced to 
flee, in the form of a first exodus or a great trek, to lands that today constitute Turkey, Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. This spatial element is interesting because they were 
later concentrated even further into where they live now due to renewed persecution. 
 56
However, one of my academic sources said that there are also Alawis living in Iran, Iraq, 
Turkey and the Balkans, but that they have different names and it would require research to 
identify them. This story is reminiscent of the story of the lost tribes of Israel in that they 
became separated from their people and now live in unknown lands far away.  
The Golden Age 
What can be described as the Alawis’ Golden Age, albeit brief, is the time after their mig-
ration to Syria and their establishment of an Alawi state. This does not mean that my sources 
depict this as a peaceful or easy time for the Alawis, but they were able to manage their own 
affairs in a corner of the Islamic world. The epitome of their autonomy was in the 10th century 
with the state of Aleppo, a frontier state bordering the Christian Byzantine Empire. Their 
greatest hero was its most famous ruler Sayf ad-Dawla. He is famous in Islamic history for his 
struggles against the Byzantine Empire and Alawis are eager to point out that he was an 
Alawi. The fact that he has never been acknowledged as an Alawi is something they see as a 
Sunni conspiracy to divest the Alawis of the credit they deserve.  
Aleppo soon succumbed to pressure from both the Byzantines and other Muslim states and 
the Alawis’ position became a difficult one. However, a balance was somewhat restored for a 
period with the arrival of the Crusaders to the Holy Land at the end of the 11th century. They 
established kingdoms all along the Mediterranean coast and my Alawi sources describe the 
relationship between the Christian Crusaders and the Alawis as one of mutual co-operation. 
This description of the Crusades is unusual as the Crusades are usually depicted as a disaster 
in Arabic history. To Alawis, apparently, it was good fortune and one of my sources describes 
this co-operation as ‘the beginning of a long and solid historical relationship between 
Christians and Alawis’, which is how the relationship with Syria’s Christian majority is 
described today and which will be examined further in chapter six. There is an element of 
ancestry in the co-operation with the Crusaders in that there was widespread intermarriage 
between Crusaders and Alawis according to some, something that they say explains the fair 
complexion of many Alawis today. 
Alawis and Crusaders apparently found common cause in battling the Sunni Muslim 
forces, the Alawis’ traditional oppressor, above all after the resistance of the Islamic forces 
gained momentum in the 12th century under the standard of Saladdin, and later on under the 
Egyptian Mamluk forces. In Arabic history, Saladdin is a great hero who rallied the Muslim 
forces under the banner of Jihad and re-conquered Jerusalem from the Christian infidels. 
Nonetheless, in the Alawi narrative, he was the one who laid the foundation for the Sunni 
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Muslim resurgence and subsequent persecution of the Alawis. It should be mentioned, 
however, that the co-operation between Alawis and Crusaders is sometimes also portrayed as 
an alliance of necessity along the lines of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’.  
The Decline and Trauma 
The Golden Age was brief, though, and with the defeat of the outside helper, the Alawis 
started their descent into a very long decline. This period is also the one most of my sources 
feel most secure talking about, as it contains the most defining events of Alawi historical 
narrative. It contains the trauma of the sect so to speak by being uprooted and marginalised, 
not to mentioned oppressed and massacred, for the next six centuries.  
Widespread persecution started properly in 1266 when the Mamluk Sultan Baybars, who 
is another hero in the Middle East for expelling the last Crusaders from the region, issued a 
decree stating that the official religion of their empire would be Sunni Islam and that people 
confessing other faiths would not have access to public positions in administration or 
education. According to a source from Tartous, this first meant that the Alawis, having been a 
prosperous group in Aleppo and the other major cities in Syria, were marginalised. Then in 
1305, something took place that embodies the trauma of the Alawis and laid the groundwork 
for the persecution they have experienced ever since.  In this year the Islamic scholar Ibn 
Taymiyyah, who’s writings became an important source of inspiration for 20th century 
Salafist Islamists and their use of takfir10, issued a fatwa (religious decree) declaring that 
the Nusayris are more infidel than Jews or Christians, even more infidel than many 
polytheists. They have done greater harm to the community of Muhammad than have 
the warring infidels such as the Franks [Crusaders], the Turks, and others. To 
ignorant Muslims they pretend to be Shi'is, though in reality they do not believe in 
God or His prophet or His book…[W]ar and punishment in accordance with Islamic 
law against them are among the greatest of pious deeds and the most important 
obligations. (Pipes 1990: 163) 
According to my Alawi sources, Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa was very influential, and what had 
earlier been repression and maltreatment now turned into persecution and brutal killings.  
The most famous massacre of this period is the so-called Kasrawān Massacre, the name 
deriving from the Kasrawān region in today’s Lebanon. In history books, this is called a 
massacre of Shi’as, but my Alawis sources say this was primarily a massacre of Alawis where 
‘everyone’ was killed or captured and the few who escaped went north to the relative safety of 
their present heartland in Syria’s coastal mountains. Just as with the case of Sayf ad-Dawla of 
Aleppo, this is yet another historical account that erases the Alawis from history.  
                                                 
10 The labelling of other Muslims as infidels because of their deviation from ‘true Islam’ 
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Their absolute historical nadir, which is referred to in all my conversations on the topic, 
came after the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk state in 1516. Under the sultan Selim I, the 
Alawis were massacred on an unprecedented scale that is described as both gruesome and 
cowardly. One story goes that thousands of Alawi religious sheikhs were summoned to 
Aleppo as representatives of their people for what was believed to be official negotiations 
with the Turkish Sunni officials of the city. Instead, gathered in a city square – which acc-
ording to one person is still today called Heads’ Square (Sāhat ar-Ru’ūs) – they were 
beheaded one by one. At the same time, other massacres took place, and some say that about 
100,000 Alawis were killed at the hands of the Sunnis. This epoch represents the outer limit 
of Alawi history where their whole existence was in jeopardy. Sometimes, when mentioning 
that Alawis do not pray in mosques, which is deplorable to other Muslims, they give historical 
reasons for this. Alawis apparently used to pray in mosques, but since the Sunnis would find 
them congregating there, mosques became places of massacre. Consequently, they forgot this 
tradition and have appeared even more as unbelievers to the Sunnis, even though the Sunnis 
caused this outcome. 
At this time, the Alawis were driven out of Aleppo and the other major cities, including 
the fertile plains of the region. This was the second exodus of the Alawis and their great trek 
led them into the Jabal Ansariyeh – the Mountains of the Alawis. These mountains, separating 
the Mediterranean coast from inland Syria, were both inaccessible and inhospitable and had 
provided refuge to both the Alawis and other persecuted Shi’a sects such as the Isma’ilis and 
the Druze for centuries. Confined to these infertile mountains, they were mostly left to 
themselves due to their defensiveness, and in this way, they retained their autonomy. The 
Jabal Ansariyeh thus came to constitute the Alawi homeland and where they ‘belong’ even if 
they now live elsewhere. Following their exodus, the decline became a reality. One man 
described the following centuries to me as a time of ‘backwardness’ when they were 
effectively isolated from the rest of the world, banished to a life on the existential margins. 
Other sources have pointed out that the Alawis were slowly drawn into a feudal system by 
the Sunni landowners of the lowlands in the 19th century. They thus became a caste of 
indentured farmers and servants of their Sunni overlords. Some say that families would 
routinely be forced to sell their daughters as maids – sometimes when they were as young as 
six years old – to Sunni households, an arrangement that often meant that they were in reality 
sex servants. Attempts to revolt against this injustice would be ruthlessly put down by the 
Ottoman authorities, a situation that persisted until about 60 years ago. 
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Domination and resistance 
Following the exodus to the mountains, however, many Alawis stayed behind in their Sunni 
dominated and hostile surroundings. This is a second occasion where Alawis describe their 
community as loosing members during a great trek. These lost Alawis were not lost in the 
sense that they were never seen again, though. Instead, they ‘went underground’ hiding their 
beliefs from both authorities and neighbours and pretended to be good Sunni Muslims. In 
Islamic terminology, this is called taqiyyah and is a religious doctrine found especially among 
the Shi’a and Shi’a minorities. The doctrine permits a believer who is under threat to conceal 
his beliefs so that his life will be spared, provided that he is true to his faith in his heart. In 
appearance and acts, Alawis would pretend to be Sunnis and not even tell their children of 
their ‘true’ religion until they were of an age where they would understand the need for 
secrecy.  
According to one person I spoke to, to this day there are Alawis living in Aleppo who’s 
families have been living there ever since the massacres, yet holding on to their beliefs 
privately through generations. He said that due to the length of this concealment, the Alawis 
have lost countless families who have forgotten who they actually are. Because of their fear of 
being found out and killed or driven out, they would raise their children as Sunnis and never 
tell them of their origins. The children would then grow up believing themselves to be Sunnis 
and, therefore, in effect, actually becoming Sunnis. Another claim goes that even for the last 
census in Syria that recorded sectarian background in 1956 (Khuri 1991), many Alawis living 
in the Sunni dominated cities of Syria did not dare reveal their religion to the authorities and 
thus wrote that they were Sunnis. This means that the total number of Alawis in Syria today is 
higher than the official estimates based on this census. 
Concealment or camouflage of one’s beliefs and intentions, according to Scott (1990), is a 
form of resistance among subordinates in situations of danger to life and property from the 
dominant. Due to the rigidity of the public transcript, they expel the overt resistance to below 
the horizon of the dominant. To Alawis, secrecy is a matter of survival of the community and 
is essential to Alawi identity. Primarily a topic of the following chapter, secrecy and 
concealment is perhaps the principal identity marker for Alawis even in contemporary Syria. 
Discursive ambivalence, meaning that there is always room for denial of accusations of 
unacceptable beliefs or behaviour, attests to the danger felt from the dominant group and is a 
resistance technique for unstable circumstances or shifting power.  
The Alawi taqiyyah has a second element, which was mentioned in chapter four. Most 
Alawis belong to the group of uninitiated Alawis that do not have any formal religious 
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education, which goes for all my sources to my knowledge. They are therefore not expected to 
know much about the religion nor do they have religious obligations. Most Alawis learn about 
their beliefs from parents and relatives and typically admit to having too little knowledge to 
be an authority on the subject of tenets. Such a concentration of knowledge of the faith to an 
elite caste of initiates is yet another form of resistance with a hidden message. By protecting 
the lay people from possibly unacceptable beliefs, they keep dangerous knowledge away from 
great parts of the community. There is personal security in the ability to claim to know 
nothing of beliefs deemed unacceptable by the dominant. One cannot be held responsible for 
what one does not know.  
Yet, this religious dissimulation is dangerous to the subordinates. The ambivalence can be 
used against them as ‘proof’ of not following the public transcript, which is what the Sunnis 
have seized upon historically. By keeping parts of their beliefs concealed, they allow an inter-
pretation of their secrecy to mean that what they hide must indeed be unacceptable beliefs. 
Furthermore, by prohibiting their adherents of revealing tenets, the religious leaders keep full 
control of what is kept hidden. Reviewing a book by Gregor Voss, van Dam (1989: 208) 
writes: 
For there appear to be no publications as yet which have been authorized by the 
Alawi religious leadership as representing a definitive view of Alawi religion. To 
date the Alawi religious leaders are still strongly opposed to the publication of an 
authoritative account of Alawi religion or the scriptures on which it is based. This, in 
turn, continues to provide opponents of the Alawis with opportunities to create or to 
keep alive doubts about Alawi religion itself. 
Indeed, by keeping the tenets so close even from their own community, it only helps to 
strengthen this speculation against them, and minor differences in such things as prayer can be 
interpreted as probable heresy. 
The Regeneration 
It would take another outside helper for the Alawis to re-establish justice. Not having been 
part of the narrative since the Crusades, the Europeans now reappear, represented by the 
French. After the First World War, the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire – the Empire 
having been on the loosing side in the war – were occupied by the Western powers. The 
occupations were made permanent as de-facto colonies in the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 
when Syria and Lebanon were put under French mandate by the League of Nations. From 
1920, what would later become Syria was established as five different states, which, gradually 
through the 1930s, were merged into the modern state of Syria.  
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To Alawis, the French system of ‘divide and rule’ became a great opportunity for them to 
be included in the Syrian state. In their colonial pursuits, the French favoured minorities and 
set them up against the traditional elites. In Syria, this meant facilitating the access of Alawis, 
Christians and other minorities to positions in government and armed forces. Alawis describe 
this turn in history as regaining the rights they should have had all along. Again, we find that 
this Alawi historical narrative is in an oppositional position to official Syrian history, which 
views the French Mandate as an imperialist venture to keep the Arabs under European 
domination (according to sources). The positive opinions of the French for both the Alawis 
and thus for Syria as a whole is widespread among my sources. This is based on the economic 
opportunities that were secured for them by the opportunity to migrate to the cities, in 
addition to recruitment in the armed forces and positions in regional administrations. One 
academic from Latakia says that the bad stories about the French are probably based on the 
misbehaviour of the colonial subjects from places such as Africa who they used to police their 
colonies. In this way, he excuses the actions of the French on their non-French forces and 
does not hold them accountable in the stories of maltreatment of Syrians.   
One of the states set up by the French during the Mandate was the state of Alaouites – 
being the French word for the Alawis. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the leaders of 
the Alawi community tried to dissuade the French to include them in the state of Syria when 
the mandate was ending, preferring any alternative option. This was not unique to the Alawis, 
though, as all the minorities in Syria feared for their rights in a Sunni dominated independent 
Syria (Kramer 1987). When bringing up the subject of the independent Alawi state today, 
though, all Alawis I have broached the subject with consider this to be a very bad idea, even if 
they are apologetic to other French policies. One person told me it was a conspiracy to divide 
the Syrian population to strengthen French rule while another acknowledges the Alawis’ 
participation in this, but adds that it was a very bad idea because states should on principle not 
be established on the basis of religion. Instead, he stresses that Alawis are Arabs and that this 
identity should be the foundation of Syrian identity and not religious differences. Of course, 
few people would ever admit to supporting such an idea as separatism is unmentionable and is 
connected to the Kurds, who are virtually outcasts. The Arab identity is very strong and as 
long as Alawis are full Syrian citizens and see Syria as their own country, the idea of 
secession will be alien to them. This is apparent in the answer of a third source, who says that 
Alawis today only see their own situation of inclusion. This is especially the case with young 
people, he says, who do not appreciate the situation their grandparents lived under at that 
time, which explains their wish to secure their autonomy.  
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Syria’s first Alawi president, the late Hafiz al-Asad who ruled Syria from 1970 to 2000, 
also has a good reputation among Alawis. Although most will admit that mistakes were made 
during his years in power, they see him see him as someone who developed the country for all 
Syrians, especially the peasants and the poor, which most Alawis were, irrespective of 
religion. And just as importantly in a country that had experienced severe political instability, 
he brought stability. At the same time, a few people are very critical to the damage he has 
done to the Alawis as a group by being perceived as someone who favoured Alawis over 
other groups in the country, a topic that will be discussed further in chapter seven.  
Antagonism and discourse 
The historical narrative of the Alawis as represented to me by my sources can be summarised 
as a history of not being accepted by the majority. This conflict centres on the debate of the 
‘Islamicness’ of the Alawis and the discursive power of the Sunnis. The Alawis refer to 
themselves as Muslims, yet have historically been rejected as such by the closure of Islamic 
discourse, which expels supposed Alawi tenets to its constitutive outside. Of course, just as 
the Alawis construct the Sunnis as their discursive other, the Alawis take the same position 
for the Sunnis. They are thus just as necessary for the construction of the identity of the 
majority. 
The way my Alawi sources present their alternative discourses highlights the Sunni 
hegemony, a hegemony they seem to concede to, but not respect. Their descriptions of their 
religious beliefs diverge into two deviating discourses mentioned earlier. The discourse most 
people draw on, the Islamic Discourse, positions Alawi beliefs squarely within the Islamic 
tradition, hence the name. The Critical Discourse, however, although it admits to its roots in 
Islam, seeks to define itself according to principles other than the Islamic ones and freely uses 
concepts, which, within the (Sunni) hegemony, are far from ‘politically correct.’  
Yet, when first raising the topic of beliefs with Alawis, they immediately draw on the 
Official Discourse presented in the previous chapter, although they in many cases later – after 
assessing the opinions and objectives of this author – modify their explanations. The Official 
Discourse downplays any differences between Muslims in Syria and presents the Islamic 
religion as monolithic, much like the content of the Syrian schoolbooks for religious 
education. Instead of challenging the Sunni hegemony, it is a form of resistance that seeks to 
use the norms and rules of the hegemony against itself, much like the example of the strategy 
of the inmates in the Norwegian prison mentioned in chapter three. In this way, they can 
create change in the hegemony without challenging its legitimacy.  
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The website alaweenonline.com adopts this approach by publishing articles on theological 
subjects to do with Islam, Shi’ism and the Alawis. It emphasises the Alawis’ respect for Ali 
and on that foundation argues that Ali always followed the Prophet both in words and deeds. 
In this way, they say, Alawis are no different from Shi’as who are accepted as Muslims by the 
Sunnis. In an article on the definition of Alawis, they write the following: 
The absolute definition, which describes the real Alawis, is nothing but the constancy 
of the way of the Prophet Mohammad. In other words, Alawis turn to the religion of 
Islam and nothing else. This was also the way of Ali Ibn Abi Taleb and the other 
followers of the Prophet Mohammad…Even though Imam Ali was known for his 
special gifts and glorious history he was still a faithful follower of his master, the 
Prophet Mohammad, just like everybody else. After all, believers are brothers.11
On another account, they excuse the differences ‘some’ Alawis have portrayed to having been 
persecuted and driven to isolation, which created some strange and esoteric beliefs on the 
surface. This, however, was only a misunderstanding because of ignorance. Representing the 
‘true’ Alawis, these authors write: ‘We are the sons of the Alawi cult by words and deeds. 
And we do insist that there is no prayer apart from the known Islamic prayer, which is 
unambiguous and has no mystery to it at all’12. They here take on what they feel are the myths 
about the Alawis and seek to refute them. The reference to the prayer, for example, refers to 
beliefs by non-Alawis that Alawis pray in a heretical way. 
The Islamic Discourse 
The Islamic Discourse diverges from this Official Discourse due to its antagonism to the 
Sunni Islamic discourse. What characterises it is that it does not try to suppress the beliefs that 
are considered non-Islamic, but instead tries to argue that these beliefs are actually a part of 
Islam, only that the Sunnis have usurped Islam for their own benefit. This view is of course 
why this discourse stays in the hidden transcript. My two most religious sources both say that 
the Qur’an is the foundation of their faith, but say that its content is not necessarily accurate. 
When I asked if this meant that there were lies in the Qur’an – something that would be 
considered heretical to the majority of Muslims as the Qur’an is considered to contain the 
direct words of God –they were quick to point out that they were not lies as such, but rather 
alterations in the first copies. One hypothetical example they mention is passages about the 
good treatment of Muslims, whereas the original message was actually about people, 
                                                 
11 http://www.alaweenonline.com/modules.php?name=Encyclopedia&op=list_content&eid=5, translated from 
Arabic by source. Downloaded 01.11.2006 
12 http://www.alaweenonline.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=103, translated from Arabic by 
source. Downloaded 09.10.2006. 
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regardless of their religion. The fact that the Qur’an is written in classical Arabic means that 
the difference to the modern understanding of Arabic creates even more mistakes.  
My two sources emphasise that the way the Prophet is portrayed in the Qur’an and 
especially in the Hadith, the religious traditions written down in the centuries following the 
death of the Prophet, is not the same understanding Alawis have of Him. In their view, he was 
not a warlord and was only depicted as such in order to appeal to the warmongering tribes of 
the Arabian Peninsula of his time. Instead, to Alawis, he was a teacher and a man of peace; he 
was the creator of civilisation in unifying the tribes; an advocate of non-violence, very much 
like Gandhi. In any case, the interpretations of the Qur’an have turned out to be the biggest 
problems in Islam. In many cases not only the Hadith, but also later theological philosophers 
such as Ibn Taymiyyah, have in practice acquired a state of infallibility on par with the words 
of the Qur’an itself. 
In effect, they say, the Sunnis have turned a divine message of freedom and civilisation 
into a rule-bound system of religious oppression where they set themselves above God in their 
judgement of others. This is contrary to everything the Alawis believe in, a belief that is based 
on the direct link between the believer and God and thus where no man can judge another 
man’s religion by his actions. Therefore, they hold, the Sunni way of judging other Muslims 
by their actions become meaningless because God does not judge us by our actions, but by 
our intentions. In this way they explain how Alawis’ apparent disregard for important tenets 
in Islam – most important of which are the Five Pillars of Islam – has nothing to do with not 
respecting them, but with their relationship with God. For example, Alawis do not need to 
pray in mosques, which Sunnis place great emphasis on, because Alawis pray in their hearts. 
Similarly, we will be judged by our actions towards others and not our actions towards God. 
At home, what an Alawi child is taught before the worship of God is the respect and treatment 
of others.  
Consequently, the Islamic Discourse reconstructs the meaning in Islam and focuses on 
different tenets than the Sunnis, yet tenets that are not easily refuted due to their universal 
acceptance such as the ultimate divine judgement and respect and tolerance of others. Their 
theology according to my sources, therefore, is constructed as the extreme opposite to the 
most extreme Sunni beliefs and emphasises tolerance and respect not only for other Muslims, 
but just as importantly, for other religions also. This is because we all ultimately believe in the 
same God and no religion or sect can claim to know the definitive religious truth, they say. Of 
course, no sect would undermine its own position by saying that other beliefs might be truer 
than theirs, so the openness to the truth of other religions is probably a result of the perceived 
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intolerance of the Sunnis. Orthodox Sunni Islam becomes the constitutive outside of the 
Alawi Islamic Discourse, representing everything that they are not, yet whilst accepting the 
stated ‘facts’ of the Qur’an. What they contest is the meaning the Sunnis place in the text and 
not the text itself. The ideal of the Prophet and of Imam Ali – who we would call human 
rights activists today – has been forgotten in the politics of the Sunnis, an ideal they say that is 
now found in European societies more than in the Islamic world. 
The Critical Discourse 
While the Islamic Discourse draws largely on Islamic elements and rhetoric, the Critical 
Discourse is representative of those who place themselves much farther away from main-
stream Islam. This is probably why those speaking within the Critical Discourse are more 
confidential in their manner, whereas those using the Islamic Discourse speak openly and are 
more relaxed about doing so in public places. While the Critical Discourse confirms the 
Islamicness of their beliefs, they see no need to ‘grovel to the Sunnis’ and therefore place 
themselves far away from Islam in religious terms. They are not afraid to use vocabulary that 
is unacceptable in Islam, such as calling the Alawi revelations a Trinity, which is a problem-
atic element in Christianity in Muslims eyes as it casts doubt on the oneness of God, the most 
central tenet of Islam. They also refer to different influences, such as Greek philosophy 
mentioned in their origins and an affinity towards Christianity due to similar beliefs. One man 
pointed out the worship of saints, which they share with Syria’s Christian community. He 
went on to say that his religious brother feels more Christian than Muslim in religious terms 
and that his room is full of crucifixes and effigies of the Virgin Mary. Yet, he says, this does 
not conflict with the Islamic tenets of his belief.  
Others drawing on the Critical Discourse mention the Five Pillars explored in the Islamic 
Discourse, only going further than the latter in pointing out its erroneous interpretation. They 
were never meant to be taken literally, they say. Instead, they have symbolic meaning for the 
faith, but are not an obligation on the believer. Many Alawis fast during the holy month of 
Ramadan, but there is no obligation for them to do so. What is particular about the Critical 
Discourse though, is its admittance to there being religious secrets in Alawi beliefs. Whereas 
the Islamic Doctrine downplays this and tries to reconcile the differences to orthodox Islam, 
the Critical Discourse highlights them as non-Islamic. Most of my sources did not wish to 
elaborate on these secrets apart from the known ones such as the belief in the transmigration 
of souls, which is even acceptable within the Islamic Discourse. However, those who do are 
clearly uneasy about certain aspects and only speak in times and places they are comfortable 
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with. At the same time, there is an element of pride apparent in the way they speak about their 
faith and not at all something they feel embarrassed about. This can be interpreted as resis-
tance to the Sunni hegemony, however with a hidden messenger in Scott’s (1990) terms. The 
aspect of resistance is explored more thoroughly in chapter seven.  
Several of these sources also question their own answers while speaking, saying that they 
do not know if they should tell me this. Some excuse themselves by saying that these things 
are more open now in this time and day, above all due to modern communication and the 
internet. Others will admit to differences, however declining to go into details. One man from 
Tartous, for example, said Alawis pray differently from other Muslims, and although he 
wanted to show me how they do it, he said he had been taught that God would punish him if 
he told a non-Alawi this.  
In conclusion 
The way Alawis construct their history is as one of suffering and trauma. Although the Alawis 
do not call themselves a nation, the way they narrate their history is thus very similar to 
narratives found in nationalist movements that draw a direct line from the distant past to the 
present and which in spatial and temporal terms explain how ‘We’ came to be who we are and 
how we ended up here. There are two exoduses in the Alawi narrative, first to Greater Syria as 
part of the plight of the greater Shi’a community, and a second one where they were driven 
out of the cities and fertile plains and up into the mountains. This trauma almost led to their 
extinction and they were only able to survive due to the hostile yet defensible terrain of the 
Jabal Ansariyeh. Some apparently also identify with other groups who have been persecuted 
by the Sunnis. One woman wrote to me about how the Armenians experienced similar 
treatment: ‘Do you know the tragedy of the Armenians? We have the same history with the 
Sunnis…We’re feeling weak because of our painful history.’ 
In narrating history and linking this with their beliefs, my Alawi sources ‘re-present’ a 
history that is discursively dominated by the Sunnis. The Sunni hegemony has written history 
in a way that expels the Alawis from the Islamic community and makes them not accepted 
because of their supposed beliefs. They acknowledge the existence of this Sunni dominance, 
but do not respect it. The Alawi discourses clearly illustrate this antagonism in their attempts 
to re-narrate both history and religion in order to press their claims to being Muslims. 
Whereas the Islamic Discourse seeks to resist the hegemony by rearranging the elements 
associated with the nodal points, the Critical Discourse goes much further in its claims to 
being unique and presents a starker belief in its right to define itself irrespective of the 
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stipulations of the hegemony. This is unlike the Official Discourse, which seeks to place 
Alawism firmly within the Sunni tradition of the hegemony and goes as far as denying tenets 
admitted to by the other two discourses. 
The differences identified between the three discourses point to conflict within the Alawi 
community in the representation of their history and beliefs. These differences could stem 
from definite theological differences among Alawi religious shaykhs of different branches of 
Alawism. When I have questioned my sources on such intra-Alawi differences, they have all 
said that they are minor and of no importance. Of course, admitting to internal differences is 
to admit to weakness and division and could be a reason why no one has wished to talk about 
this in their perceived position of subordination to the hegemony. Another reason could be 
that this is a theological discussion taking place within the circles of the Alawi initiates and 
thus not something normal Alawis concern themselves with.  
How the Alawis see themselves at this point in time is affected by how they interpret 
history. History determines how we see the present. However, history is also interpreted and 
represented according to how one sees one’s current situation. The historical narrative and 
relation to the dominant Sunnis must be seen in a dialectical relationship. The following two 
chapters deal with how Alawis construct their social world and the contemporary politics in 
Syria.  
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6 CONSTRUCTING SOCIETY 
 
Discourses are constructed by what they expel to their constitutive outsides and identities 
follow this relational pattern, constituting themselves as everything they are not. ‘We’ are 
constructed by the construction of ‘The Other’ and it is this frontier formation that ultimately 
constitutes ‘Us.’ It is therefore in these borderlands that the identity is constructed and the 
differences thus become the core of the identity. This chapter is about this frontier formation 
and how Alawis constitute themselves through the social construction of ‘The Other.’  
Just as in their historical narrative, the Sunnis are the constitutive outside of the Alawi 
collective identity. The Sunni discursive hegemony – centring on their power of definition of 
Muslim identity and ‘correct Islam’ – creates forms of resistance among Alawis and creates a 
feeling of inferiority in the public sphere. Yet, their counter-discourses in the form of hidden 
transcripts show that although they place themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy of 
sectarian identities in Syria, they see themselves as socially and culturally superior to their 
adversary. This phenomenon is strengthened by sharing a position of opposition to Sunni 
power with the Christian minority who they construe as their partners, but also as role models.  
The issue discussed in this chapter is how this forms the basis for constructing their 
society with a focus on culture or way of living and the markers they use to differentiate 
themselves from the Sunnis. 
‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
Alawi identity is not necessarily over-arching or brought into play in many situations. As is 
the case with all identities, Alawi identity comes to the fore only in particular contexts and is 
often overshadowed by other identities. At the same time, it is an important identity in the 
way all religious identities are important in Syria, and it hovers in the background more or 
less continuously, being used as an explanatory or causal factor on many issues.  
Through questions to Alawis about who they – the Alawis – are, the impression is that 
their sectarian identity is not one they focus on at first. Typically, they will draw on other 
identities to define themselves; most importantly the fact that they are Syrians, Arabs and 
Muslims. Syrian public discourse is characterised by its focus on a wide Arabic identity rather 
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than a nationalist Syrian identity. Both schoolbooks and the media use a pan-Arab viewpoint 
just as the official name of the country is The Syrian Arab Republic (Landis 2003). Alawis are 
no different in this and my sources are keen to point out that they belong to a greater and 
overarching group and present themselves first and foremost as Arabs and Syrians. 
This corresponds to the Official Discourse by its discounting of sectarian identities and 
that these are not the topic of open debate. The rule of thumb when speaking to someone you 
do not know, therefore, is to adhere to this discourse and speak along acceptable lines. Yet, 
when showing an interest in the social differences, how their society seems to be different 
from other parts of the country, people are quick to want to elaborate and speak more of their 
society presented in sectarian terms as an Alawi society.  
There is a clear perception among the Alawis of being a separate group sharing certain 
traits that make them different from other Syrians. Thus, when constructing their group’s 
identity, the first thing almost every Alawi I have spoken to focuses on is its liberal character. 
Just like any characteristic, ‘liberal’ is relational and they use comparisons to both Syrian 
society and Europe to elaborate. Many Alawis will explain that they are culturally quite 
different from the rest of Syria and will draw on other discourses, such as the relative 
liberalism of Mediterranean cultures, and link them with an Alawi discourse to construct this 
idea. What characterises the Critical Discourse is that it is more westward looking than the 
Islamic Discourse, which is more linked to an Arab identity. By presenting themselves as 
Mediterranean, these Alawis will make a cultural link with Europe, which corresponds to how 
they also narrate history and its origins in Greek philosophy and co-operation with the 
Crusaders. The Christians also play an important role in this construction, being constructed 
as culturally similar to them and equally tolerant and open-minded. 
The Islamic Discourse, on the other hand, typically presents Alawi liberalism in terms that 
are more religious and within a broader Arabic context. However, they distance themselves 
from the Sunnis just as much as those in the Critical Discourse in how they choose to live 
their lives within Islam as they define it. 
When speaking to Alawis about how their society differs from that of the Sunnis – about 
how they form the frontier – there are a few markers that people persistently return to. This 
mainly deals with how Alawis are not rule-bound the way Sunnis are. The widespread 
availability of alcohol and the open consumption of it is one thing they focus on. In Syria, 
alcohol is freely available and drinking either beer or spirits is fairly common in many parts of 
the country. But Alawis will point out that although it is allowed throughout Syria, Alawi 
society is more relaxed about alcohol and does not frown upon people drinking, of course, 
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unless it is excessively. Still, drinking does not seem that widespread and it is often limited to 
having a drink with a meal or to younger people’s parties. But in Alawi discourse it becomes 
a sense of pride because it is something allowed, unlike in Sunni society where people might 
drink, but it is certainly not permissible according to religious rules. So instead of being 
something some do and according to their own wishes, it becomes a symbol of Alawi 
liberalism versus Sunni conservatism. 
What is more an issue of pride, though, is the role of women in society and the relations 
between men and women. Alawi women, they say, are both much freer in how they choose to 
live their lives and they also take part in society to a much greater extent than Sunni women. 
To juxtapose, they speak of how girls are supposed to behave in the stereotypical Sunni 
society, where they have to wear a veil and cover up as much of their bodies as possible. 
Dress thus becomes an important marker for girls’ liberty; being able to dress as they wish 
and typically showing a lot more skin than anywhere else in Syria apart from the upper-class 
neighbourhoods of Damascus. And again, as is the case with alcohol, they emphasise that 
there are no rules for women’s clothing and covering one’s hair is not required or customary, 
even if many older women do. Indeed, due to the construction of Sunni society as con-
servative and strict, an Alawi woman should consequently not wear a veil since this becomes 
a symbol of religious repression of women.   
Likewise, interaction between men and women in Alawi society is not controlled the way 
it is in Sunni society. To illustrate this, my Alawi sources explain that having a girlfriend or a 
boyfriend is quite common and not frowned upon, unlike among the Sunnis. Furthermore, 
once a couple decides to get engaged, they are allowed much more leeway than Sunnis are in 
order to get to know each other and the other’s family properly before they get married. In 
general, interaction between the sexes is less restricted. Just meeting and chatting to someone 
of the opposite sex is easy and while speaking about this issue, my sources point to the street 
outside to men and women chatting or use themselves as examples of how they met someone 
in a shop or restaurant. This is very different to Sunni society, which they describe as highly 
traditional in its gender roles, whereby non-related girls and boys are not allowed to interact 
and marriages are arranged by their families.  
Alawis typically also use their own families as examples to explain how they differ from 
Sunnis. When I have been invited into people’s homes I will meet their mother and sisters and 
shake their hands as they present me. They will also sit with me and partake in the 
conversation just like any male member of the family. Sunni girls on the other hand, they tell 
me, would never shake my hand or sit down to chat in this way, in many instances never even 
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coming out to greet the guest at all. Sometimes, they use my own position as a Westerner and 
non-Muslim in the same way. One source told me that some orthodox Sunnis would never 
even shake my hand due to my (lack of) religion. Thus, by using extreme examples of ‘The 
Others’ he makes clear implicitly that what ‘They’ are, ‘We’ are not.  
Several of my sources also use contemporary events to show how the reaction of the 
Alawis is proof of their relaxed attitude towards religion and society, as opposed to the 
extreme reactions of the Sunnis. One such example is the torching of the Norwegian and 
Danish embassies in Damascus after the publication of the caricatures of the Prophet 
Muhammad in the Scandinavian media in February 2006. They say that even though Alawis 
did not like it, they would never dream of reacting with anger and violence. Unlike the 
Sunnis, who perceived this as an insult to their religion and wanted to punish the perpetrators, 
the Alawis are liberal minded and thus not provoked by it. Above all, Alawis would never 
dream of taking something like that personally. This highlights what they present as a lack of 
collective religious thinking and it thus becomes yet another marker to differentiate 
themselves from the extremist Sunnis.  
Inter-sectarian relations 
It is an ideal in Syria for the sects to live in harmony and for people not to place importance 
on religion. This is also official policy and conflicts with a sectarian tinge tend to be covered 
up in the media. With Alawis, like with all Syrians, when jumping straight to the question of 
inter-sectarian relations, the first reply will invariably correspond to the Official Discourse 
and that there are no problems with them and other sects and that people deal with each other 
on an equal basis and that religion is not important. 
As sectarian harmony is such an ideal, people do not want to be seen as biased, prejudiced 
or old-fashioned. This seems even more important to Alawis because they have to live up to 
the image of being open-minded and liberal. Often they will employ vagueness rather than 
admit to having negative views of other sects. Once, in a conversation with the guardian of an 
Alawi shrine in the Jabal Ansaryeh about the purpose of the shrine, the old man explained that 
all people are brothers and worship the same god, naming Alawis, Christians, Jews, and 
Muslims. When asked if this included Sunni Muslims, he mumbled something and went on to 
change the subject. In this case, his silence on the subject probably meant that his view of the 
Sunnis was too difficult or negative to be shared with strangers. 
In most cases, whenever I have asked about someone’s relation to other sects that live in 
their town or region, they will answer that sectarian background is not important. Typically, 
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they will use themselves as examples and explain that they have friends from all kinds of 
backgrounds. Yet, when inquiring further about their friends, it turns out that in most in-
stances, the non-Alawi friends they talk about are all Christians and only rarely Sunnis. This 
does not mean that Alawis and Sunnis do not mix, because they do in many situations. But 
genuine friendship between Alawis and Sunnis seems to be related to education and class. In 
the instances where I have come across this, it has been either with the upper classes, 
intellectuals, or in cases of socially marginalised people, such as gays or Westernised youth 
who seek friends with similar outlooks as themselves. A representative of the Critical Dis-
course says outright that this is the case with him. Even though he has many acquaintances 
that are Sunnis, these are all people he spends time with because of his work or studies. Of the 
people he spends time with of his own choice in his spare time, every one of them is either 
Alawi or Christian. He goes on to say that he expects the same is the case for his father, even 
though he has spent time with all kinds of people through his job in the army. 
The one instance where people freely admit to religion being an issue is in the case of 
marriage. In Syria, cross-sectarian marriages are not very widespread. My younger and more 
liberal sources have a fairly laid-back attitude towards this at a personal level, but say that the 
social consequences are so big that it is preferable to avoid the problem altogether and not 
even consider someone from another sect as a potential partner. On the surface, Alawis, who 
claim that someone’s religion does not matter and who want to portray themselves as open-
minded, champion their liberal views on mixed marriages. Typically, they will use family or 
friends who have married non-Alawis and use this as examples of religion not being 
important. This, just like the religion of their non-Alawi friends, turns out to be only part of 
the story.  
In most cases, the marriages they speak of turn out to be between Alawis and Christians 
and not between Alawis and Sunnis. Furthermore, in the examples my sources have used, they 
tend to be between an Alawi man and a non-Alawi woman. Due to the patrilineal tradition in 
Islam, the religion of the father determines the child’s religion and so, as long as the father has 
the ‘right’ religion, the religion of the mother is unimportant. This means that a woman from 
your own community marrying someone from another sect is seen as less acceptable than the 
other way around. They thus use the Official Discourse of religious harmony as an ideal, but 
forget to mention that the harmony is not complete. 
This ideal is also apparent in stories about ‘model communities.’ One such ideal is the 
village of Dwerta outside of Tartous. Most people I have spoken to about this portrays it as a 
village where Christians and Alawis live together and marry one another as if they belonged 
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to the same sect. Although this seems far-fetched, other stories claim that there are also 
Sunnis and Shi’as living there and that everybody marries and gets along. The way it is 
presented, especially when even more sects are introduced into the mix, shows that it is how 
the Alawis want to see their society: free of prejudice and sectarian thinking. Dwerta is thus a 
living example of the Official Discourse and its success as an ideal. Whether the situation 
there is as described or not is of less importance as the story about it is a symbol of the 
possibility of sectarian co-existence, at least for Christians and Alawis.  
Therefore, while wishing that religion were not important, from both conversation and 
observation among Syrians of different sectarian backgrounds, sect does play a prominent role 
in their interpretation of their world. This is no different among the Alawis. Typically, if I 
mention an acquaintance from another town, especially if it is a mixed town, one of the first 
questions I will get is ‘Is he/she an Alawi/Christian/Sunni?’ depending on the situation. There 
is nothing extraordinary about this as people all over the world have prejudices and need to be 
able to place others in categories in order to understand ‘who they are.’ Many Alawis, like 
most other people, seek to have their preconceptions confirmed by continually placing things 
in the predetermined sectarian categories. 
In general, due to the stability and the taboo of sectarianism, people deal with each other 
as individuals. Yet, an indication of the sensitivity of the subject of religion is the fact that, as 
we have seen, religion is not supposed to be an issue. Just inquiring about someone’s religion 
to his face is considered extremely impolite and is not done. As a foreigner, one can play 
ignorant of this fact and still ask, but even though people will answer, it is obvious from many 
reactions that they are uncomfortable with a direct question. This unease seems more 
prevalent among Alawis than other groups. 
Since religion is so important for how someone one meets can be categorised, Syrian 
society has invented ways to circumvent the direct question. Instead they will ask for the 
family name and where ‘one’s village is’, the Syrian version of where one is from ‘originally.’ 
Karfan (18.03.2005b) has an entry on this particular game in his blog: 
Usually in Syria people ask you "where are you from?" just to figure out whether you 
are Sunni, Alawi, [Druze], [Isma’ili], and whether you are Kurdi or Christian. 
Tartous, the city where Karfan comes from, has a population of both Sunnis and 
Alawis. You will be immediately asked in such situation: "where from in Tartous?" 
Karfan used to play around with people by saying a fictitious name of an area that 
does not exist and watch his asker straining themselves to find out whether it is in the 
Alawi or the Sunni side by inquiring where exactly is this area and whether it is in the 
City (Sunni) or the outskirt (Alawi). But the game of "where are you from?" was 
mastered by all Syrians; it is an essential skill for living here.  
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Hiding one’s background and religion thus becomes very difficult unless one wants to resort 
to outright lying. 
Relations between Alawis and Sunnis 
The biggest sectarian divide in coastal Syria is between Alawis and Sunnis. Alawis define 
themselves above all in relation to the Sunnis and use the stereotypical image of them as 
traditional and conservative when constructing themselves as their exact opposites. When 
speaking about the Alawi-Sunni divide, my Alawi sources hold opinions ranging from disdain 
to indifference, but as already mentioned, they will differentiate between individuals and the 
group itself. Very often, they will speak of their scepticism towards Sunnis, but in the same 
breath speak of a Sunni they know who is different. They will explain that this comes down to 
them not being like the ‘typical’ Sunnis. It is Sunni society that is the problem and not the fact 
that people are born Sunnis.  
This is connected to the fear Alawis inherit from home; stemming from a conviction that 
Sunnis, in essence, believe that they are the only ones who know the true Islam, and this truth 
must be spread by force to other Muslims who have chosen the wrong path. In the end, the 
dislike of Sunnis boils down to the perception that Sunnis do not like them. This constructs 
the Sunnis in a direct line to the historical narrative that centres on the persecution and 
oppression of the Alawis. One of my sources, a representative of the Critical discourse who 
places the Alawi religion very far from mainstream Islam, expressed this in one of our 
conversations on the topic by saying: ‘I don’t know why they hate us!’  
This is based on the depicting of the Sunnis as religious fanatics who judge Alawis 
according to extremist views following religious interpretations like those of Ibn Taymiyyah 
(see page 58). Another of my outspoken sources says, while speaking of how Alawis do not 
pray in mosques and that their women do not wear a veil, that in Sunni eyes ‘we are infidels 
because we don’t follow these rules. And extreme Sunnis believe that if one kills a heretic one 
will go to Paradise after death.’ This view, he says, is more a matter of upbringing and 
education than religion as such. The problem is that as many as 40 percent of Syrians do not 
receive a proper education and are instead given religious education in a mosque. This gives 
them an inherently religious fundament to their whole understanding of Syrian society and its 
sects. At the same time, Syrian society is becoming more open and tolerant, but this is a 
process mostly found in the middle classes. My source’s biggest worry is the potential that 
lies in Sunni doctrines and not the fact that a majority of Sunnis hold these extreme beliefs.  
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Not surprisingly, of my sources, the ones with least interaction with Sunnis seem to be the 
most categorical and least ready to admit to Sunnis being a heterogeneous group. Sources 
from Latakia, which is a very mixed city, seem more open to there being ‘different’ Sunnis 
than those having grown up in the Jabal Ansariyeh. Age also seems to be an issue in the 
perception of Sunnis. Unfortunately, most of my sources are between 20 and 40, but even 
they tell me of how their parents and grandparents see things differently from them. In most 
cases, they will say that the older a person is the more critical he is of the Sunnis. They 
attribute this to the elderly having experienced what it is like to be discriminated against, 
which was still the case as late as the 1940s. One girl of a Sunni father and an Alawi mother 
told me that her grandmother on her mother’s side had confided to her that she had actually 
never accepted her daughter’s marriage to a Sunni. To her, the injustice she had lived under 
was living memory, as her childhood memories were of Alawis being mistreated and 
physically abused in public by their Sunni overlords. The younger generations, not least the 
ones who grew up after the sectarian troubles culminating in 1982, have only experienced the 
peace and stability they have had from that time onwards. To them, their parents’ and grand-
parents’ horror stories are therefore more history than reality.  
Very few people will admit to there being sectarian conflict between Alawis and Sunnis. 
Many of my sources will voice their concern and scepticism of the Sunnis of the region and of 
the country, but if an explicit word such as ‘conflict’ is part of the question, most of them will 
reply in the negative and say that only a few extremists want conflict. Yet sometimes the 
comments get nastier when people feel they have been treated badly due to their religion.  
A very few of my younger sources use much harsher words and describe the general 
situation as both parties hating each other and seeing the situation as a battle being waged 
between the two groups. One source of mixed background, and who admittedly describes 
many aspects of Syrian society as beset with conflict, describes the situation in the mixed city 
of Latakia as a demographic battle where both Sunnis and Alawis see population as 
constituting power. This means that if an Alawi girl marries a Sunni man the Alawis ‘lose’ 
members as this couple’s children will add to the Sunnis’ numbers. I came across another 
story, also from Latakia, where I was told by a person working in public administration that 
there was grumbling among the Sunnis in the department because the head of the department 
– conventionally a Sunni according to unwritten rules – had now been replaced by an Alawi, 
something which my source described as upsetting the status quo. In any case, it is rare to 
come across such extreme points of view and even if any of my other sources held such 
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controversial convictions, I would never expect them to admit to them because they do not go 
well with their self-portrait of being hated, but not hating themselves.  
Relations between Alawis and Christians  
As was explained above, the Christians are the Alawis’ ‘alibi’ for their tolerance and open-
mindedness to other religions. When Alawis speak of sectarian co-existence and that they 
have no prejudices against other sects, they are usually referring to Syria’s Christian 
community. In the Alawi historical narrative, they refer to Christians in a favourable light, and 
many of my sources have used this narrative to explain the good relationship between Alawis 
and Christians. More importantly, though, they say that Alawis and Christians are culturally 
very similar and that both groups are both tolerant and open-minded. There is also a case of 
shared fate in that the two minorities both feel dominated by the Sunni majority. One of my 
academic sources emphasises this point, saying that having a common foe draws the two 
communities closer together, although he is quick to point out that this would not have been 
the case had they been very different in culture and outlook.  
There are no major differences between the two Alawi discourses when it comes to 
describing this relationship, but the Islamic Discourse focuses more on the social similarities 
between the two groups, employing many of the same markers they use to differentiate 
themselves from the Sunnis. Tolerance and liberalism is highlighted and a shared history in 
mixed villages and regions are pointed out. Some of those using the Critical Discourse 
additionally mention theological similarities to the Christians to strengthen their link. One 
source explicitly explained the Alawi trinity as very close to the Christian trinity and 
maintained that this shows shared beliefs. Others have also pointed out how Alawis and 
Christians share their beliefs in saints and share many shrines around the mountains of coastal 
Syria.  
There seems to be a certain pride among many Alawis in their association with Christians, 
as if the Christians form an ideal that they want to be like. This is more prevalent among the 
members of the Critical Discourse, but other Alawis also seem to hold Christians in high 
regard. This is possibly because the Christians as a group in Syria have done well for 
themselves, but also because they share the same religion as Europeans. The lifestyle asso-
ciated with Europe, in many ways also an ideal for many Alawis, is therefore somehow 
projected onto the Christians of Syria. One member of the Critical Discourse said that the 
relation to Christians is the crux of the problem with the Sunnis, saying: ‘This is why they 
hate us; because we are like the Christians’. Another one said outright that he wishes he were 
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a Christian and not an Alawi. This is the quintessence of the Alawis’ dilemma. They present 
themselves as culturally very close to the Christians, but they are Muslims. Once they identify 
with the Muslim identity, they become victims of the Sunni hegemony, which has the power 
to construct this identity. What my source means when he says he wishes he were a Christian, 
then, is that if he were, he would be able to live as he does now, but be judged by different 
standards because that lifestyle would be expected of a Christian. However, as a Muslim, 
albeit an Alawi, he is the victim of the Muslim identity constructed by the hegemony and 
what it imposes on its subject positions as acceptable behaviour.  
Hegemony and disguise 
There is a sense of frustration among my Alawi sources because there is no way for them to 
get through to non-Alawis in general to let them see ‘the real Alawis’. Sectarianism and 
religious identity is not a topic of public debate and there are no arenas for Alawis to 
communicate their views as a group, something I will return to in chapter seven. The rest-
rictions originate in the Sunni hegemony and are a result of the antagonism between the 
hegemony and Alawi discourses. As was the topic of the previous chapter, the Alawi anti-
hegemony discourses redefine parts of the Islamic religion to accommodate their beliefs, but 
this is not possible to do publicly due to the repression of public debate of sectarian issues. 
Furthermore, if they did, Alawis feel they will be labelled as apostates and infidels, a label 
they feel they have suffered enough for already through history.  
The Alawi taqiyyah – the concealment of religion – is described by my Alawi sources as 
determining how Alawis choose to live their lives. The guiding principle behind this is the 
threat they feel to their community from the Sunni majority. They explain this by the 
historical experiences of the Alawis and how they have been persecuted and massacred 
throughout the ages and that the Sunni extremism that drove these events is still to be found in 
the Syrian-Sunni population. From how they describe contemporary Syria, one sometimes 
gets the impression that the stability that the Alawis are now experiencing is just a respite 
from the ‘natural order’ where they are on the receiving end of maltreatment and injustice.  
This vulnerability could also explain how some Alawis seem to reject their own 
backgrounds and say they wish they were not Alawis, like my source mentioned above. There 
also seems to exist a group of Alawis, although I do not have reliable information on this, that 
seem to go in the opposite direction. These are rejectionists who go further than the Official 
Discourse and want to be like the majority instead and prefer to hide the fact that they are 
Alawis. My impression is that those who look up to the urban upper classes of Damascus see 
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the Alawi ways as not suitable when seeking integration in wealthy and cosmopolitan circles. 
Therefore, this is possibly more the case for Alawis living in non-majority Alawi areas (and 
not covered in my fieldwork). Being Alawi then becomes a restriction to aspirations, which is 
apparently widespread according to Karfan (28.03.2005), who writes: 
Everybody knows, especially those Alawies who tried very hard to integrate with 
their Sunni surroundings after moving to the main cities, that they will never be 
accepted by the Sunnis. There isn't a single Alawie house in Damascus without a 
story or two on failed experiences in... what you may name: go out of own skin 
attempts. Alawies are still bad Muslims. 
All my sources, though, live in Alawi-dominated areas and in this context they are proud to be 
Alawis. This is also clearer when I, as the interested foreigner, show a positive attitude in 
what makes them different from other Syrians. Yet, the defensiveness in regard to the Sunni 
majority, especially when faced with Sunnis even on their own turf, is still present. Being part 
of Islam means that the main tenets are unassailable and the following example highlights 
this: I walked past an Alawi acquaintance and his group of friends in Tartous and was invited 
to join them. After a while, a Saudi Arabian tourist stops and asks them in Arabic for the time 
of al-Maghrib, the sunset prayer. This question caused some confusion among my friends, 
probably because of the difference in dialect, but also because al-Maghrib is also the Arabic 
name for Morocco (meaning ‘The West’). They therefore started answering as if the Saudi 
Arabian wanted to travel to Morocco. When it became clear that he wanted to know the time 
of the prayer, they immediately excused themselves and said that they did not understand 
properly, nor could they answer his question, because they were all Christians.  
Being Alawis and thus Muslims, they felt that they should have understood such an 
important question, especially when asked by a Saudi, who Alawis joke about by saying 
‘Everything is “God is Great” to them!’ (kullu allahu akbar). Instead of just saying they were 
ignorant of the call to prayer, which is not an acceptable answer for the Muslim identity, they 
chose to conceal that they were Alawis and took on a Christian identity instead, which was the 
only socially acceptable way to be oblivious to the Muslim prayer. The fact that they all 
positioned themselves in the same way in the face of a Saudi ‘religious extremist’ shows how 
internalised such an act of concealment is. Their reactions were only an issue afterwards 
because I asked about it. The only reply I got was that it is ‘easier’ when dealing with such a 
fellow.  
This is an instrumental use of identities that is not confined to the Alawis due to sectarian 
prejudices and the belief that one is treated according to one’s sect. An illustrating example is 
the role of women and what is expected of them. An Alawi woman will have more freedom of 
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dress and behaviour than a Sunni woman will if we go by how the society around them 
perceives them. I know a Sunni girl in her mid-twenties who uses this to her own advantage. 
She dresses and behaves in a very liberal way and is automatically taken to be non-Sunni (i.e. 
probably Alawi or possibly Christian) excusing behaviour that would normally be frowned 
upon if she was judged by Sunni standards. Only by seeing her travelling with a foreigner, it 
is clear from their questions that they presume she is either Alawi or Christian since a good 
Sunni girl would supposedly never behave in such a way.  
This girl often confuses people because of her behaviour, at the same time as her accent is 
that of the city and associated with the Sunnis. She says that she will take on the role people 
expect of her since people believe what they want to believe anyway. At one point, we went 
together to a public office to sort out some paperwork. In the office, she realised she knew one 
of the clerks and we went to speak to him. The clerk, an Alawi, invited us to sit with him and 
at the right moment in the small talk that followed, in order to confirm his supposition that she 
is Alawi, he asked casually for her family name. Her name is common among Alawis, but 
also found among Sunnis, so the clerk went on to ask about where her father is from. Since 
her father grew up in an Alawi village, the clerk now believed she was Alawi. After we left 
she told me that she saw no reason to let him believe otherwise as she was convinced that he 
gave us better service than he would have given us had he known that she is Sunni. However, 
this concealment of identity is a dangerous game, something the aforementioned girl herself 
admits to. In her own words: ‘The Sunnis will definitively kill me if the Islamists seize power 
because I behave like an Alawi.’  
According to many of the Alawis I have spoken to, this instrumental use of identities to 
conceal one’s own, is widespread among Alawis and is part of their taqiyyah. One says that it 
depends on what tradition a family belongs to, as this differs from region to region, but that it 
is more widespread among those who live in Sunni dominated communities. Some families in 
mainly Sunni cities would never admit to being Alawis to a stranger. Their women will cover 
themselves when leaving the house and they will adhere to Sunni practices to complete the 
charade. This is very similar to what I was told about Alawi families staying in Aleppo after 
the massacres and keeping their faith a secret, which is summed up by one man saying: ‘We 
hide because we are weak, because we’re a minority. We do not want to be killed.’ As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, some use this as a reason to claim that the number of 
Alawis in Syria is much higher because many did not dare admit to being Alawis in the last 
census, which is the basis for all later estimates for the sectarian balance in Syria.  
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The Alawis’ outward appearance and behaviour thus seem to depend on where they are 
and how threatened they feel. This is comparable to my observations in different parts of 
coastal Syria where Alawis live. Places are graded according to ‘Alawiness’, which means 
how mixed they are with Sunnis. Whereas the Jabal Ansariyeh is constructed as the Alawi 
heartland and is closely tied to their historical narrative as the place where they sought refuge 
from Sunni oppression, the coastal plain, and especially the cities of Tartous and Latakia, is 
described as one of ‘recent arrival’ where they are less ‘in their element’. Hence, their 
mountains are where they organically belong. Of course, through their historical narrative 
they lay claim to greater areas where they now live because this is where they were driven out 
from during the massacres. One source from Tartous told me that his village is outside 
Tartous in the mountains. However, they are ‘originally’ from Aleppo and were driven out by 
the massacres. 
This discursive construction of place is connected to the Sunni hegemony and its strength. 
Where it is stronger, represented by the presence of Sunnis, Alawis display less of the 
differences they describe than they do where it is not felt in their daily lives. This difference 
can be illustrated in the following observation. During the month of Ramadan, when all 
Muslims are supposed to abstain from food, drink and smoking during the daylight hours – 
and when many Muslims who drink alcohol during the rest of the year do not – Tartous and 
Latakia are experienced differently. As has been explained, many Alawis interpret the 
religious rules, and especially the Five Pillars, as symbols rather than strict rules to be 
followed (e.g. praying in the mosque) and even when they do follow them, they are not 
concerned by others’ disregard of them. In the mountains and in Tartous, which only has a 
small minority of Sunnis, people eat and drink openly and the restaurants stay open during the 
fasting hours. Alcohol is also sold and consumed openly, although some of the bigger 
restaurants catering to Syrian tourists refrain from selling alcohol throughout the month. In 
Latakia on the other hand, a city that is divided between Sunnis and Alawis (both groups seem 
to claim they are the majority), there is a lot less open disregard for the fast. Finding an open 
café downtown during the day is difficult, and the restaurants do not serve alcohol at all. 
This grading of places is apparent on the local level also. Alawi girls are, according to my 
sources, not comfortable going to the Sleibeh neighbourhood, a Sunni part of Latakia noto-
rious for its conservativeness. And a place such as a bus station can take on a sectarian 
character as the following example shows: In a group of young people of mixed religious 
backgrounds, a girl was leaving on her own to go to the bus station to catch a microbus to her 
village outside Latakia. One of the young men, a visitor from another part of Syria, was very 
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concerned about her going all by herself as she might be harassed by the ruffians who hang 
out in such places as bus stations. Everybody else, the girl herself included, replied that there 
was no need for concern as this bus station only serves the villages in the region and these are 
all Alawi. This explanation was all that was needed as it meant that not only are the people 
there Alawis, but the fact that she is there means she is an Alawi and will be treated accor-
dingly. 
Finally, if we take the building of mosques in Alawi areas to be a symbol of the strength 
of the hegemony, it gives an impression of how Alawi resistance works. As we saw earlier, 
my sources claim that Alawis do not have a tradition for praying in mosques first of all 
because they pray in their hearts and secondly because they lost that tradition because it 
became a site where massacres of Alawis took place. If this is the case for Alawis in general, 
it would mean that they do not have the need for mosques (shrines are not counted as 
mosques). However, there are mosques in every Alawi village I have ever been to, although 
there seem to be fewer than in Sunni towns and villages. The building of mosques would, in 
this perspective, indicate that they were built for appearance only and are thus a material 
outcome of the Sunni hegemony. On the surface, there are mosques to indicate that Alawis are 
Muslims in the way Muslims adhere to the rules of that identity as defined by the dominant, 
whereas the hidden transcript allows that these are not used as prescribed by the hegemony.   
In conclusion 
From the theoretical framework in chapter 2, identity is viewed as relational and is constituted 
both as what is intrinsic to it and, just as important, everything it is not. The Sunnis have 
become the Alawis’ ‘The Other’ and the previous chapter explored the historical and 
theological reasons for this. But this is also the case in the social sphere and Alawis construct 
their collective identity in this sphere above all in relation to the Sunnis. In discursive terms, 
there is antagonism where the Sunni and the Alawi identities overlap as Muslim identities. 
Alawis present their identity as blocked by the Sunni hegemony of the right to define Muslim 
identity, something that becomes clearer in that several of my sources feel socially more 
Christian than they feel Muslim. The constitutive outside of Alawi identity is thus not non-
Alawi, but anti-Alawi. In other words, their identity is restricted and also threatened by other 
identities, above all Sunni identity.   
In order to define themselves as a group, Alawis make stereotypes of orthodox Sunnis in 
order to define who they are not. By using examples of strict Sunni practices in relation to 
alcohol and women’s behaviour and clothing, they portray themselves as the opposite of this 
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and therefore as liberal and tolerant. Some also seek to link their (cultural) identity both to the 
Christians and to Europe in order to distance themselves further from the Sunni threat. And it 
is exactly this threat that is essential to their identity. Many of my sources describe the Alawi 
relationship to the Sunnis as one where they are hated by them. Again, this point is intensified 
by their stories of how many Alawis in mixed areas hide their religion because it is not 
acceptable and they fear they will not be respected. This will turn into maltreatment and 
persecution in a potentially hostile future. 
Not surprisingly, the feeling of a restricted identity seems to be felt more in places where 
Alawis are exposed to a perceived judgement from Sunnis, such as in the mixed towns and 
cities of the coast. In the purely Alawi areas of the mountains the perception of Sunnis is even 
more stereotypical, but at the same time one gets the feeling that they have ‘carved out’ a 
place for themselves where they can live out their identity freely and in practice expel the 
hegemony from their daily lives.  
Yet, Alawi identity is not static and contemporary events affect how it is constructed. This 
is the case in the role of the regime and its policies towards Alawis and Sunnis, but also 
contemporary events in Syria and the wider region either weaken or exacerbate issues 
explored thus far. This political context is the topic of the next and final chapter in the 
analysis.  
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7 CONSTRUCTING POLITICS 
 
The two previous chapters have dealt with how the Alawis construct their identity, first of all 
based on a historical narrative and theological issues, and secondly on social issues relative to 
their perception of ‘The Other,’ mainly the Sunnis. This chapter focuses on how the Alawis 
construct their identity based on the political developments in Syria. Their, in many cases, 
involuntary connection to the regime is an important issue in how they present their political 
situation. Those few who feel comfortable to be critical, describe a situation where new 
political myths about them are created through the mistakes of the regime and their inability to 
address these issues under the present circumstances. The Alawi discourse of contemporary 
politics is closely bound to their historical narrative and the fear of the Sunnis is the over-
riding issue. Political events outside Syria also have an impact on Alawi identity, and, as will 
be discussed towards the end, the Islamic Discourse and the Critical Discourse differ when it 
comes to how Alawis see their effect. Overall, though, the hidden transcript is surprisingly 
uniform when presented by my sources, as the construction of politics will show. 
Proving history right 
Throughout this analysis, the focal point of Alawi identity has been the threat they feel to their 
community from the majority Sunnis in Syria. This fear and scepticism is constructed through 
the historical narrative – retold orally through generations – of being oppressed, subjugated 
and massacred. However, this is not ancient history to Alawis as stories of ill-treatment are as 
recent as the 1940s. Having reached their epoch of regeneration and re-establishment of their 
rights with Syrian independence, events during the first part of Hafiz al-Asad’s reign would 
prove to them that their freedom and way of life had not yet been secured, and that the hatred 
of the Sunni population towards them had not yet abated.  
In 1976, six years after President Hafiz al-Asad seized power in Syria, the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood launched an armed uprising against the Syrian regime that would last until 1982. 
The Muslim Brotherhood is an offshoot of the Sunni Islamist movement of the same name 
that was founded in Egypt in the 1920s. It had existed in Syria for decades and its primary 
goal had been to replace the regime with one committed to and based on the Salafist version 
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of a pure Islam – wanting to return to a Golden Age of their own: that of the first three 
generations of Muslims that were uncorrupted by conquests and pre-existing civilisations 
(Smith 2003). During the uprising, they sought to mobilise the Sunni population of Syria 
against the regime by portraying their struggle as a religious war against the heretic Alawi 
regime through the declaration of Alawis as neither Muslims nor Arabs (Landis 08.10.2004, 
Leverett 2005).  
The discourse of the uprising is not closed in Syria today, something the different 
descriptions of the conflict attest to. The conflict is over representation, and the narrative of 
my Alawi sources presents the events as motivated by sectarianism. This is contrary to the 
Official Discourse of the regime, which defines the conflict as politically motivated. Wedeen 
(1999) shows that the regime, both during and after the conflict had struggled to represent it in 
political terms in order to negate the religious anti-Alawi slogans of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
By describing the insurgents as conservative, religious extremists that were enemies of the 
progressive and inclusive state, they downplayed their own minority religious backgrounds by 
claiming to be representatives of all modern-minded Syrians. The parties in the conflict were 
therefore not Sunnis versus Alawis, but rather extremists versus Syrians of all creeds. Yet, 
even if the regime refused to enter into a secular debate, reprints of a number of history books 
portraying Alawis in a favourable light were allowed to be sold in bookshops around this time 
(van Dam 1989). Whether the regime was successful influencing Syrians with its secular 
interpretation of the conflict is difficult to say. However, considering the historical ambi-
valence and subsequent lack of power of definition Alawis have in religious matters discussed 
in chapter five, this is doubtful.  
Yet, the Alawis who feel comfortable talking about this subject portray this conflict as a 
sectarian conflict and a direct attack on the Alawis in the same way the Muslim Brotherhood 
argued. To them, the Muslim Brotherhood is the continuation of extremism among Sunnis 
that has existed above all since the fatwa of Ibn Taymiyyah in the 14th century (see page 58). 
One of my sources describes the conflict as one where almost all the victims that were singled 
out were Alawis and where all the perpetrators were Sunnis. The acts of violence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood are described by these sources in terms very similar to how they 
describe the historical persecution of the Alawis. It was principally characterised by brutality 
and cowardice. Furthermore, due to the (cowardly) guerrilla tactics of their warfare, there was 
no way their victims could protect themselves against the attacks. 
The fact that the conflict is recent history, gives their historical narrative contemporary 
evidence. Additionally, personal experience and first-hand accounts gives any narrative a 
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guarantee of certainty (Hodgkin & Radstone 2003a). Therefore, when my sources relate 
stories of their families’ – or their friends’ families’ – direct experience of the conflict, it gives 
increased strength to their representation of the conflict. A man from Tartous told me the 
story of the killing of the husband of his aunt during the uprising. The husband was an officer 
in the army and was on his way to work one morning. He was killed by three men who had all 
dressed up as women wearing the traditional Sunni dresses that cover both their bodies and 
their faces. In this cowardly way, they were able to hide automatic weapons under the loose 
garments, and he was gunned down in cold blood on the street. Not only does the account 
give the impression of relative innocence in that he was on his way to work as on any normal 
morning, but the reasons for his murder was condensed in my source’s summary: ‘He was 
killed because he was an Alawi.’  
Landis (08.10.2004) tells a similar story about his father-in-law: 
My father-in-law, a retired Alawi Admiral of the Syrian Navy, was on the 
Brotherhood hit list and nearly assassinated by a neighbor who turned out to be a 
member of an underground organization. Needless to say, this had a profound effect 
on the family (a neighbor from a family they liked). 
A second event that appears formative, yet not discursively closed, for the Alawis as a group 
was the bloody culmination of the uprising. In 1982, after years of conflict and increasing 
boldness on their part, the Muslim Brotherhood seized control of the city of Hama, one of 
their most important bases of support. Wanting to set and example, and having made 
membership of the organisation punishable by death two years earlier, the regime sent in the 
army and levelled part of the city, killing more than 25,000 people according to a 2006 report 
of the Syrian Human Rights Committee13 although other sources cite numbers between 
10,000-15,000. At issue here is that the stories of the massacres tell that the perpetrators were 
Alawis under the command of Hafiz al-Asad’s brother Rif’at al-Asad. The fact that Alawis 
constituted the crack units in the attack gave them the opportunity to get their revenge on the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Sunnis in general.  
These stories were told to me by the Alawis themselves, seeking to disprove this myth. 
They were eager to show that this is how Syrians in general tell the story and that it unfairly 
reflects very badly on Alawis. On the contrary, they say, the units partaking in the attack were 
made up of Syrians from all kinds of backgrounds. One source uses his father as an example. 
He told me that he was a soldier in one of the units that fought in Hama and that, even though 
he confesses to not knowing a lot about it, he has been told that the unit was composed of men 
                                                 
13 http://www.shrc.org/data/aspx/d5/2535.aspx, downloaded 10.01.2007 
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representing Syrian society, meaning that they belonged to different sects and religions, 
including Sunnis. To strengthen the argument, I was offered to speak to his father myself to 
have the story verified. Interestingly, in this context – where Alawis are placed on the 
perpetrating side – my source tells the story of this event in the conflict as a war between 
extremists and Syrians (similar to the Official Discourse) and not as a sectarian struggle, as 
was the case for the conflict as a whole. It would seem that in a situation where he admits to 
Alawis being on the perpetrating side, they are representatives of Syrians and not of 
themselves in a sectarian struggle.  
An ‘Alawi’ regime? 
Closely coupled to the fear my Alawi sources feel for their Sunni neighbours, is the 
perception Syrians supposedly have of the regime being ‘Alawi’ – meaning that it is primarily 
by and for Alawis. This is another of the constitutive myths and is how the Muslim Brother-
hood portrayed the regime during its uprising. Chapter four outlined the background to this 
claim, but the issue here is to get an impression of the Alawis’ opinion on the matter. None of 
my sources disputes the fact that Alawis have played an important role in the developments in 
modern Syria. Nevertheless, the role of the Alawis’ are ‘re-presented’ by them as members of 
a coalition of progressive-minded groups and people and not as an exclusively Alawi project. 
A few of my most critical sources, though, say that it has been a big mistake by the Alawis in 
power to have such a central and visible role in the regime. Their role reflects back at the 
group and this is something they are afraid that they will have to pay for at some point.  
Typically though, when confronting Alawis with the claim that the regime is ‘Alawi’, they 
instantly answer that this is not so. The immediate reaction in several cases has been to point 
out that the number of Alawi ministers in the government is very low or that the important 
Sunni families of Damascus are more powerful than all Alawis put together. In many cases, 
my sources have pre-empted my questions when the topic has turned to the religion of those 
in power by saying that the Alawis have not benefited as a group just because the president is 
Alawi. They here implicitly refer to a myth of how all Alawis benefit from the regime due to 
belonging to the same sect as those in power. The power of this myth on the self-perception of 
my Alawi sources becomes clearer when questioning them further on their initial reaction.  
They categorically deny that the Alawis have benefited because of their religion. To the 
extent that the Alawis have benefited, it has been through the economic development of the 
region, which had anyway lagged behind due to centuries of neglect by the authorities. 
Instead, they say, the nepotism of the regime is well known, but this is based on personal 
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connections and the patronage of powerful families regardless of sect. To demonstrate this, 
they typically mention the difficult financial situation of themselves or their families or the 
lack of amenities in the villages where they are from. One Latakian said that this is something 
non-Alawis living in Alawi areas are well aware of, but that Syrians in other parts of the 
country all believe that all Alawis are well off from government money.  
A young man from Tartous said outright that he feels that no one represent the Alawi 
community as a whole. To him, the regime only represents itself, whereas the others sects in 
Syria have representatives – usually religious leaders – that the authorities deal with on a 
regular basis. These leaders also have the opportunity to raise questions pertaining to their 
community publicly. Unlike these groups, the Alawis are treated as if they don’t exist – he 
here refers to how the Alawis fall under Sunni Shari’a law against their will – and do not have 
their own say in the government’s treatment of them. To put it differently, he sees no opp-
ortunity to challenge the Sunni discursive hegemony as long as his sect does not have a public 
face other than the regime. Instead, he yearns for public representatives defending Alawi 
interests, not Alawis defending regime interests. The Alawi Khudr14 (30.08.2006) elaborates 
on this issue. He writes that Alawis used to feel represented by the regime as long as they saw 
an improvement in the fortunes of the Alawis, but that this feeling has been severely 
weakened by the full-fledged alliances between the traditionally powerful Sunni families and 
the Alawi families with political power. This, he writes, shows that the regime is more 
interested in the perpetuation of its power than in the communal interests of the Alawis. 
 
Not only do my sources disagree to the claim that the regime as ‘Alawi’ (although it is 
important to point out that none of them comes from wealthy or important families), but a few 
of them criticise the regime directly for having caused many of the sectarian problems in the 
first place and thus damaging the Alawi name. This, they feel, is very harmful in the 
hypothetical situation where a new regime cannot guarantee the rights of the Alawi com-
munity.  
One of these reasons was mentioned in chapter four where it was described how the 
Syrian curriculum disregards Syria’s Islamic minorities and presents Islam as only the ortho-
dox Sunni understanding of it. The religious education does not have even one reference to 
Alawis – nor Druze or Isma’ilis, or even of Shi’a Islam as a whole – on any level of the 
school system. Discussion of Islamic diversity is not to be encouraged (Landis 2003). One 
                                                 
14 See page 18 for explanation 
 88
person I spoke to in Tartous about this said that it would be inconceivable for a teacher of 
religion (or any other subject for that matter) even to mention the term ‘Alawi’ in the 
classroom. Doing so would get him into a lot of trouble with the school authorities. This lack 
of openness in religious matters is perceived by Alawi critics as a big mistake on part of the 
regime because of the simple fact that ignorance leads to intolerance. At the same time, the 
Sunni monopoly in education is described as yet another proof that the Sunnis are the ones 
with actual power and get to impose their religious views on the population as a whole, 
despite the supposed secularism of the regime. Karfan (23.03.2005) describes this precisely, 
yet in harsher words, in his blog: 
Nine hundred years of living next to each other and still all what we know about each 
other is a bunch of lies that are regurgitated from generation to generation. We have a 
great unofficial and official policy of uprooting sectarianism and tribalism: Ignoring 
their existence!!…Most of the rest of us know about Martians more than they know 
about Kurds or [Druze] who have been living here for thousands of years…[O]ur 
fathers "failed generation" spent sixty years loosing their Don Kichotian wars and 
chasing dreams while forgetting to make us know each other better and build us a 
solid identity. 
Along similar lines, a second policy of the regime has been the downright suppression of 
Alawi religious mobilisation, as mentioned in chapter four. Unlike Christians and Muslim 
sects, the Alawi are not allowed to establish religious organisations. My Alawi sources 
disagree on the reasons for this, but they do confirm that the attempts to organise the Alawi 
religion has been barred by the regime. It may have weakened Alawi religious identity and 
solidarity, but Alawis I have spoken to do not necessarily see this as negative. One of my 
academic sources believes this prohibition was a good idea, above all because any formal 
religious hierarchy is contrary to the beliefs of the Alawis, which emphasises the individual’s 
right to keep his relationship with religion between him and God. Secondly, he said, formal 
organisation of the religion might lead to increased influence from other Islamic sects leading 
to a more rule-bound and less tolerant understanding of religion.  
A few critical voices ascribe more sinister motives to these policies. They speculate that 
the reasons behind are to keep the country divided and ignorant of other groups and sects and 
thus keeping them uneasy about ‘The Other’ – a topic returned to in the next section below. 
Furthermore, for the Alawis in particular, these policies are supposed to thwart any alternative 
political forces to develop among them that may challenge the regime. This view also has 
proponents in academic circles abroad. Perthes (05.10.2005) expanded on this theory in his 
article, claiming that the only credible alternative to the present regime comes from the 
possibility of a counter-coup from within the Alawi community itself. This theory was 
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discussed among Alawis in my presence as well when rumours were rampant after the 
supposed suicide of the Alawi Minister of Interior, Ghazi Kana’an, at the height of the 
perceived instability of the regime during the autumn of 2005 (see ‘Political circumstances’ 
below). According to Scott (1990), rumours are important forms of resistance, and in this 
case, the fact that it was not rejected out of hand by those present, could be an indication of 
the strength of an Alawi hidden script. 
Karfan (28.03.2005) lends his voice to the most extreme critics, who see the suppression 
of the Alawi religion as an attempt to keep the Alawis down for the regime to stay in power: 
"King Lion the 1st" long ago realized how much he relies on the support of his sect to 
stay in power, and realized who much dangerous would be to rely on something that 
can be easily manipulated such as religion. He then diverted this lurking danger to his 
rule by imposing an overwhelming Sunni-fication policy on the very Alawie sect that 
supported him…The Sunni-fication attempt did not work simply because it was not 
meant to work in the first place. While "King Lion the 1st" and his thugs were 
trumpeting this integration policy, they were at the same time systematically building 
a culture of separation and segregation between Alawies and Sunnis, and between all 
sects and ethnic and religious groups in Syria for that matter. The real reason behind 
this policy was never integration with Sunnis or establishing an acceptance for the 
Alawies by the Sunnis. The real reason was to deprive the Alawies from any solid 
unified religious ideology that might one day pause a fatal danger on the rule of the 
King. To turn them into meaningless tribes ranked by how much they support the 
King. 
For the most part, though, my sources are fairly apologetic towards the regime on these 
issues. Even when they strongly disagree with the policies, they give an impression that 
maybe the regime has good reasons to do these things. The academic source mentioned 
above, for example, thinks that the reason for not mentioning Alawis in the school curriculum 
is the regime’s desire to promote unity in the population. This, he says, might be the reason 
they teach similarities rather than differences in religious education. Whether the apologetic 
arguments are uttered because of a fear of being too critical or an indication of a belief in the 
ultimate good intentions of the regime is hard to say. However, the latter reason does not 
rhyme well with how much the nepotism of the regime bothers them or their support for the 
regime as outlined at the end of the chapter. A third possibility has to do with the taqiyyah and 
that they cannot imagine their own religious beliefs out in the open and being taught in school 
or organised publicly.  
There seem to be generational differences among Alawis when it comes to the feeling of 
representation the regime gives them. This difference was explained earlier as being 
connected to personal experiences. Older Alawis have to a greater extent than the young ex-
perienced a different life of more hardship and greater inequality in their regions. To them, the 
regime of Hafiz al-Asad created opportunities for them to climb the social ladder and leave 
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the countryside and poverty behind. They might therefore feel that the regime represents them 
more because they felt their living standards improve in the last half of the 20th century. 
Young people, on the other hand, have only seen their opportunities decrease with the 
deteriorating economic situation. 
This supposition is backed up by Khudr (30.08.2006) who writes that ‘Most of us have not 
lived the unjust circumstances that our fathers and grand-fathers were subjected to by the 
Sunnis. As such, we do not have the same appreciation as our fathers of the Alawi rule that 
the late president Hafez Assad brought.’ Additionally, he points out an important difference 
when it comes to the modest background of the early Alawi leaders and their function as role 
models:  
Our fathers’ support for Hafez was driven largely by their resentment for the wealthy 
bourgeois that Hafez and his Baath claimed to oppose and which imbued their 
movement with much of its legitimacy. The followers of Rifa`at al-Assad used to 
recount to us in the seventies how they admired him because he would pick up a dirty 
used tuna can from the floor and drink tea from it. I wonder what those people think 
about him now that he uses golden utensils in his multi-million dollar villas in France 
and Spain? … Unfortunately, we are watching how the Alawi rulers and many of 
their children, are becoming the very same thing they taught us to despise. 
Overall, it would seem that the regime is falling pray to its own rhetoric in the form of 
discursive negation (Scott 1990). The Official Discourse claims that the regime represents all 
Syrians equally, and Alawis should therefore be represented on the same level as other groups 
in Syria. However, many Alawis actually feel under-represented compared to other groups 
and this undermines the belief in the Official Discourse. The language of sectarian harmony is 
negated in the same way by being proven wrong in the anti-Alawi policies of the regime.   
The durability of fear 
It would be an overstatement to claim that Alawis live in fear in general. Rather, it is a mixed 
feeling of scepticism towards the Sunnis and the myths they believe in about the Alawis, and 
of insecurity for what might happen in the future if radical elements gain a position of power. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s uprising proved to the Alawis that many Sunnis still see them as 
heretics and thus religious targets in their holy war for Islamic purity. Although many of my 
sources speak of increasing openness and tolerance in Syrian society in general, they see a 
parallel development of increasing devoutness in the Sunni population and a rising influence 
of puritanical interpretations.  
Due to the non-existence of a public debate or openness on sectarian issues, little is known 
of the strength of extremist sentiments in the Sunni population. Yet, stories are told and retold 
among friends and family, and many people read news and analyses from abroad on the 
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internet. Most people I have spoken to about the future of the Alawis are convinced that the 
Sunni extremists have a strong following and that they will want to have their revenge on the 
Alawis when they get a chance.  
One source living in the city of Latakia said that she is convinced that the extremists will 
gain power at some point in the future. When that happens, she says, the Alawis will 
experience massacres rivalling those that took place under the Ottoman Empire. Exemplifying 
how the extremism is spreading, she told me that she herself has seen it in Damascus. In the 
main market area, one can now see posters with quotes from Ibn Taymiyyah and other 
religious extremists who are famous for their calls to kill those that do not follow their 
teachings. Other stories abound, such as the supposed dissemination of flyers in the late 
summer of 2005 warning the ‘Alawi unbelievers’ that the day of judgement is imminent 
(Landis 14.09.2005).  
Those of my sources who travel abroad or are very internationally minded are the most 
critical of all. Possibly, these sources are also the ones who dare to speak most openly because 
they feel more protected than the Alawis living in Syria on a permanent basis who are 
exposed to the surveillance of the intelligence services. Another possibility is that they more 
actively seek alternative views online or in the media in languages other than Arabic. In any 
case, these critics portray the regime as further aloof from the general population than other 
sources and as more interested in its own survival than the survival of the Syrian population. 
By sabotaging true religious harmony, they could present themselves as the only viable 
alternative in a society on the verge of chaos. In the words of Karfan (23.03.2005):  
Our fathers then found this [the coup of Hafiz al-Asad] as a chance to get rid of their 
seven hundred years of segregation and being treated like semi-human beings, and 
they helped him up. Soon after, they noticed that instead of building a real secular 
civil society in which they and other minorities can guarantee being treated equally 
by our Sunni big-brothers, he and the gang around him were more concerned in 
building their own bank-accounts and influence. When he noticed that he is risking 
that many Alawis are starting not to buy his bullshit, then he resolved into convincing 
them that if they do not side by him, their historical depressors, the Sunnis, will kick 
their asses back to the top of the cruel mountains they once came from. The stupid 
Muslim-Brother gang helped him in his mission by hunting down every single poor 
Alawi they could get their hand on. The "White Knight of Tadmur" [Rif’at al-Asad] 
helped even more by doing the same to the Sunnis.  
In other words, in order to hold on to power, it has not been in the regime’s interest to 
promote true inter-sectarian understanding. Instead, in order to boost its own legitimacy, it has 
instilled a fear of civil war in the population by enhancing news related to the threat of Islamic 
extremism at the same time as discouraging any type of open sectarian dialogue. These critics 
see catastrophe looming ever closer the more corrupt the government becomes. The more the 
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regime seeks to hang on to power the more it harms Alawi interests because, in the event of a 
collapse of the regime, Syrians do not differentiate between Alawis in general and the Alawis 
of the regime. 
However fabricated some people think the idea of eventual sectarian strife is, the fear of 
civil war comes up on a regular basis whenever inter-sectarian relations are discussed. Apart 
from history and the extremism of the Muslim Brotherhood, my sources have pointed to two 
things that exacerbate their fear: the experiences of the neighbouring countries and the role 
and language of the overseas-based opposition.  
Many of Syria’s neighbours have experienced sectarian strife, and these influence people’s 
perception of whether something similar could happen in Syria. Lebanon suffered 15 years of 
civil war from 1975-1990 and positions in government and parliament are allotted on a 
sectarian basis. The Syrian government even uses the term ‘lebanonisation’ in official rhetoric 
when warning of the dangers of sectarian thinking (Nome, unpublished). Iraq proves another 
case in point where a fairly stable dictatorship, not unlike that in Syria, presided over a range 
of different sects who suddenly went for each other’s throats once the stability of the regime 
had disappeared. Even though my sources have always been careful to point out that Syria is 
more peaceful and stable than both Lebanon and Iraq, they express themselves in a way 
whereby one gets the impression that communal harmony is something artificial and 
ephemeral rather than natural and stable.  
When it comes to Syrian dissidents based abroad, these also influence the feeling of what 
is to come inside Syria itself. Unlike the internal opposition, which speaks the language of 
religious harmony, the language of the dissidents abroad sometimes differs. One example is a 
letter by Farid al-Ghadry, the current president of the Syria Reform Party, a US-based oppo-
sition party, who in October 2006 called for the Alawis to ‘return to their mountains.’15 
Repeatedly, people come up with examples like these to show that nothing has changed and 
that the Alawis will still be the target of reprisals when the time comes.  
This fear is, not surprisingly, more noticeable in times of heightened tensions. During my 
fieldwork in Syria in the autumn of 2005, international pressure on Syria was growing. This 
was a result of the UN investigation into the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri in Lebanon and a 
more aggressive stance towards Syria from the Bush administration. The government of 
Bashar al-Asad was showing signs of stress and there was speculation both inside Syria and in 
international media of the imminent collapse of his regime either through a popular uprising 
                                                 
15http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua.M.Landis-1/syriablog/2006/08/should-syria-and-israel-
negotiate.htm#c115697233538484447, downloaded 12.09.2006 
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or through an internal coup. There was increasing speculation of what might happen and some 
of my sources were fearful of the future. This feeling was exacerbated by rumours that Alawi 
families living in Damascus were making preparations for a situation where they would have 
to move to safer – meaning Alawi – areas on short notice.  
Political circumstances and their impact 
The theme so far in the role politics play on how Alawi identity is constructed has been the 
role Sunnis and Sunni extremism plays in constituting a threat to the Alawis. However, events 
abroad influence how this threat is felt in the Alawi community. In short, the more threatened 
Syrians feel by forces abroad, the less they seem to emphasise the threats from inside Syria. 
The way people spoke about their fears and anxieties in the autumn of 2005, when there was a 
fear that the regime might collapse under the pressure from both abroad and inside Syria was 
centred on their concern for their personal safety in an uncertain future. During the summer of 
2006, on the other hand, when people were rallying to defend their country from the perceived 
imminent Israeli attack to punish Syria for its support for Hezbollah during that summer’s 
war, sectarian issues were less pronounced and people were more hopeful.  
There are mainly two reasons for this. Firstly, an overarching Syrian identity is strength-
ened when there is a need to come together against an external enemy. This is especially the 
case when the enemy is a traditional enemy like Israel or when people believed that Syria was 
next on the list for invasion by the United States after Iraq in 2003. In these cases, Alawis 
have told me that they feel more accepted as both Arabs and Syrians because the Syrian 
identity trumps sectarian identities in the national interest. Second, where the regime is seen 
to defend Arab rights, as they did during Hezbollah’s war against Israel that summer, or when 
the regime supports the Palestinians in their struggle against Israel, this reflects back on the 
Alawis. This is ironic since Alawis feel that people’s negative feelings of the regime reflect 
unjustly on the sect because of the background of the president and other Alawis in power. 
However, when an Alawi is seen to fight for an Arab or Muslim cause and the support of the 
regime increases, they have reason to be proud of their backgrounds also.  
The reactions to Hezbollah’s perceived victory over Israel are interesting for the 
construction of Alawi identity. Support for Hezbollah and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah was 
near total in the Alawi communities I encountered. But then again, this support was just as 
ardent among my Syrian-Christian acquaintances and was therefore, in my opinion, for 
political and not religious reasons. However, the fact that Hezbollah is a Shi’a party and that 
Alawis also define themselves as Shi’as was mentioned by some of my sources as having a 
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positive influence on the perceptions about Alawis. There is a long history of animosity 
towards Shi’as in the Sunni Muslim world and these sources believe that this animosity has 
also reflected on the Alawis in a negative manner. This began to change with the Iranian 
revolution as Sunnis started respecting the Shi’as for their achievements (obviously, as long 
as they did not feel threatened), and has grown stronger with Iran’s and Hezbollah’s strong 
stance against Israel over the last few years. This link to their namesakes is seen to strengthen 
their claims to be Muslims, at least amongst the less extreme parts of the population.  
 
However, the internal Alawi discourses are affected by these events also. Although I have 
never come across any Alawi claiming not to be Muslim, the two Alawi discourses identified 
in this thesis differ in their attitudes towards Islam in general. Adherents to both the Islamic 
Discourse and the Critical Discourse have shown great scepticism towards Islam – due to the 
Sunnis’ power of definition – throughout the various topics of this thesis. This is blamed on 
the alienation they feel from the majority Sunni Muslims of Syria who, they feel, do not 
accept them as Muslims. This alienation is strengthened by Muslim extremism elsewhere, 
above all in Iraq, which stands for a Muslim identity they do not recognise as even remotely 
related to their own. Its impact is more apparent in the Critical Discourse, where several of 
my sources who use it say they wish they were not considered Muslims at all. In many ways, 
they describe the Muslim identity like a prison. It becomes a label by which they are judged 
by non-Muslims by all the negative associations created by Sunni Islam in both conservatism 
and extremism.  
The Islamic Discourse takes a somewhat different view. My sources drawing on this 
discourse are equally worried about the role of extremism, but seem more relaxed in their 
identity as Muslims. They speak instead of the importance of showing that Islam is more than 
the conservative understanding of the Sunnis and that the ideal of the Prophet is now to be 
found in the tolerance of some European countries rather than in some backward-looking 
Arab societies. However, this difference between the discourses is not surprising. Those of 
my sources drawing on the Critical Discourse are the least religious, whereas the opposite is 
the case for those espousing the Islamic Discourse. Criticising one’s own religion is obviously 
less acceptable when one is a devout believer. 
As an extension of this topic, I have asked several of my sources about the impact the 
aforementioned conflicts have on the Muslim identity of the Alawis. Again, the two 
discourses diverge in the answer. The sources within the Critical Discourse reply that Alawis 
feel less like Muslims and closer to the Christians because of what they see abroad. They say 
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they cannot relate to the logic of the Islamic way of thinking and they share values with the 
Christians more than with other Muslims. In other words, they emphasise culture more than 
they do religion, which corresponds to my remarks on religion above.  
Those within the Islamic discourse have a different answer. They emphasise the growing 
religious and political strength of Shi’a Islam and that this is affecting the Alawis as well. One 
source in particularly underlines the impact the secretive nature of the Alawi religion has. 
Unless you are an initiate, you will not have access to the Alawi religion and doctrines apart 
from what you have learned at home. The solution, therefore, which one of my academic 
sources said he is doing, is to look for information elsewhere. In this case, it is easier to turn 
to the Sunni and Shi’a teachings than to stick only to what one has learned at home. Couple 
this with the sole teaching of the Sunni version of Islam in schools, and the result is the 
mixing of the Alawi religion with other sects in Islam.  
This is not necessarily a bad thing, I have been told, since studying and finding one’s own 
way to God is in the spirit of Alawism. However, several of my sources display concern for 
this situation also because they are afraid it will mean that Alawi culture will be influenced by 
the other sects. One girl I spoke to said that the close ties the Syrian regime has forged with 
Iran is frightening. The image of Hezbollah and Iran is having an impact on Alawis, she says, 
and with the free access Iranians have to come to Syria to spread their ideas of Islam, Alawis 
could become influenced by both their theological ideas, but more worryingly, their rigidity in 
matters of society and culture. 
Alawi support for the regime 
It is neither the scope of this thesis nor an aim in itself to be able to generalise about whether 
Alawis in general support the regime more or less than other groups in Syria. However, due to 
the simple conclusions sometimes drawn that because Alawis play an important role in the 
regime this means that Alawis in general support it, I would like to diversify this picture 
somewhat.  
Although talking about the regime, and especially the ruling cabinet, is something most 
Syrians are extremely wary about, I have built up a picture from a variety of reactions, 
guarded comments and a few private conversations. However, after having read this chapter, 
there will be no surprises in the ideas outlined here. As for the support of the regime, my 
sources have opinions ranging from complete support and confidence to complete disgust for 
it. Of the former group, it consists mostly of people who are both very political and who 
support the Ba’th Party and its ideology of Arab nationalism. It is hard to gauge this group, 
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though, since praising the regime is what Syrians do by default when speaking with people 
they do not know well and trust. The use of posters and pictures of the president and his 
family in shops, taxis, and any other public space in Syria attests to this. Even my most 
critical sources have ‘proof’ of their support of the regime on their walls, a strategy Wedeen 
(1999) describes as deflecting unwanted attention since not having it is more unusual than the 
other way round. The most critical group consists of the least political people who just want 
change to the status quo, no matter the consequences. They are also the most self-critical ones 
and place least importance on an active Alawi identity and solidarity.  
Yet, most of my sources fall into a middle category where they would either want 
extensive reforms to the current regime or a new regime completely – but in an ideal world. 
The earlier explanation of how my sources see the ‘Alawiness’ of the regime reflects how the 
majority of them see the situation. Many of them are extremely sceptical of the regime and its 
intentions, viewing its policies as unsustainable in the long run. Moreover, they say they want 
democratic reforms and an end to the nepotism and patronage that is choking the country. 
However, they do not see any alternatives to the present regime in today’s Syria and are 
therefore its silent supporters. These silent supporters of the regime seem to base their passive 
support on their anxiety of what a new political situation could bring. This is largely because 
they fear that the Sunni extremists will play a powerful role. As noted, the Muslim 
Brotherhood plays a central role in the opposition abroad and the signals from this opposition 
regarding the role of the Alawis in a new Syria are mixed. For those who have clarified their 
ideas, such as Farid al-Ghadry, they have been about the expulsion of the Alawis from 
government positions rather than ideas for a peaceful normalisation of the sectarian balance.  
The result, therefore, is a situation where many Alawis prefer a dysfunctional regime that 
protects their rights as Syrians, rather than something unknown. It would be preferable to 
have a new and more democratic regime that could reform the economy. But at present, a new 
regime might just as well lead to the persecution and expulsion of the Alawis from the cities 
of Syria. 
In conclusion 
Inquiring about Alawi solidarity to a man I spoke to in Tartous in the summer of 2006, he 
replied that Alawi identity is not very strong and that Alawi solidarity is only activated in 
times of threat to the community. Yet, the stories from most of my sources indicate that 
danger is all around. True, the threat is hypothetical and not something they have to deal with 
in practice, but it is real in that the consequences were felt only 25 years ago during the terror 
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of the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite the issue’s banned character, it still endures in the 
forefront of people’s minds and as a living and contemporary example of their historical 
narrative. Its strength not only derives from its proximity in time, but also from its impact on 
the private sphere because friends and relatives were killed. The narrative follows that of their 
historical experience with its focus on persecution and massacres and is characterised by its 
brutality, cowardice and terrorist tactics.  
In the political conflicts of Syria, Alawis feel they are hated by ‘The Other’ because of the 
mistakes of the regime. It is a myth, they say, that we gain in any way from a shared religious 
background. Instead, the nepotism so visible is about personal relations with powerful 
families, both Sunni, Christian and Alawi, and not sect. Some, therefore, present their shared 
background as a curse rather than a blessing: ‘If you build a city, few people will hear about 
it. If you destroy a city, however, everybody will hear about it.’ This was how one of my 
sources described the situation of the Alawis in Syria. Whereas many Alawis helped build the 
country after independence and even opposed the regimes of Hafiz al-Asad and Bashar al-
Asad, the few disgraceful ones contaminate their whole reputation.  
The Official Discourse of the regime seems to have negated itself in the representation of 
my Alawi sources. By not living up to its norms of non-preferential treatment of certain sects, 
the leeway given to the Sunnis to portray their version of Islam as the only legitimate one in 
the school curriculum and the suppression of Alawi religious organisations, it negates itself. 
Instead of providing security for the Alawis in a future Syria, the impression is that even 
though there is progress on some fronts, ignorance of Alawis is still thriving. This feeling of 
being misunderstood is intensified by a lack of good representatives. Their only public 
representatives, the Alawis of the regime, only represent themselves and not the Alawi 
community. To add to this, the public sphere is closed for the raising of sectarian issues, and 
any mentioning of differences coinciding with sectarian differences is taboo. There is a clear 
sense of frustration among my Alawi sources, therefore, of not being able to state their own 
case for the rest of the Syrians to hear. It should be mentioned, though, that this view is a 
minority view in that most of the sources of this thesis have declined to speak about political 
issues. Whether this silence means a support for the regime and its policies or a fear of being 
critical is impossible to know. 
Briefly, on the political future, my sources are hopeful that things will work out for the 
best and that their fears of the future will be unfounded. But to quote the girl mentioned 
earlier as anticipating new massacres: ‘If worst comes to worst, we are ready to defend 
ourselves and what we believe in.’ 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
A first-time visitor to Syria will experience Syria as a tolerant society where the sects live side 
by side without noticeable friction. This is also the case in practice, but people’s experiences 
are more multi-faceted once they go beyond the Official Discourse they instinctively draw on 
when speaking about sectarian issues. This thesis has divided Alawi identity according to how 
they speak of their history and beliefs, their society, and the political situation in Syria. When 
we see all these issues together, there are certain over-arching matters that materialise in the 
Alawis’ perception of their world. 
The Sunni hegemony 
What becomes clear the more my sources have spoken about themselves is how their identity 
is shaped by the Sunni hegemony. Although there is antagonism between the Alawi dis-
courses and the Official Discourse, their discourses are constructed mainly in opposition to 
the Sunni discourse. Although this has only become clear to me through the final work on the 
analysis, the way the Alawis describe their group in religious terms indicates a situation of 
near-objectivity. As was explained in chapter three, objectivity is the enlargement of the 
hegemony into what is seen as ‘natural’. The power of the discourse is not apparent and is 
only visible through the fact that the order of things is not questioned. This does not mean that 
there is no antagonism within the Sunni hegemony. As was shown in chapter four, there is a 
battle between different understandings in Sunni Islam, but only within the confines of the 
hegemony. Yet, its near-objectivity status becomes even more apparent when academics not 
part of the discourses play by its rules. When Pipes (1990) and others conclude that Alawis 
are ‘definitely not Muslims’ (see page 2), it is because they themselves write from within the 
hegemony and has been subjected to the power of definition it contains.  
There is of course a second hegemony in the form of the Official Discourse, but I have 
chosen not to call this a hegemony because it does not appear to have power other than on the 
surface. It was installed with the regime of Hafiz al-Asad through a hegemonic intervention 
caused by the overlap of Sunni and other discourses in Syria that restricted one another. By 
using the power at its disposal, the regime was able to force an overarching identity meant to 
supplant antagonistic sectarian identities. However, this discourse, and especially the 
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identities within it, do not seem to be widely respected and are contested within hidden 
transcripts of not only Alawis, but probably also the Sunnis. The strength of the Sunni 
hegemony is apparent in its influence on the Official Discourse in its denial of any Islamic 
diversity in Syria and the presentation of Sunni Islam as the only legitimate interpretation of 
Islam.  
This in itself undermines the Official Discourse and gives it less legitimacy. This is 
because the power it accedes to the hegemony means that it rejects the minorities that it 
claims to include. From the Alawis’ point of view, the Official Discourse negates itself when 
it claims that Alawis are part of Islam, but at the same time portrays Islam as nothing but 
Sunni Islam. The further claim that Alawis are accepted by Syria’s non-Alawi Muslims, 
further intensifies this when most Alawis seem to believe that the opposite is the case, at least 
among powerful segments of Sunni society. This is topped by a denial of a separate Alawi 
tradition in Syria even by its own members in power.  
The creation of the Sunni hegemony goes back to the division between Sunni and Shi’a 
Islam in the first century of the religion. The hegemony, of course, has never been static, but 
in Alawi eyes it has controlled Syria almost continuously since that time. In this way, all 
Islamic history becomes political and thus contested. The quote at the beginning of this thesis 
seems innocent enough on its own. However, when I enquired about it to one of my sources, 
she pointed out that it was meant to cement Sunni power in Syria when the caliph Mu’awiyah 
took over as head of the Islamic community following Ali’s assassination. They interpreted 
Islam to fit their own political goals of war and conquest instead of what the Alawis see as the 
true, peaceful message of the religion. The quote, therefore, refers to the ‘truth’ of Islam as 
propounded by the Damascus-based Umayyad dynasty, which meant that the great conspiracy 
against Islam, in the form of Sunni Islam, was victorious and hijacked history. This con-
spiracy has been maintained by all later Sunni empires, including the Ottoman Empire and its 
policy towards Shi’as and Alawis. Having the power of definition, Sunni Islam’s terms of 
itself and others are those that all Muslims and non-Muslims alike use, hence the name of 
‘Those that follow the Tradition’ kept for themselves and the labelling of the minorities as 
deviating from this.  
Yet, the existence of the Sunni hegemony does not mean that Alawis are, by definition, 
rejected from Islam. Instead, it means that the hegemony constructs what is acceptable Islam 
and what is not. As long as Alawis adhere to the rules that are deemed to make a Muslim, they 
can define themselves as such.  
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The Islamic Discourse and the Critical Discourse 
In the face of the hegemony, therefore, Alawis have the option either to identify with its 
subject positions or to oppose them. Even though there are surely Alawis who choose 
identification in the interpellation of the Muslim identity, this is not the case among the 
Alawis I have spoken to. They oppose the hegemony, yet within the boundaries of the 
hegemony. This is anti-identification and means that they do not reject the hegemony as such, 
but instead try to improve their standing within the hegemony. This mode of resistance is very 
typical of the Islamic Discourse, which claims that there is no conflict between the message of 
Islam, as expressed through the Qur’an, and Alawi beliefs. By stressing the Qur’an’s role in 
Islam, they use the main tenet in Sunni Islam to undermine the logic of the more extreme 
elements in that community, which place great importance on later Islamic scholars. By criti-
cising these later additions, which they claim have become more holy than the Qur’an itself, 
they place themselves squarely within the heart of the Islamic tradition’s belief in peace, 
tolerance, and God as the only judge. Sunni Islam thus becomes a political project for the 
domination and suppression of all those who question their right to lead all Muslims. 
The anti-identification is also apparent in the Critical Discourse, which also fights the 
hegemony within its boundaries. However, there are also elements of disidentification in parts 
of this discourse in its rejection of acceptable Islam as a whole. As mentioned, this view is 
quite marginal among my sources, but there are those who place themselves outside the 
hegemony. They do not even try to make their views more acceptable in an Islamic 
perspective, essentially saying that they have the right to be both Muslims and Alawis 
regardless of what the Sunnis preach. They are more eager to define their sect on their own 
terms and draw on discourses other than the Islamic ones. This is why they willingly bring up 
pre-Islamic influences of Greek philosophy and do not see this as conflicting with calling 
themselves Muslim at the same time. This view finds the Islamic label an obstruction to their 
views because of what the hegemony defines as Islam. One of my sources therefore admits to 
wishing that the Alawis did not call themselves Muslims, which is the case with the Druze 
community in Israel (Landis 2003). Had this been the case, they would definitely have more 
freedom of definition, but at the same time been second-rate citizens in an Islamic Syria.  
The two discourses exist as hidden transcripts out of view from the dominant. Being 
threats to social stability, there is no arena for a discursive battle to take place and they are 
constructed in an oppositional manner only among Alawis. Concealment is therefore central 
to the Alawi hidden transcripts. Although the regime presents the most immediate threat in its 
ability to apply force behind its views, what is constructed as the biggest, yet more 
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hypothetical, threat is the Sunni community of Syria. The hegemony is so strict and the 
consequences for transgression so frightening that the Alawis guard themselves against 
possible futures. The role of the regime in this then becomes a defender of the Sunni 
hegemony in its institutionalisation of its dominance. This role increases the possible later 
danger because there is no room for open debate. A secular policy on the part of the regime 
would open the field to parts of the hidden transcript, at least the parts deemed most 
acceptable to the hegemony. 
From discourse to identity 
What do these discourses mean for Alawi identity? Discourses construct identities and 
identities are, as such, products of the discourses’ social construction of reality. When Alawi 
discourses are constructed as counter-discourses to the Sunni hegemony, this means that 
Alawi identity is constructed in the same way. What materialises from this are the two 
discourses presented above. However, on the level of collective identity, it is constructed in 
practice as a representation of ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ where the Sunnis nearly always constitute the 
group they define themselves in relation to. They are the Alawis’ constitutive outside and 
represent everything the Alawis are not. This constitutive outside is more than just non-Alawi; 
it is instead anti-Alawi. This defines the antagonism that is so apparent because it represents 
the blockage of identities. Through its existence, Sunni identity obstructs Alawi identity and 
hinders its closure. This, of course, works the same way for Sunni identity, where Alawis and 
other competing Islamic identities are anti-Sunni and block Sunni identity. The intervention of 
the Official Discourse was the reaction to this antagonism, but it was only successful on the 
surface. Now, the construction of Alawi identity takes place away from public view and in the 
form of hidden transcripts. 
What is special about Alawi identity, though, is the level of threat it feels from ‘Them’. 
Not only are the Sunnis intolerant and socially conservative, they also hate ‘Us’. This hatred 
is proven through the historical narrative, which centres on the traumatic experiences of 
persecution and massacres throughout centuries of Sunni rule. Its continued potency was 
proven in the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood and its use of rabid anti-Alawi and 
sectarian propaganda. Now that political Islam is again gaining strength all over the Arab 
world, including inside Syria manifest in the regular shoot-outs between militants and the 
armed forces, this only strengthens the fear and the resistance it creates. 
Fear thus guides Alawi identity to the extent that the Alawis have gone underground both 
in the concealment of their beliefs and even as a community. Historically, it has even led to 
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the involuntary assimilation of Alawis into Sunni communities because they have concealed 
their identity even from their own children. Yet, they now find themselves in the ironic 
position of supposedly being in power since key figures, including the president, are Alawis. 
This, however, only adds to the defensiveness Alawis feel because the Sunnis have gained yet 
another card, this time political, in their perceived hatred against them. A lot of the 
construction of Alawi identity consequently deals with refuting all the myths they believe 
other Syrians have of them. These mostly deal with how much the Alawis have enriched 
themselves as a sect because of their link to the regime. 
In conclusion 
Much research done on the Middle East is criticised for being too conflict oriented. The tone 
in this thesis is indeed one of conflict. This does not mean that the Alawi-Sunni relationship is 
necessarily only one of conflict. Alawi identity is not strong in the sense that it organises 
people’s everyday experiences or makes them act as a group. However, it is a fallback identity 
meaning that when people feel threatened, it becomes very important. On the surface, there is 
no conflict. Yet, the way Alawi identity is constructed shows that there is a deep-seated 
scepticism towards the Sunnis and their intentions in a different social order in the future.  
This is why some Alawis argue that they should open up completely and reveal everything 
about Alawi beliefs, come what may. This would at least set the stage for an open sectarian 
debate before it is too late and the myths about them decide the Sunnis’ reaction. This is of 
increasing importance now that the chasm between Sunni and Shi’a Islam is growing wider 
and more violent with the sectarian civil war in Iraq and its repercussions in other parts of the 
Middle East. This does not mean that Syria will be faced with similar problems, but should 
push come to shove, sectarian identities will be strong forces for political mobilisation, not to 
mention who is perceived as the enemy. 
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